Problems of Communism

MAY-JUNE 1987

Book Reviews

Walter Arnold
Vladimir Tismaneanu



SOVIET FOCUS ON THE PACIFIC

Hiroshi Kimura

Sino-Soviet Relations

Herbert J. Ellison

China's Leadership

Parris H. Chang

NOTES

Soviet Economic Interests in Afghanistan

M. Siddieq Noorzoy

Officer Education in the Chinese PLA

Lonnie D. Henley

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Problems of Communism

3

MAY-JUNE 1987 VOL XXXVI

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1 Soviet Focus on the Pacific
Hiroshi Kimura

17 Changing Sino-Soviet Relations
Herbert J. Ellison

30 China after Deng: Toward the 13th CCP Congress
Parris H. Chang

NOTES

43 Soviet Economic Interests in Afghanistan
by M. Siddieq Noorzoy

55 Officer Education in the Chinese PLA
by Lonnie D. Henley

BOOKS

72 "Recent Trends in Sino-Japanese Relations"
by Walter Arnold

78 Pitfalls of Détente
by Vladimir Tismaneanu

Cover: General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during his July 1986 visit to the Soviet port city of Vladivostok. Photo by APN via Gamma-Liaison.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Prob' s of Communism

Articles

Soviet Focus on the Pacific

Hiroshi Kimura

Unlike his predecessors, Mikhail Gorbachev is aware that Soviet military power alone does not translate into greater political influence in the Asia-Pacific region. His government is therefore embarking upon a multi-faceted engagement in Asia-Pacific affairs by proposing multilateral economic development efforts, collective security conferences, protection of the environment, and the like, even as it sustains Soviet military buildup in the region. There is a chance that flexible policies in the non-military spheres will gain greater—although by no means complete—acceptance for the USSR from the Asia-Pacific community of states.

Changing Sino-Soviet Relations

Herbert J. Ellison

Relations between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union today are considerably more cordial than during the Cultural Revolution, when Mao Zedong was reviling the Soviet Union for its revisionism and troops of the two communist powers clashed on their common border. Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and in the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border remain major but perhaps not insuperable obstacles to further Sino-Soviet reconciliation. The reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev and China's caution with regard to Western values, make for better mutual ideological understanding, although the national security interests of the two communist powers are likely to remain at odds.

China after Deng: Toward the 13th CCP Congress

Parris H. Chang

The factional struggle that has been pervasive in the Chinese Communist leadership since the death of Mao Zedong is becoming more pronounced again as the party prepares for its 13th Congress this autumn. At the beginning of the year, conservative forces seized on student demonstrations on behalf of democracy as a pretext for ousting Deng Xiaoping's heir apparent, Hu Yaobang. A campaign to combat "bourgeois liberalization," which attempted to counter the adverse effects of contact with the capitalist world, has been moderated by Dengist reformers, but the maneuvering continues over who will succeed Deng and thus shape China's future policy agenda.

Notes

Soviet Economic Interests in Afghanistan

M. Siddieq Noorzoy

Far from acting as a drain on the economy of the USSR, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan promises to advance long-term Soviet economic interests. The development and exploitation of Afghan natural gas exclusively for Soviet markets or Soviet client states is a good indication of this fundamental reality. The Afghan rural economy—of little import to the Soviet Union—is deemed dispensable and is being destroyed by a conscious policy of depopulation.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Officer Education in the Chinese PLA

Lonnie D. Henley

One of the "four modernizations" undertaken by the People's Republic of China is in the national defense area. China's leadership has come to recognize that its military officers need a college-level education and considerable technical training in order to master the advanced technology that China seeks for its armed forces. As a result, Beijing has taken major steps to overhaul the military school system in addition to streamlining and restructuring the People's Liberation Army.

Essay-reviews

Recent Trends in Sino-Japanese Relations

Walter Arnold

After weathering a major crisis in 1979–80, Sino-Japanese relations have stabilized in the past several years. Still, long-term prospects for growing political and economic interdependence have been clouded of late by rising anti-Japanese sentiment in China, a chain of trade problems, and disillusionment in the Japanese business community.

Pitfalls of Détente

Vladimir Tismaneanu

Even the severest critics of détente with the Soviet Union as it developed in the 1970's concede that there is no real alternative to entering into some basic agreements with that communist superpower. The West, however, must be careful to avoid illusions that détente is somehow an end in itself, and set itself instead the difficult task of negotiating agreements whose terms the Soviet Union would not only accept formally but also fulfill practically.

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Soviet Focus on the Pacific

Hiroshi Kimura

Western specialists have long assessed the Soviet Union's policy toward Asia and the Pacific as counterproductive. Owing to its heavy-handed, coercive approach to Asians, particularly East Asians, and its single-minded concentration upon the strengthening of its military forces, the Soviet Union has become increasingly the "odd man out" in the region.[1]

Has the accession of the relatively young, dynamic, and seemingly innovative Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the top decision-making position in the USSR, led to significant changes in the Soviet Union's Asia-Pacific policy? As in any other government, the policies of Gorbachev's government are bound to be a mixture of change and continuity. The real question is to what degree and in which fields Gorbachev is bringing about changes in policies toward Asia and the Pacific.[2]

This article will therefore attempt to (1) ascertain in which areas of Soviet relations with the Asia-Pacific region Gorbachev is pursuing the policies of his predecessors; (2) gauge the extent to which Gorbachev has made, or is ready to make, changes; (3) examine underlying reasons for change and continuity in Soviet policy; and (4) assess and evaluate the "mix" of change and continuity under Gorbachev.

Addressing these questions and tasks requires analyzing the public pronouncements of the Soviet leaders and their spokesmen. Four statements are particularly important for understanding Gorbachev's official position on Asia and the Pacific: Gorbachev's address at a banquet for Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Moscow on May 21, 1985; Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU Congress on February 25, 1986; the Statement of the Soviet Government on the Asia-Pacific region, published on April 24, 1986; and Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986.[3] Needless to say, these public pronouncements should be carefully examined in the context of what the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has actually been doing in the region.

Hiroshi Kimura is Professor of Political Science at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University. He was director of the Center from 1975 to 1977 and from 1985 to 1987. He has written widely on international relations and communist affairs. The present article is a revised version of the author's contribution to the Japan Review of International Affairs *(Tokyo).*

Self-Image and Bipolar Perception

There is no doubt that Gorbachev has made a strong claim that the Soviet Union is an Asian and Pacific power. His government's Statement, which underlies the new policy orientation toward the Asia-Pacific region, called the Soviet Union "one of the most important powers in Asia and the Pacific."[4] In his Vladivostok speech Gorbachev said again that "the Soviet Union is an Asian and Pacific country."[5]

The Soviet claim to be an Asian power is not new. Almost all Soviet leaders have represented their country as being not only a European but also an Asian state, differing only in their emphasis on one or the other. Many Soviet politicians, including the late Leonid Brezhnev,

[1]See Donald Zagoria, "The Soviet-American Rivalry in Asia," in Marshall Shulman, Ed., *East-West Tensions in the Third World,* New York, Norton, 1986, pp. 84, 88, 89; and Paul Dibb, "Soviet Capabilities, Interests and Strategies in East Asia in the 1980s," in Robert O'Neil, Ed., *Security in East Asia,* London, Gower, 1984, pp. 2–3.

[2]For a more detailed discussion of this question, see Hiroshi Kimura, "Gorbachevism—Simply Old Wine in a New Bottle," in Kinya Niiseki, Ed., *The Soviet Union in Transition,* Boulder, CO, Westview, to be published in 1987.

[3]On their importance, see Genrikh Apalin, "Peace and Security for the Asia-Pacific Region" *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow—henceforth *MZ*), No. 10, 1986, p.25.

[4]*Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 24, 1986.

[5]Ibid., July 29, 1986.

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

The Soviet aircraft carrier ***Minsk*** *in the Pacific.*

—TASS from Sovfoto.

have asserted that the Soviet Union deserves to be seen as a significant force in Asia, and have invariably cited Lenin's dictum that "geographically, economically, and historically Russia belongs not only to Europe but also to Asia."[6] Sergey Tikhvinskiy, a prominent Asia specialist and president of the Soviet Association of Historical Sciences has written: "The Soviet Union is an Asian power to the same extent as it is a European power."[7]

Beginning in the 1970's, the USSR started to define itself as a Pacific power, as well as an Asian power. This point was clearly made to Professor Osamu Miyoshi of Kyoto Industrial University at the third meeting of the Japanese-Soviet Conference on Security Affairs, held in Kyoto in 1976, when a Soviet delegate declared that the USSR was a "Pacific power."[8] At the eighth meeting of the same conference, held in Moscow in 1984, Oleg Bykov, a deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations and a member of the Soviet delegation, asked the Japanese delegation to drop from the meeting's final communiqué the phrase "the new Asia-Pacific era has come." Miyoshi surmises that this request was made after due deliberation and reflected the Soviet delegation's awareness that the Soviet Union was not a full-fledged member of the Asia-Pacific community, and hence its reluctance to admit that such an era had already begun.[9]

Gorbachev's reasons for claiming that the Soviet

[6]Vladimir Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* (Complete Collected Works), 5th ed., Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962, Vol. 30, p. 326.

[7]Sergey Tikhvinskiy, Ed., *Mezhdunarodnyye problemy Azii 80-kh godov* (International Problems of Asia in the 1980's), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1983, p.19.

[8]Osamu Miyoshi, "The Growth of Soviet Military Power and the Security of Japan," in Richard B. Forster et al, Eds., *Strategy and Security in Northeast Asia*, New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1979, p.78

[9]Osamu Miyoshi, "Japan-Soviet Relations in Transition: The Pacific Age Has Left the Soviets Behind," *Genronjin* (Tokyo), July 1984, p. 3.

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Union is an Asia-Pacific power are the same as those of his predecessors: he cites geographic, demographic, and other physical factors. In his Vladivostok speech Gorbachev said: "The Soviet Union is an Asian and Pacific country" because "a large part of our territory lies east of the Urals, in Asia, Siberia, and the Far East," and "this vast region's complex problems are close to those of the Soviet Union, touching it directly."[10] Similarly, Yevgeniy Kovrigin, a Soviet specialist on Asian and Pacific affairs, writes: "Our country is a great Pacific power" because "the 16,700 mile coastline of the Soviet Far East far exceeds the entire 14,225 mile coastline of the United States, including that of its Atlantic shore."[11] This geographical justification is no different from that used by earlier Soviet politicians and spokesmen, who stressed, to quote Brezhnev, that because "almost two-thirds of its territory is located on the Asian continent, the Soviet Union is an Asian power."[12]

To be sure, geographical and other physical factors are among the most important grounds on which any state makes claims to being a power in a given region. Yet such factors by themselves are not sufficient. What a country does in the region and how it is perceived and accepted there are equally if not more significant factors. Expressing the Soviet frustration at not being recognized by the United States as a full-fledged Pacific power, Kovrigin said: "Our country is a great Pacific power, although the US Department of State does not recognize the Soviet Union as a Pacific power."[13] But the United States is not alone in rejecting the Soviet claims of belonging to the Pacific community; other states are skeptical as well. One could say that perceptions in Asia of the Soviet Union since Gorbachev came to power have changed little and that the assessment of its position by Professor Gerald Segal of the University of Bristol in 1983 is still valid: "The Soviet Union is a power in Asia but is not an Asian power yet."[14]

The Soviet perception that the United States is its major adversary in the Asia-Pacific region has also remained unchanged under Gorbachev. It derives from the Soviet penchant of measuring influence in military terms. Because the United States possesses a military, and especially a nuclear, capability comparable to that of the Soviet Union, the USSR sees it as its primary competitor in Asia as elsewhere. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev seems determined to equal the superpower status of the United States both in the world as a whole and in specific regions. Gorbachev shows himself disinclined to tolerate a situation in which the US is regarded as number one while the USSR is treated as number two. To put it simply, just as President Ronald Reagan wants to build a "strong America," Mikhail Gorbachev wishes to create a "strong Soviet Union."

From the Soviet perspective, the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a general symbol of a "strong America" and a specific symbol of American scientific, technological, and industrial potential.[15] Professor Stephen Meyer of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has gone further: "For the Soviet Union, the US SDI programme is quickly becoming symbolic of a more fundamental challenge between states—or perhaps, between social systems—calling into contention the political, economic and industrial, scientific and technological, and military potentials of the super-powers."[16]

In his speeches to the 27th CPSU Congress and in Vladivostok, Gorbachev made it clear that the key concept in his defense and security policy is "genuine equal security" with the United States. In other words, the Soviet Union is not necessarily aiming at achieving military superiority over the United States, but it certainly will not accept a position of inferiority. Gorbachev clearly enunciated this position in his speech at the CPSU Congress: "The Soviet Union does not lay claim to greater security, but it will not settle for less."[17]

The Soviet Union under Gorbachev has consistently demonstrated its wish to deal largely, or even solely, with the United States, thus disregarding the realities of the Asian region in which four major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan—play a significant role. Indicative of the fact that by and large he still adheres to a bipolar rather

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[10]*Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

[11]Yevgeniy Kovrigin, *Protivorechiya i perspektivy formirovaniya "tikhookeanskogo soobshchestva"* (Contradictions and Prospects for the Formation of a "Pacific Community"), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1986, p.13.

[12]Leonid Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* (Following the Leninist Path), Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, Vol. 3, p. 492. See also A. Yosilevich, "Beijing and Security in Asia," *Aziya i Afrika segodniya* (Moscow), July 1976, p. 9; V. Mazurov, *SShA-Kitay-Yaponiya: perestroyka mezhgosudarstvennykh otnosheniy, 1969–1979* (USA-China-Japan: Restructuring Interstate Relationships, 1969–1979), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, p. 4; I. Kovalenko, *Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za mir i kollektivnuyu bezopasnost' v Azii* (The Soviet Union's Struggle for Peace and Collective Security in Asia), Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p. 4; V. Pavlovskiy, "Collective Security Is the Path to Peace in Asia," *MZ*, No. 6, 1972, p. 30; D. Petrov, Ed., *Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya v aziatsko-tikhookeanskom regione* (International Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, pp. 9, 16.

[13]Kovrigin, op. cit., p. 13.

[14]Gerald Segal, Ed., *The Soviet Union in East Asia: Predicaments of Power*, London, Heinemann, 1983, pp. 129–31.

[15]See "Why Moscow Fears Star Wars," *National Security Record: A Report on the Congress and National Security Affairs* (Washington, DC), No. 58, April 1985, p. 5.

[16]Stephen Meyer, "Soviet Views on SDI," *Survival* (London), No. 6, 1985, p. 290.

[17]*XXVII S"yezd Kommunisticheskiy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskiy otchet* (Stenographic Record of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 88, 90; *Pravda*, June 7, 1986.

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than a quadrilateral perception of Asia and the Pacific, Gorbachev underscored in his Vladivostok address the significance of the United States in the region: "We clearly take into account that the United States is a great Pacific power." Stating that it was absolutely necessary for the Soviet Union to deal directly with "such a great power," he continued, "There is no doubt that without the United States, without its participation, one cannot solve the problem of security and cooperation in the Pacific region zone in a manner satisfactory to all the states in the region."[18]

Chief Policy Target: China

On the whole, in the Asia-Pacific region the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has given top foreign-policy priority to its struggle with the United States. This should not be taken to mean, however, that the Soviet Union has not changed its perception of the power configuration in the region at all. While adhering to the traditional bipolar view of superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in Asia, Gorbachev has tended to place more importance than his predecessors on China and Japan. One reason for this change is Gorbachev's recognition that China and Japan may have tactical utility for the Soviet Union as it deals with its major adversary, the United States.

Particularly notable is the Gorbachev government's increased attention to China. To be sure, Moscow's efforts to improve relations with Beijing can be traced back to the last years of the Brezhnev regime. Following Brezhnev's appeal for Sino-Soviet rapprochement in a speech delivered in Tashkent in March 1982, the two countries began gradually to improve relations. This trend has continued under Brezhnev's three successors, Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and now Gorbachev.

Though contacts between the two states have improved markedly in the fields of economics, technology, culture, and sports, the political deadlock has continued, primarily because of what China terms the "three obstacles": (1) the concentration of Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia, (2) the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and (3) Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. Until Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok, there had been no sign of greater Soviet flexibility with respect to these three conditions. The Kremlin was extremely careful to avoid admitting any link between these "obstacles" and the state of the bilateral Sino-Soviet relationship, since the conditions primarily affect third countries. While paying lip service to China, Gorbachev hastened to add in his



US President Richard Nixon at the Great Wall during his 1972 visit to the People's Republic of China.

—Gamma-Liaison.

speech at the CPSU Congress that his government did not intend to seek cooperation with China if this was "detrimental to third countries."[19]

Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok touched for the first time on two of Beijing's three preconditions for the normalization of political relations with the Soviet Union when he pledged to withdraw "a substantial part" of the Soviet troops in Mongolia and "six Soviet regiments" (an estimated 6,000 troops) from Afghanistan. With regard to the long-standing dispute over the demarcation of the Sino-Soviet border along the Amur River, to the great surprise of outside observers, Gorbachev conceded for the first time that the official boundary should run along "the main channel of the river,"[20] as China had long insisted.

Ever since these proposals and statements were made public, analysts have debated whether and to

[18] *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.
[19] *XXVII S"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. 1, p. 95.
[20] *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

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what extent they represent any actual concessions to the Chinese. The official Chinese response, too, has been one of both interest and caution. While acknowledging that Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech contained some new elements, including concessions to China on the Sino-Soviet border issue, the Chinese have been very careful, at least on the surface, not to overestimate the Soviet overtures. More important, they give the appearance of being dissatisfied with the withdrawal of only six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan instead of a pullout of all Soviet troops. They also appear unhappy with Gorbachev's failure to bring up Soviet support for Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia, which they regard as the key issue standing in the way of normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. In an interview given to CBS Television, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping commented: "The main obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations is the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea." If Vietnam were to withdraw its troops from there, Deng went on, "I myself will be ready to meet him [Gorbachev] . . . go to any place in the Soviet Union . . . ."[21]

To judge the extent to which Gorbachev intends to meet China's conditions, it is necessary to look at what the Soviet Union has actually been doing in the three areas that Beijing considers obstacles. The USSR apparently did pull about 6,000 troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 1986 as Gorbachev had promised, although this constituted the removal of only a small part of the estimated total troop strength of 118,000.[22] And after the Afghan government proclaimed a six-month cease-fire in mid-January 1987, the Gorbachev government indicated that it intended to withdraw all Soviet troops,[23] provided help for the resistance fighters in Afghanistan ceased.

There are two views about these moves among Western specialists. One group believes that the Kremlin under Gorbachev is serious about a complete pullout from Afghanistan. Others do not rule out the possibility that the declared Soviet willingness to withdraw is nothing more than a propaganda ploy. Whatever the real Soviet intentions may be, the fact remains that as of mid-1987 no further pullout of troops has taken place, nor have Soviet troops stopped fighting. On the issue of Soviet troop reductions in Mongolia, the Soviet government in January 1987 announced the removal of one division (about 10,000 to 12,000 troops), also only a fraction of the estimated 65,000 Soviet troops in Mongolia.[24]

As for a Cambodian settlement, the biggest obstacle to Sino-Soviet rapprochement according to Deng, Gorbachev offered nothing new at Vladivostok, only stating categorically that "it is unacceptable to prolong its [Cambodia's] tragic past." Speaking as though the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the Cambodian conflict, Gorbachev said simply that "much here depends on the normalization of Chinese-Vietnamese relations."[25] Here again, as a guide to its policies, the Soviet Union's actions are more important than its pronouncements. In October 1986, Truong Chinh, chairman of the Council of State and general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, stressed that Soviet economic assistance might be reduced if it was not used more carefully and effectively. Subsequently, at the Sixth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1986, a major reshuffle of top leaders took place, with old hands being replaced by relatively young, reform-oriented leaders. The new Vietnamese leadership expressed its support for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Yegor Ligachev, who represented the Soviet leadership at the Vietnamese party congress, stated at a news conference that a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China would produce better relations between Vietnam and China as well. To be sure, Ligachev also revealed that the Soviet Union would provide Vietnam with 8–9 billion rubles (roughly US$11–13 billion at the official exchange rate) in aid from 1986 to 1990, or approximately $2 billion a year.[26] Nevertheless, one can sense that the Soviet Union is not altogether satisfied with what the Vietnamese leaders have been doing and wants to see some changes in their policy.

These developments seem to indicate that the Soviet Union wishes to improve relations with China and is even prodding "third" countries, such as Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Vietnam, to cooperate in achieving this objective. If this judgment is correct, the next question is what motivated the Gorbachev leadership to try to improve relations. Though nobody outside the Kremlin can reply with certainty, there appear to be several motives. As mentioned earlier, the Gorbachev government has begun to pay more attention to the role that China and Japan play in Asia and the Pacific. Gorbachev has recognized, though not yet fully, the futility of the Asia-Pacific policy of his predecessors—a policy that only served to push China and Japan closer to the United States. The new Soviet leader obviously realizes that it is necessary to improve relations with these two major Asian states in order to expand Soviet influence in the region.

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[21] *China Daily* (Beijing), Aug. 9, 1986.
[22] *The Military Balance: 1986–1987*, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986, p. 46.
[23] *Daily Yomiuri* (Tokyo), Jan. 17, 1987.
[24] *The Military Balance: 1986–1987*, p. 46.
[25] *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.
[26] *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), Jan. 4, 1987, p. 11.

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Soviet party secretary Yegor Ligachev (front row, second from right) attends the 6th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in Hanoi in December 1986; in the front row, from left to right, are: former VCP Politburo Member Le Duc Tho, General Secretary of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Heng Samrin, former VCP Politburo Member Pham Van Dong, Ligachev, and former VCP General Secretary Truong Chinh.

—Laurent Maillard/AFP.

The immediate target of Gorbachev's diplomatic offensive appears to be China, which in my judgment is more susceptible to Soviet overtures than Japan. First, China's underdeveloped economy requires cooperation and exchanges with the Soviet Union, while the advanced Japanese economy does not necessarily need to interact with that of the Soviet Union. Second, China's geographical position and hence its military vulnerability to the Soviet Union obliges Beijing to assume a conciliatory posture toward Moscow. Such considerations do not apply to the same degree to Japan, which is separated from the Soviet Union by sea and is protected by its security treaty with the United States.

Third, being a "socialist" country, China has commonalities with the Soviet Union that capitalist Japan does not. Fourth, since about 1982, China has been pursuing an "independent" foreign policy, which means it has not leaned excessively toward the US-led Western alliance, as it had tended to do in the 1970's. The Soviet Union can take advantage of this stance. In contrast, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has been moving closer to the Western defense alliance, leaving no opening for the Kremlin.

Fifth, Beijing's three conditions for Sino-Soviet reconciliation are not as rigid as they appear at first glance. The Soviets are well aware that these conditions do not necessarily constitute non-negotiable demands that the Chinese expect the Soviets to meet before any betterment of relations can take place. They are, rather, China's way of a signaling the West, especially the United States and Japan, that Sino-Soviet rapprochement will be of a limited nature. If China were to move very close to the Soviet Union, then the United States, Japan, and other Western countries might reconsider their current policies toward China, including their generous economic, financial, and technological assistance, which the Chinese need to achieve their "four modernizations" program.

Having this in mind, the Chinese pretend to be adamant on the three conditions, although they are in fact flexible. On the Cambodia issue, for example, all that the Chinese are asking at present is that the Soviets cease their military assistance to Vietnam, without which, according to the Chinese, the Vietnamese could not continue their aggression in Cambodia. In other words, China is no longer opposed to the Soviet Union's economic aid to Vietnam or to its continued use of the bases at Cam Ranh and Da Nang. The Chinese consider both to be bilateral matters between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, in which China cannot interfere.

In short, the USSR under Gorbachev appears to be placing a high priority on improving relations with China.

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One reason is the Soviet leader's recognition that past policy was counterproductive, because it pushed China toward the West. To improve relations with China, Gorbachev needs to make some concessions on the three obstacles, but China cannot be too inflexible either, because it needs a peaceful external environment if it is to achieve its modernization program. In my opinion, Sino-Soviet relations will improve gradually and incrementally despite the obstacles, although the rapprochement will be limited. China does not want to risk the economic and technological assistance that it acquires from the United States, Japan, and the West as a whole.

Dilemma of Policy toward Japan

Like his predecessors, Gorbachev faces a serious dilemma in Soviet policy toward Japan. The Soviet Union needs sophisticated economic management, know-how, and technology from Japan more than ever before. In spite of this, the Gorbachev government is not yet ready to pay the price: concessions on the issue of what the Japanese call the "Northern Territories," four Soviet-occupied islands that Japan insists are its own. When Gorbachev took power, he appeared to underestimate this dilemma, mistakenly thinking he could somehow manage to obtain what Moscow wanted from Japan without making any political concessions in return. However, he seems to have changed his mind in the course of the two years that he has been in office.

The Soviet inclination to pay more attention to its policy toward Japan is quite evident since Gorbachev came to power. Soviet newspapers, calling Japan "the land of the rising sun,"[27] have carried numerous articles underscoring the Soviets' need to "learn from the Japanese people's unique capability to creatively master technology."[28] In his Vladivostok speech Gorbachev called Japan "a power of top-level significance."[29] It appears that his government's assertion that it gives high priority to improving relations with Japan is not simply talk.[30] One indication was Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in January 1986. This was the first such visit by a Soviet foreign minister since Andrey Gromyko came to Japan in 1976. More unusual even, the Soviet Union invited Shintaro Abe, Japan's foreign minister at that time, to Moscow in late May of the same year. Gorbachev himself took time to receive the Japanese foreign minister at the Kremlin. At meetings between the two countries' foreign ministers, understandings were reached—with somewhat baffling rapidity—about concluding a whole series of agreements on long-standing issues, including a trade payment agreement, a tax agreement, an agreement concerning cultural exchanges, Japanese visits to family graves in the Northern Territories, and the reactivation of the Japan-Soviet Scientific and Technological Cooperation Committee.

Discussion of a visit to Japan by Gorbachev also proceeded with surprising speed. While over the past 41 years, Japanese prime ministers have visited the Soviet Union on four occasions (among these, the funerals of Soviet leaders), not one Soviet top leader had expressed a desire to visit Japan despite repeated invitations from Japan. The Japanese naturally assumed that Gorbachev, too, would be reluctant, but the Soviet Union has been extremely receptive to the idea of a visit. A succession of high Soviet government officials have endorsed the proposed visit, leading to increased speculation that a visit is a virtual certainty.

Gorbachev himself, although he was recuperating from an illness, chose to meet a Japanese Communist Party delegation headed by the Secretary General Tetsuzo Fuwa and candidly stated that his visit to Japan "is not only a hope but a necessity."[31] Although Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo did not materialize in January 1987, the time hoped for by the Japanese government, the Soviet government has not cancelled the plan but has continued to assure Tokyo that a visit will take place sometime in the near future.

If the visit occurs, it will be historic in a number of ways. The events mentioned above,such as Shevardnadze's visit to Japan and Japanese visits to grave sites in the Northern Territories, either have precedents or have been under serious consideration for many years. But a visit to Japan by the Soviet Union's highest leader is unprecedented in postwar Japanese-Soviet relations. For the Soviet Union, this would undoubtedly be a decisive diplomatic action, and one based on well-defined objectives. Thus, it is necessary to address the question why Gorbachev, relatively soon after his accession to power, decided to go to Japan. What was behind this decision? An understanding of Gorbachev's reasons is

[27] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 28, 1985; *Pravda*, Apr. 3, 1985, and Jan. 12, 1986; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Jan. 10, 1986.

[28] *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 1, 1985.

[29] *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

[30] On the first day of the fifth Japanese-Soviet high-level working consultations, which began on September 5, 1985, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa explained the policy of the Gorbachev government as follows: "The Soviet Union's new leadership puts emphasis on relations with Japan and is seriously thinking about an improvement in relations" (*Nihon Keizai Shimbun* [Tokyo], Sept. 6, 1985). *Pravda* political commentator Vsevolod Ovchinnikov expressed a similar opinion (*Yomiuri Shimbun* [Tokyo], Jan. 8, 1986). On July 11, 1986, Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo Nikolay Solov'yev, while chatting with Prime Minister Nakasone during a courtesy call upon assuming his post, stated, "Japan is a great country, and the Soviet government pays great attention to Japan" (*Sankei Shimbun* [Tokyo] and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 12, 1986).

[31] *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Aug. 12, 1986.

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

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze meets with his Japanese counterpart Shintaro Abe at the beginning of talks in Tokyo on January 15, 1986.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

likely to shed light on the way in which internal and external policy is made, including policy toward Japan. I shall limit my discussion to three main points.

Arguably, the primary reason for Gorbachev's emphasis on Japan is that he has no alternative. Faced with severe domestic problems and mounting difficulties abroad, the Soviet Union can no longer afford to disregard Japan. While this does not necessarily presage a change in basic policy toward Japan, it does at least point to a change in approach and strategy.

The second reason is recognition that past policy toward Japan has not been successful. Indeed, Western specialists consider the Kremlin's traditional policies toward Asia, and especially toward Japan, to have been quite disastrous. A good example is the fact that by strengthening Soviet military forces in the vicinity of Japan the Soviet Union has heightened anti-Soviet feeling among the Japanese people and fueled fears of the "Soviet threat," so that in effect the Soviet Union itself has caused Japan to increase its defense efforts.

In line with arguments put forward by George Breslauer,[32] I have for some time pointed to the possibility that an able and enlightened leader of the Soviet empire would come to power.[33] Whether Gorbachev is this sort of far-sighted leader I cannot yet judge. He does seem

[32]See George Breslauer, *Five Images of the Soviet Future: A Critical Review and Synthesis*, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978, pp. 27, 75.

[33]Hiroshi Kimura et al., *Gyakusetsu no Soren-Keizati teitai, gunkaku, to Nihon no anzen hosho* (The Paradoxical Soviet Union: Economic Stagnation, Military Expansion, and Japan's Security), Tokyo, Ningen no Kagakusha, 1985, p. 121.

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to be a leader who largely understands that traditional Soviet policies have helped place the Soviet Union in its present predicament. Of course, the fact that he understands the gravity of the situation does not necessarily mean that he can come up with the correct prescriptions to remedy it, or that he will have the courage and ability to implement such prescriptions. Nevertheless, it would be dangerous to dismiss Gorbachev as just one more Soviet leader whose primary preoccupation is to maintain the status quo.

The third reason for Gorbachev's emphasis on Japan has to do with tactical considerations. It may be that Gorbachev does not really place much weight on Japan but believes nevertheless that a diplomatic pretense of doing so could be advantageous in order to lessen the anti-Soviet feeling prevalent among the Japanese. Or it may be that he thinks that there is no need, or even perhaps no way, to change the substance or goals of Soviet policy toward Japan but calculates that paying attention to such things as protocol and style—which can be changed—might create the appearance of substantive changes and enable the Soviets to deal more effectively with the Japanese.

The strong anti-Soviet feeling among the Japanese seems to me to stem mainly from three causes. The first, needless to say, is the Soviets' occupation of the Northern Territories. The second is the deployment of Soviet military forces on these islands. The last, but not least, is the heavy-handed way in which Soviet authorities have dealt with Japan. In many cases, Soviet behavior toward them has rubbed the Japanese the wrong way. Recall, for example the 1976 defection to Japan of a Soviet MiG–25 pilot with his plane and the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983. In both cases, the Soviets refused to accept any culpability; moreover, in the first instance they demanded compensation from Japan, while in the the second instance, they refused to pay any compensation and tried to shift the onus of guilt onto the United States and Japan.

Elsewhere, I have predicted that the advent of a Soviet leader who is truly astute would one day cause Soviet behavior patterns to become more subtle and sophisticated, even if they still might not reach international standards.[34] It seems to me that with Gorbachev's accession this prediction has been fulfilled. For example, although the government's treatment of the Chernobyl' nuclear reactor accident of April 1986 fell short of what might have been expected from Western democracies, and was not dramatically different from Soviet behavior following the KAL 007 incident, there was nevertheless a definite change for the better.

What of the Soviet occupation of the Northern Territories and the military buildup there, which are the two substantive problems that have given rise to deep anti-Soviet feeling among the Japanese people? The present Soviet government does not deny that Japan considers ownership of these islands to be a controversial issue. This itself is a change for the better. However, since the Gorbachev government has not budged from its basic stance that the problem has already been solved, this may be nothing more than a tactical change designed to soothe Japanese sensitivities. With regard to the problem of the military buildup on the islands, no one has so far been able to discern any change in the Gorbachev government's attitude and policy from those of its predecessors.

As noted above, it is clear that the Soviet Union is adopting a stance indicative of greater emphasis on and even respect for Japan, and there is no doubt that it wants to improve Japanese-Soviet relations. However, it is also clear that Japan requires the return of the Northern Territories before any true improvement in relations can take place. Given the Russian national character and territorial views derived from historical tradition, as well as the Soviet perception of its military and strategic position in the global confrontation with the United States, returning the Northern Territories is a condition that may be difficult to meet even for Gorbachev. His policy toward Japan must necessarily be shaped by these inherent constraints. It will likely consist of trying to improve relations with Japan without relinquishing the Northern Territories. The Soviets, at least for the time being, are prepared to make almost any concession short of showing a willingness to return these four islands. Japan cannot accept this policy.

In an attempt to deal with this standoff, Gorbachev's strategy is to hold out hope that improved Japanese relations with the Soviet Union will eventually lead to the return of the Northern Territories. Such events as the above-mentioned meetings of Japanese and Soviet foreign ministers, Japanese visits to grave sites in the Northern Territories, and reciprocal state visits by the Japanese and Soviet heads of government can be interpreted as forming a part of this approach. Fortunately for the Soviet Union, there are in Japan a number of people who support the so-called exit theory with respect to the Northern Territories and see territorial return as a goal to be reached as a consequence of improved relations. More skeptical Japanese, however, suspect that Gorbachev is deliberately making misleading gestures to create the appearance that things are in fact moving smoothly in that direction.

In any case, Gorbachev's strategy of postponing the

[34]Ibid.; also Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Challenge," *Trialogue* (New York), No. 37, Fall 1983, p. 19.

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return of the Northern Territories to the indefinite future while the Soviet Union takes advantage of improved relations with Japan to reconstruct the sluggish Soviet economy and strengthen the Soviet Union's international military and political position, will no doubt eventually lose its appeal for the Japanese. Excitement over the possibility of a Gorbachev visit, like the earlier excitement over the impending visit by Deng Xiaoping, will probably not have a lasting impact on Japanese public opinion; the Japanese are quick to warm up but also quick to cool down.

In light of the enthusiasm that was generated in Japan in the fall of 1986 for Gorbachev's scheduled January visit and the extensive publicity the visit received in the Soviet Union during the same period, it is surprising that Tokyo and Moscow agreed the visit was not feasible on the date planned. What were the reasons for the postponement? Undoubtedly, the course of the US-Soviet "presummit" at Reykjavik in October 1986 was one factor. A second factor may be that the Gorbachev government has decided not to deal with current Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who is a lame duck with no hope of being reelected in the fall of 1987. Finally, Gorbachev may have deferred the visit due to a pragmatic diplomatic calculation. It is conceivable that realists like Nikolay Solov'yev, a Japan specialist and the newly appointed ambassador to Tokyo, advised Gorbachev to make a more sober calculation of the costs and benefits of going to Tokyo, arguing that the visit risked causing disappointment and disillusionment among the Japanese, if the Soviet leader went to Japan without bringing any "souvenir" or "gift."

Whatever the reason, it is almost certain that for the Soviet Union, Japan is currently much harder to deal with than China, though one might be tempted to think the opposite. Japan's chief condition for good relations—the return of the Northern Territories—is more difficult for the Soviet Union to meet than are China's three conditions. Moreover, in bilateral relations the correlation of forces between the two states matters more than the appearance of toughness. It is my judgment that the Soviet Union needs Japan technologically, economically, and hence diplomatically, but that Japan can get along without the Soviet Union as long as its security is assured. Simply put, Japan does not need the USSR as much as China does.

Continuity and Change in the Pacific

Western Kremlin watchers have observed that in recent years, particularly since Brezhnev's death in November 1982, the Soviet Union has been reassessing its policy toward the Third World. Some observers have noted that Gorbachev's foreign policy has tended to place less emphasis on the Third World than that of his predecessors.[35] If this is indeed the case, then the reassessment will also have an impact on Soviet policy in the Asia-Pacific region. To judge whether the Soviet Union has adopted a new approach, two documents issued under Gorbachev merit attention: the new party program and his speech to the 27th CPSU Congress.

The party program states that "socialist-oriented" governments, such as those in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, which came to power with the help of the Soviet Union and its allies in the 1970's, must create the material and technical base necessary for building a new society "mainly through their own efforts." The Soviet Union will provide economic aid and military training and assistance only "to the extent of its abilities."[36]

Gorbachev's address to the CPSU Congress also deemphasized the Third World. This becomes very evident when his speech is compared with Brezhnev's address to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981. Brezhnev devoted an entire section to the Soviet Union's relations with the "newly liberated nations," while Gorbachev's brief references to the Third World were almost exclusively about Afghanistan.[37] Moreover, when Gorbachev spoke of Afghanistan, he was speaking not of a Third World country but of a country that is contiguous to the Soviet Union and hence strategically important. Brezhnev spoke of other countries with which the Soviet Union has concluded friendship treaties, such as Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. Gorbachev completely ignored these countries, the treaties, and their ongoing revolutionary struggles. Brezhnev commented on the economic aid rendered by the Soviet Union to developing countries and on Soviet "help to strengthen the defense capability of liberated states"; Gorbachev was silent on both points.[38]

There seem to be two schools of thought among Western observers about Gorbachev's policy toward the Third World. One school, believing that Gorbachev has changed Soviet policy toward the Third World, un-

[35]See Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1986, pp. 715–31.

[36]*Programma Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p. 65.

[37]*XXVII S"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza,* Vol. 1, p. 92; *XXVI S"yezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskiy otchet* (Stenographic Record of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, Vol. 1, pp. 28–33.

[38]See Alvin Rubinstein, "A Third World Policy Waits for Gorbachev," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1986, p. 358.

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derscores the Soviet Union's deliberate, self-imposed restraint. It surmises that Soviet leaders, particularly Gorbachev, have begun to reconsider the political and economic costs of Soviet engagement in the Third World.[39] They argue that the Soviets cannot be indifferent about the cost of the protracted war in Afghanistan. They point out that as Gorbachev is required to devote resources needed for his economic restructuring to the war in Afghanistan, he must wonder why the Soviet Union keeps pouring out huge amounts of economic aid for ungrateful and ineffective regimes in developing nations.

The second school of thought argues that Soviet quiescence in the Third World is more correctly explained by objective necessity, that is, by a lack of opportunities, rather than by self-imposed restraint.[40] Brezhnev's Soviet Union did not expect its invasion of Afghanistan to evoke such a strong Western reaction, including the economic and other sanctions imposed by the United States during the Carter Administration. The Soviet Union under Gorbachev must take into consideration President Ronald Reagan's even stronger reaction to Soviet ventures into the Third World. Regarding the Soviet Union's desire to expand its influence throughout the world as an "inherent propensity," the second school predicts that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev will not hesitate to expand again in the Third World "whenever the opportunity presents itself."[41]

In short, whereas the first school of thought is inclined to think that Gorbachev may have changed Soviet policy toward the Third World, the second school tends to conclude that he has not. Whichever school may be correct with regard to the Soviet Union's future conduct, as far as Gorbachev's present policy toward the Third World is concerned, the assessment of Francis Fukuyama seems to me closest to the mark. He argues that the Soviet Union is concentrating on consolidating past gains in the Third World rather than taking on costly new commitments.[42]

Vietnam and ASEAN. With respect to Southeast Asia in particular, it will be useful to discuss Gorbachev's policy toward Vietnam, the principal antagonist to the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), before examining Soviet policy toward the countries in that organization. Moscow's Vietnam policy is determined by many factors: the global confrontation with the United States, regional rivalry with China, bilateral relations with the countries of Indochina and ASEAN, and so forth. While I cannot discuss all these and other determinants, as well as the complicated dynamics of the mutually related actions and reactions, one interesting question I wish to examine here is the balance that the Soviet Union seeks to maintain as it tries to improve relations with China and to maintain good relations with Vietnam. To see how hard it is for the Soviet Union to balance these two objectives, let us review the role that Vietnam and China play in the Soviet Union's Asian policy.

Vietnam's value for the Soviet Union is considerable. Although the strategic value to the Soviet Union of its bases at Cam Ranh and Da Nang is not as great as that of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines to the United States, Cam Ranh is the largest Soviet forward-deployment naval base outside the Soviet Union. It has, however, been argued that the military and strategic value of Cam Ranh and Da Nang are greater in peacetime than in wartime. Thus, Vietnam's value to the Soviet Union cannot be assessed in military terms alone. Its military and strategic value is reinforced by its political, diplomatic, and ideological value. No matter how hard the Soviet Union has tried to present itself as an Asian and a Pacific power, geographic propinquity has not sufficed to substantiate such a claim. Actual presence in and control over one or more regional actors are important additional factors. Vietnam not only demonstrates the validity of Marxism-Leninism in the Third World, but it also serves as a symbol of the Soviet foothold in Southeast Asia; without ties to Vietnam, the Soviet Union's claim to be an Asian power would be greatly weakened.[43]

On the other hand, as pointed out by Professor Leszek Buszynski of the National University of Singapore, the acquisition of Vietnam as an ally has had a detrimental impact upon Soviet Asian policy, particularly because Soviet backing of Vietnam's aggressive stance in Cambodia has become the target of severe criticism from many countries. One of the major costs to the Soviet Union of its alliance with Vietnam is the alienation of ASEAN. The Soviet commitment to Vietnam has also brought about a renewed US involvement in this part of Asia. In addition, Vietnam's aggression in Cambodia and conflict with China have hampered Soviet efforts to improve relations with China.

The military and economic aid that the Soviet Union provides to Vietnam is also a considerable drain on the Soviet economy.[44] Moreover, there are a number of

[39]See Dmitri Simes, "The Domestic Environment of Soviet Policy Making," in Arnold L. Horelick, Ed., *US-Soviet Relations: The Next Phase*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 157.

[40]See Francis Fukuyama, "US-Soviet Interactions in the Third World," in Horelick, op. cit., p. 207.

[41]Alvin Rubinstein concludes that "to date, continuity of his predecessors' policy, rather than change, has been the hallmark of Gorbachev's approach to the Third World" (Rubinstein, loc. cit., p. 363).

[42]Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," loc. cit., p. 716.

[43]See Leszek Buszynski, *Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986, pp. 115, 179, 248.

[44]Ibid., pp. 248–49.

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actual and potential strains in the marriage between Moscow and Hanoi, which is merely a "marriage of convenience." According to Donald Zagoria and Sheldon Simon, differences between the Soviet Union and Vietnam arise over five issues: the quantity and quality of Soviet economic aid, Vietnamese economic planning, control over Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam's regional objectives versus Moscow's global objectives, and Vietnamese resentment of Soviet efforts to dominate their country.[45]

As the Soviet Union has admitted, ASEAN is a far more important part of Southeast Asia in terms of both territory and population, (61.9 percent and 71.4 percent respectively,) than Indochina, (15.1 percent and 18.4 percent respectively).[46] The Soviet perception and attitude with regard to ASEAN—and therefore Soviet policy and strategy toward the members of the association—have undergone changes since ASEAN's formation in 1967. Recently, the Soviet Union has made a consistent effort to reduce ASEAN's antagonism toward Indochina and itself. Although in general the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has paid relatively little attention to the Third World, greater efforts to woo the ASEAN member states have become more evident.

In his speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev deliberately underscored only the "plus" side of ASEAN, saying that "there is much of positive value in the activity of ASEAN and in bilateral contacts [with its members]." He continued: "We are ready to expand our ties with Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore."[47] Reiterating the Soviet interpretation of the conflict between ASEAN and Indochina as neither "inherent" in nature, nor "historically deep-rooted," but a "product" created and foisted on the region by Western imperialist powers,[48] Gorbachev stated: "In our opinion there are no insurmountable obstacles to the establishment of mutually acceptable relations between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN. Given good will and conditions of non-interference, they could in time settle their problems for the good of Asian security as a whole."[49] However, this is easier said than done. Shevardnadze's tour of the Southeast Asian countries in March 1987 illustrated that, so far, the Soviet Union has introduced more rhetorical than substantive changes in its policies toward ASEAN states.

All-Asian security conference. The political, diplomatic, and military picture in Asia and the Pacific is far more complicated than it is in Europe. In Europe, there is a relatively simple and clear-cut demarcation between two opposed blocs, the Warsaw Pact, headed by the Soviet Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, led by the United States. With a few minor exceptions, Western Europe is collectively opposed to Eastern Europe.

The power configuration in the Asia-Pacific region is much more complicated. To begin with, the interests of four major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan—converge, conflict, and sometimes clash. What is more, relations between the two communist giants are very delicate and constantly in flux. The presence of two divided nations—China and Korea—is another complicating factor. The divergence in economic development among the states of the region is quite large. The region contains the most advanced countries, such as the United States and Japan; the newly industrializing economies, such as those of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan; the developing ASEAN countries, among which there are also varied levels of affluence; South Pacific island nations that have just begun developing; and many more. Given this complexity and diversity, it is thought very difficult, if not impossible, to grapple with the issue of regional collective security. Some observers even conclude that "Asia is better off without any form of collective organization on the security issue."[50]

Gorbachev appears to appreciate the complexities of the Asia and Pacific region far better than his predecessors. His Vladivostok speech described the region as follows: "Every country has its own social and political order with all the conceivable shades, its own traditions, achievements and difficulties, its own way of life and beliefs, convictions and prejudices, its own understanding of spiritual and material values. This impressive diversity calls for due attention, study, and respect." Stressing that it is necessary for the Soviet Union to formulate its approach and policies in the Asia-Pacific region in full accordance with the realities stemming from "such varied states and peoples," the Soviet leader proclaimed that "our approach to that part of the world is based on recognition and understanding of the realities existing there."[51]

[45]See Donald Zagoria and Sheldon Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," in Donald Zagoria, Ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1982, p. 165. Buszynski points out three areas of discrepancy between the Soviet Union and Vietnam in regard to foreign policy—ASEAN, China, and Cambodia (see Buszynski, *Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia*, pp. 189–202).

[46]See M. Khaldon, *ASEAN bez illuzii* (ASEAN Without Illusion), Moscow, Mysl', 1985, p. 64.

[47]*Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

[48]See I. Plekhanov and A. Rogozhin, *Ekonomika i politika ASEAN* (Economics and Politics of ASEAN), Moscow, Mysl', 1985, p. 64.

[49]*Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

[50]Swadesh De Roy, "Collectivity Not for Asia," *Daily Yomiuri*, Dec. 22, 1986.

[51]*Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

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In marked contrast to this new, and seemingly realistic, perception of the complexities of the Asia-Pacific situation, Gorbachev's actual proposals vis-à-vis the region prove to be little different from those of his predecessors. A case in point is the suggestion, made in his Vladivostok speech, to convene an all-Pacific conference on security. Gorbachev's proposal closely resembles Brezhnev's concept of an Asian collective security system, first broached in 1969.[52] Greeted with indifference, coolness, and even suspicion in Asia, the idea of establishing an Asian collective security system has been quietly dropped.[53] The Kremlin shifted to the strategy of drawing up a number of selective bilateral treaty arrangements with Asian states as building blocks for an edifice of collective security embracing all the states in that part of the globe.

Gorbachev's proposal, like Brezhnev's scheme, betrays a tendency to apply to Asia the European collective security system agreed upon at Helsinki in 1975. The underlying principles of Brezhnev's proposal for an Asian collective security system were (1) renunciation of the use of force, (2) respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders, (3) nonintervention in internal affairs, and (4) the broad development of economic and other forms of cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit.[54] These principles are almost identical to those incorporated into the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975.

Gorbachev first suggested a conference on security in which all Asian countries would participate in his speech welcoming Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Moscow on May 21, 1985: "Is it not advisable, considering Europe's experience, to think of a common, comprehensive approach to the problem of security in Asia?"[55] In his Vladivostok speech, he referred again to the European system: "We would propose a Pacific conference along the lines of the Helsinki conference."[56] The above-quoted sentences reveal that, like Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, Gorbachev also naïvely believes that he can apply with equal effect to the vastly different situations in Asia the policies, methods, and tactics that were successful in Europe.

Objecting to this criticism, the Soviet analyst Genrikh Apalin has argued that "no one is trying to mechanically transplant the experience of Europe to Asia" and that in any case it is wrong to distinguish sharply between Asia and Europe in efforts to maintain peace and stability. He offers four points in defense of his view: (1) what the Soviet Union proposes to apply from Helsinki is "not a dogmatic pattern but a principle, an approach" to the problem of ensuring and furthering peace and cooperation in the region; (2) the European agreement at Helsinki incorporated earlier experiences and principles, including some initiated in Asia; (3) in today's world of interdependence it is wrong to decouple one region of the globe from others. The principles of sovereignty and of non-use of force are applicable irrespective of geographic location; (4) Asia has an obligation to contribute to solutions of global significance.[57]

Military presence and economic flexibility. Gorbachev's policy toward the Asia-Pacific region is marked by a combination of change in economic policy and continuity in military and security policies. Though the Soviet Union has begun to demonstrate an unusual degree of flexibility in economic affairs, it has maintained its traditional policy of incessantly strengthening its military power. When criticizing the "anti-Soviet military alliance" of the United States, Japan, and South Korea, Gorbachev is not different from his predecessors. In his Vladivostok speech, for example, he declared: "Since the second half of the 1970's, the United States has undertaken large-scale measures to increase military forces in the Pacific. It is under its pressure that the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military triangle is taking shape."[58] During a dinner for visiting North Korean President Kim Il-song in October 1986, Gorbachev reiterated his concern over the possible creation of an "eastern NATO," made up of the United States, Japan, and South Korea.[59]

While severely criticizing the security arrangements of the United States and its allies, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has not hesitated to build up its own military capabilities and those of its allies in Asia. The increase in SS–20 mobile intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed east of the Urals provides a good example. As of this writing, the number of SS–20 missiles deployed in Asia was 171 (each equipped with three nuclear warheads), a number that has grown from one-third to two-fifths of the the total number of such weapons deployed throughout the USSR. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev did propose reducing the number of SS–20's in Asia to 100. On July 22, 1987, in an interview given to the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka*, Gorbachev proposed a "global double zero option," thereby expressing his readiness to remove all Soviet INF missiles from Asia as well. If this offer is unconditional, then it would represent a highly significant development.

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[52]Ibid., June 8, 1969.
[53]See Robert Scalapino, "The Political Influence of the USSR in Asia," in Zagoria, op. cit., p. 87.
[54]*Pravda*, Mar. 21, 1972.
[55]Ibid., May 22, 1985.
[56]Ibid., July 29, 1986.
[57]Apalin, loc. cit., p. 25.
[58]*Pravda*, July 29, 1986.
[59]Ibid., Oct. 24, 1986.

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It hardly needs saying that the Soviet military presence at and use of both Cam Ranh and Da Nang in Vietnam has been steadily growing. Furthermore, it became evident in July 1985, a few months after Gorbachev's accession, that the Soviet Union was providing North Korea with substantial military assistance, including MiG–23 fighters, of which a total of 50 has been committed. Since the principal North Korean fighter was previously the MiG–21, this new assistance has upgraded North Korea's air force capability considerably, the stated purpose being to counter the US F–16's stationed in South Korea.[60] According to Amos Jordan, the decision to provide the fighters was made by none other than Gorbachev himself.[61] In exchange for this and other military assistance, the Soviet Union seems to have obtained from North Korea overflight rights, which allow it to shorten the transit time for Soviet aircraft deployed at bases in Vietnam and to mount surveillance flights off China and Japan. Soviet naval vessels have also gained access to North Korean ports.

Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union has continued not only to expand its military power but also to exert diplomatic pressure through its increased military muscle. The Soviet proposal to Japan of "confidence-building measures" is an example. Japan does not want to conclude any treaty or agreement with the Soviet Union until the territorial question is settled in a peace treaty. With the aim of shelving the peace treaty and hence the territorial issue, the Soviet Union has been proposing a treaty or agreement that could serve as a substitute.[62] Frustrated by Japan's negative reaction, the Gorbachev government threatened Japan. An article in *Pravda* stated that if Japan did not seriously consider the Soviet proposal, the security of Japan's sea lanes would be at risk. *Pravda* warned: "Japan depends greatly upon imported resources. Accordingly, Japan must be well aware that escalation of the arms race in sea lanes of communication only increases Japan's vulnerability. The Soviet Union is ready to apply the proposed confidence-building measures to such sea lanes as the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Japan's acceptance of the Soviet proposal will coincide well with Japan's vital interests."[63]

Even if the Soviet Union under Gorbachev is largely staying on its former track with regard to security issues, its conduct in economic foreign relations is very flexible and promises to become the most innovative aspect of Soviet policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. Gorbachev has made no secret of the fact that he sees his major task as rev talizing the sluggish Soviet economy. For this reason he has been demonstrating a willingness to undertake all kinds of measures short of abandoning the Soviet model of socialism. Recently, the Soviet Union has made approaches to international economic organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), and Gorbachev has declared that the Soviet Union wishes to participate in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.[64] The Soviet Union has also introduced laws allowing for the establishment of joint ventures with Japan and with other advanced capitalist countries. Gorbachev has even indicated that his government would be ready to "open up" Vladivostok—currently a completely closed naval port—"for visits by foreigners" and as "a major international center for trade and culture."[65]

Abandoning its long-standing antagonistic stance to the former Japanese Prime Minister Masayashi Ohira's concept of Pacific Basin cooperation, on the grounds that such cooperation might lead to the formation of a new military bloc,[66] the Soviet Union has now expressed its readiness to participate in the economic aspects of the concept. The Soviet government's Statement on the Asia-Pacific region, which formed the basis of a new Soviet policy orientation toward the region, surprised Western observers with its frequent use of such terms as "joint work," "division of labor," and "exchange." The term "cooperation," which was mentioned seven times, is used in conjunction with such fields as economics, trade, science, technology, and information. For instance, the statement says: "The Soviet Union proposes to start an extensive exchange of views among all the countries concerned in the region on the question of equal, mutually beneficial, smooth cooperation in the fields of trade, economics, technology, science and culture." The Soviet Union is "ready to participate actively in such regional cooperation," which "is promoted, regardless of differences in social systems . . . under circumstances of enhanced interdependence among nations."[67]

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[60]Richard Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, Eds., *The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security*, Dover MA, Auburn House, 1986, p 64.

[61]*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 6, 1985.

[62]See Hiroshi Kimura, "The Soviet Proposal on Confidence-Building Measures and the Japanese Response," in Joshua Katz and Tilly C. Friedman-Lichtschein, Eds., *Japan's New World Role*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1985, pp. 81–104.

[63]*Pravda*, June 22, 1985.

[64]*Daily Yomiuri*, Aug. 22 and Sept. 5, 1986; *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Aug. 26, 1986.

[65]*Pravda*, July 29, 1985.

[66]See Hiroshi Kimura, "The Impact of the Afghanistan Invasion on Japanese-Soviet Relations," in Roger Kanet, Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy and East-West Relations*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1982, pp. 154–58.

[67]*Pravda*, Apr. 24, 1986.

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Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his wife visit Vladivostok's trade center "Okean" (Ocean) in July 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Observers were also struck by the statement's resemblance to the report issued by the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, an advisory group to Prime Minister Ohira, in May 1980.[68] As the chart on page 16 shows, seven of the nine proposals in the Soviet statement duplicate proposals in the study group's report. The Soviet Union also stunned the Japanese and others in July 1986 by expressing a wish to send observers to the PECC meeting to be held at Vancouver, Canada, in November of that year.[69] This in fact happened, and now the Soviet Union is tenaciously asking that the PECC upgrade its observer status to full-fledged membership before the next meeting, scheduled to be held in Osaka.

In recent years the Soviet Union has also been trying to expand its presence and influence in the South Pacific, particularly through fishing agreements with the island nations. In August 1985, it concluded an agreement on fishing rights with Kiribati for which the Soviet Union pays an annual fee of about $1.5 million. Shortly after establishing diplomatic relations with Vanuatu in June 1986, the Soviet Union was also concluding a fishing agreement with this island state and has also been asking for port facilities for its trawlers and landing rights for Aeroflot. It is also reported that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate similar fishing agreements with Papua New Guinea and other South Pacific island states and that it has requested an Aeroflot route between Moscow and Suva in Fiji.[70]

The Soviet Union has clearly been trying to make inroads in the South Pacific, taking full advantage of the island states' discontent with how the United States has treated them. The United States has turned down requests from some of the islands to recognize 200-mile economic zones around their shores and to require American fishing companies to pay for fishing in these waters. Under such circumstances, some islanders feel that if the American fishing associations are not prepared to pay, then Russian money will do just fine.

The Soviet Union is motivated not simply by the economic benefits to be gained from fishing but also by the

[68]See Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, *Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept*, Tokyo, 1980.

[69]*Daily Yomiuri*, Aug. 1, and Nov. 11, 1986.

[70]*The Economist* (London), Sept. 25, 1986, p.6.

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Goals in Final Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept (May 19, 1980)	Goals in Statement of Soviet Government on the Asia-Pacific Region (April 23, 1986)
	Development of productive forces.
Cooperation in human resources.	Training of cadres.
Cooperation in resource exploitation.	Exploration of new energy resources.
Expansion and consolidation of transport and communication systems.	Completion of means of transportation and communication.
Promotion of trade expansion and adjustment of industrial structure.	Promotion of new forms of trade—economic and financial cooperation.
Promotion of international exchanges and mutual understanding.	Exchange of scientific and scientific-technical information.
Marine development.	Protection of environment and rational exploitation of biological and mineral resources of the ocean.
	Promotion of peaceful studies of space for the public interest.
Cooperation in public health and medical care.	Joint work in medical and health protection.

SOURCES: *Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept* (translation), Tokyo, The Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group, May 19, 1980, pp. 25, 39, 43, 46, 50, 53, 68; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 24, 1986.

military advantages to be gained from access to a strategically important region. According to a US specialist on defense of Asia and the Pacific region, the military advantages accruing to the Soviet Union from inroads into the region include proximity to US territory, surveillance of US missile and SDI research on Kwajalein, advantages in space and military operations, missile-testing advantages, support for seabed mining of strategic minerals, and trans-Pacific capabilities.[71]

Thus, Soviet efforts to increase economic contacts and exchanges with countries in the region can also serve an important political function. The two trends observed under Gorbachev, namely, continued military buildup and economic flexibility, may be not contradictory but complementary, both serving the aim of increasing Soviet political influence in Asia and the Pacific.

[71] "USSR Discovers Strategic Value of Pacific Islands" (text of testimony before the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on September 10, 1986, by Rear Admiral Edward Baker, Jr., director of the East Asia and Pacific Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs), Washington, DC, pp. 2–4.

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Changing Sino-Soviet Relations

Herbert J. Ellison

The diplomatic realignments in Northeast Asia over the past two decades exceed in scope and significance comparable changes in any other part of the globe. Central to the realignments has been the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). It was China that initiated diplomatic relations with the United States and Japan in the 1970's, ending its isolation from them that had persisted since the 1950's, and it was China that opened the way in the 1980's to an extensive reconciliation with the Soviet Union, after a 20-year break in relations. Although China's role has been pivotal, the success of Chinese initiatives depended on vigorous responses from the United States, Japan, and—of course—the Soviet Union, especially under Mikhail Gorbachev.

The bilateral relationship between China and the Soviet Union is the most complex and, ultimately, the most important to the future of Northeast Asia. While the improvement has been considerable, the obstacles to a full Sino-Soviet reconciliation remain formidable.

To understand the current status and the problems of the Sino-Soviet relationship one has to examine the recent trends in the major areas of that relationship. But first, attention needs to be given briefly to the earlier history of Sino-Soviet relations because its legacy strongly affects the manner in which the two leaderships have conducted their relations since the early 1980's.

The Background

In 1966, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) severed mutual relations. The act was the climax of a conflict lasting over a decade and having two major sources. The first source of tension to manifest itself was rooted in Soviet strategic ambitions in Northeast Asia. Although the Soviet Union under Stalin relinquished its control over—but not foothold in—Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan, today the Uygur Autonomous Region) soon after the communist victory in China, it retained control over Port Arthur and Dairen where it stationed its navy, army, and air forces.[1] Stalin's successors returned these important ports by 1955, but pressed for long-range radio facilities in China and for ports to station a joint Sino-Soviet fleet that was to be under Soviet command. These requests caused great concern in China and led it to suspect Moscow of seeking "to control the coastline of China."[2]

It seems now that, at the time, Soviet leaders viewed China much as they viewed the military bloc they were constructing in Eastern Europe—as part of a Soviet-dominated military/strategic system. Consequently, they showed little sensitivity to Chinese fears of an effort

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[1]Xinjiang passed from Soviet to Chinese (Kuomintag) control in 1941. A compromise between the Soviets and the Kuomintang created an autonomous regime in the region from 1944 to 1948, but with the communist victory in China the Soviets handed over the province to Chinese rule. The predominantly Turkish people of the region were governed on the Soviet pattern of republican "autonomy."

Russia acquired the naval base at Port Arthur in 1898 together with the right to build the South Manchurian Railroad. It already had the rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1905 it ceded Port Arthur and the South Manchurian Railroad to Japan and in 1935 sold the Chinese Eastern Railroad as well. In 1945, the Soviet Union recovered half ownership of the two railroads and acquired a lease on Port Arthur as part of the gains granted it at the Yalta Conference. In 1950, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with Mao Zedong's government which stipulated that the USSR would return Port Arthur at the end of 1952. A subsequent agreement signed in September 1952 stipulated that the USSR would return the railway but could retain Port Arthur until Japan, the PRC, and the Soviet Union worked out a peace treaty among themselves. Thus resolving the issue of Port Arthur was left to Stalin's successors.

For interesting background on the events affecting Xinjiang and Manchuria that followed the communist victory in China, see Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow*, New York, Mentor Books, 1964, pp. 271–76.

[2]Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1982, p. 8, fn. 11.

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to "place China under Soviet military control . . . ."[3] Soviet attempts to maintain domination of a centralized world communist movement further added to the concern among Chinese leaders about the PRC's political autonomy. The concern remains central to this day.

The second source of the Sino-Soviet conflict was the leftist communism of Mao Zedong, which eventually damaged China's relations with the CPSU and all other ruling communist parties except those of Albania and Romania, whose communist leaderships shared Chinese skepticism about de-Stalinization. Mao rejected Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign initiated at the 20th Soviet Party Congress in 1956, and the economic reforms that preceded it in the Soviet Union and parts of Eastern Europe. He strongly criticized Krushchev's brief reconciliation with "revisionist" Yugoslavia in 1955, and viewed the eruption of popular opposition to communist rule in Eastern Europe as the result of such "mistakes."

Favoring aggressive support for communist insurgency, Mao resented Khrushchev's stress on cooperation with leaders of the newly independent "nationalist" states of Asia and Africa. He also feared that Khrushchev's statements to the effect that nuclear weapons made a world war unthinkable and "peaceful coexistence" imperative were opening the way to Soviet accommodation with the United States. This, he believed, would ultimately lead to a division of the world into Soviet and American spheres of influence that would threaten Chinese interests.

The charges of ideological deviation that China leveled against the Soviet Union were coupled in the mid- and late 1960's with claims for the return of territories acquired from China by the former tsarist government of Russia and by the Soviet Union.[4] These claims for restitution of territory in the Far East, impelled the Soviets to expand rapidly and dramatically their military deployments along the Sino-Soviet border (from 15 to 45 divisions within a few years), and their regional air and naval forces.

The stridency of Chinese verbal attacks on the Soviet Union (and of Soviet responses to them) increased appreciably during the height of the Cultural Revolution (1966–69). After the border conflicts at Zhenbao (or Damanskiy) Island in March 1969, the Chinese broadcast a statement affirming "the aggressive nature of Soviet revisionist imperialism" and labeled the Soviet Union China's "principal, most dangerous enemy."[5] In answer, the Soviets mounted a large campaign against the CCP leadership aimed particularly at creating mistrust between the party leadership on the one hand and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the intellectuals, and the minority populations in China on the other. Arguing that Mao was attempting to destroy the communist party and that he had abandoned proletarian internationalism, the Soviets urged the PLA not to obey his orders, because he would eventually turn against the PLA as he had against other institutions. Minority peoples of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet were urged to resist Chinese domination over them and to "struggle against Mao's inhuman chauvinism."[6]

Diplomatic Revolution of the 1970's

By the end of the 1960's, China had isolated itself almost totally. Ties with most communist parties were quite strained, and China closed its embassies throughout much of the world. Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet hostility was growing. A fundamental revision of foreign policy was clearly necessary to end China's isolation and to counter the expanding military—and political—presence of the Soviet Union in Asia.

The process of reorienting the PRC's foreign relations was accomplished swiftly. The decade of the 1970's brought reestablishment of Chinese diplomatic ties around the world, with special emphasis upon the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and the communist states of Eastern Europe.[7] During the three-year period of 1971–73 alone, China established or renewed relations with 36 countries.[8]

The most dramatic event was the rapprochement with the United States. The Chinese leadership believed that links to the United States were crucial for containing the Soviet threat in Asia. The thorny issue of US recognition and support of Taiwan was effectively bypassed when the United States agreed to UN membership for the Peo-

[3]Ibid.

[4]Mao Zedong vented his grievances on the border issue publicly in 1964. The scope of Chinese claims varied widely over the course of the 1960's. The repudiation of the Chinese losses from the "unequal" treaties with the tsarist government in the nineteenth century suggested the possibility of enormous Chinese claims, though the claims were in practice eventually limited to more modest border territories. See Thomas W. Robinson, *The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, 1970.

[5]Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1970*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p. 558.

[6]Ibid., p. 101.

[7]A helpful survey on the Chinese relations with the communist parties of Eastern and Western Europe is provided in Trond Gilberg, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Eastern Europe" and "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Western Europe," in Herbert J. Ellison, Ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1981, pp. 268–324.

[8]Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1974*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1974, p. 427.

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Soviet demonstrators outside the Chinese Embassy in Moscow in March 1969 bear banners declaring: "The Policy of the CPSU Is a the Policy of Proletarian Internationalism" and "The Policy of Mao Serves Imperialism!"

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ple's Republic of China rather than Taiwan. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and the opening of "liaison offices" in Washington and Beijing shortly thereafter, helped prepare the way for the eventual full restoration of diplomatic relations in January of 1979.

China's relations with Japan, important for economic and defense purposes, progressed at an even faster rate. The process of normalizing relations began in September 1972 with the visit to Beijing of Premier Kakuei Tanaka. By March 1973 the two countries had exchanged ambassadors.[9] The restoration of relations with Japan brought an immediate increase in trade. As early as 1972, Japan became China's leading foreign trade partner, accounting for roughly a quarter of Chinese foreign trade.[10]

Chinese diplomatic activity in Eastern Europe in this period was aimed at expanding trade with the region and undermining the Soviet Union's position there. Chinese official statements stressed the importance of national equality and autonomy and continued to criticize undue Soviet interference in the area, especially the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Relations with the Soviet Union, however, although marked by substantial growth in the volume of trade between the two countries (up by 66 percent between 1971 and 1972), renewed negotiations on the border issues, and restoration of civil air transportation between the capitals of the two countries, did not improve in the political realm. If anything, the tone of Soviet polemics intensified in the early 1970's, with the USSR accusing China in August 1973 of being "hostile to the socialist world" and of having effected "a complete rupture with Marxism-Leninism." The Chinese responded by charging that the Soviets had "restored capitalism, enforced a fascist dictatorship and enslaved the peoples of all nationalities . . . ." Their criticism of Soviet foreign policy was no less harsh:

. . . it has invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia, massed its troops along the Chinese border, sent troops into the People's Republic of Mongolia, supported the traitorous Lon Nol clique, suppressed the Polish workers' rebellion, intervened in Egypt, causing the expulsion of the Soviet experts, dismembered Pakistan, and

[9]Ibid., p. 433.
[10]Ibid.

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carried out subversive activities in many Asian and African countries.[11]

Soviet Overtures

With the resumption of Chinese diplomacy, the competition between the PRC and the USSR was internationalized. Sino-Soviet polemics developed in the early 1970's in a global context marked by the steady advance of détente in Soviet-Western relations. As the process of détente began to weaken after 1975, the Soviets feared that China would take advantage of deteriorating Soviet-American relations to forge an alliance with the United States and Japan, thereby gaining ground in the competition. Their fears seemed realized when, after Mao's death and the purge of the "Gang of Four" in the fall of 1976 that heralded China's decisive departure from Maoism, the new Chinese leadership moved to seek military cooperation with the United States and Japan rather than closer ties with the Soviet Union—as the Soviets had expected.[12] It also announced open support for a strong American military presence in East Asia as a counterbalance to Soviet power in the region.

Soviet reaction to Chinese overtures to the United States was to soften criticisms of the PRC during the closing months of 1976 and to seek an improvement in relations. But the Soviet desire to improve relations was not reciprocated by China. Moscow's messages of congratulations to Hua Guofeng upon his becoming the new chairman of the CCP were rejected. The Soviet-Chinese talks in January and February that brought Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev to Beijing with new proposals to end the border dispute were broken off. By April 1977, despairing of Chinese cooperation, the Soviets resumed their old tactics. Mikhail Zimyanin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee responsible for ideology, accused the Chinese of abandoning proletarian internationalism and of trying ". . . to form the most reactionary forces into a bloc . . . ."[13]

However, Deng Xiaoping's return to power in July 1977 was soon followed by a resumption of Sino-Soviet talks on river navigation, and, in late August, the Chinese filled their vacant Moscow ambassadorship. But these and other signs of improved relations (the friendly Chinese reception of Tito in August; the Ussuri River Navigation Pact in October) were outweighed by other developments. Most important of these was the conflict developing between Cambodia and Vietnam, in which the Chinese and Soviets supported opposing sides. In May 1978, following the expansion of Vietnamese military actions against Cambodia in the previous month, the Chinese withdrew their advisers from Vietnam. Although the Soviets had hoped for an improvement in relations with China under Deng's leadership, Chinese foreign policy was becoming increasingly anti-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations reached a new low.

Chinese troops crossing the Ky Cung Bridge into Vietnam during hostilities in March 1979.

—China Photo Service from Eastfoto.

The Nadir of Sino-Soviet Relations

The year 1978 marked the low point of post-Mao Sino-Soviet relations. During US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's visit to China in that year references were made to "the enemy to the north," while the

[11]Ibid.

[12]In the Soviet view, the main obstacle to closer relations with China was Mao Zedong and Maoism. Once Mao departed, Soviet leaders believed, Sino-Soviet reconciliation would be inevitable. After Mao's death and the purge of the "Gang of Four," the USSR realized that although the new Chinese leadership was departing fundamentally from Maoism in internal policy, it continued on a foreign policy course that was hostile to the Soviet Union. For a detailed examination of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the early aftermath of Mao's death see Ross Terrill, *The Future of China after Mao*, New York, Dell, pp. 206–31.

[13]Richard Starr, *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1978*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979, p. 89.

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Sino-Japanese Treaty of August contained a clause denouncing hegemonism, universally understood to refer to the Soviet Union. This treaty was quickly followed by China's announcement in April 1979 that the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950 would not be renewed.

Adding to the strain in Sino-Soviet relations was the Soviet intrusion into Indochina—traditionally a Chinese sphere of influence—with the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty in 1978 and arrangements for Soviet bases in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. China's resumption of full diplomatic relations with the United States in January of 1979, its continued support of a strong US presence in East Asia, and its encouragement of Japanese cooperation with US defense policies—all part of a strategy to check Soviet expansionism in Asia and forestall a possible Soviet encirclement of China—led to a further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, as did the Sino-Vietnamese war of February and March 1979 and Chinese charges that Vietnam had invaded Cambodia "to serve the Soviet Union in its expansionist strategic plan."[14]

In the aftermath of the PLA 's failure to "teach Vietnam a decisive lesson," a bitter China blamed the Soviets for backing the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and causing the loss of 20,000 Chinese men. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, launched a major propaganda campaign against the PRC. In 1979, addressing himself to Maoist "historical falsifications," CPSU Central Committee secretary for relations with communist parties Konstantin Rusakov spoke of "the hegemonic desires and expansionist policy of the present Chinese leaders."[15] That same year, *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire*, was published.[16] This book, written by Moscow's mouthpiece Victor Louis, portrayed graphically the revolt of China's minority peoples in Inner Asia. Yet, despite this evidence of sharp Sino-Soviet friction, there were signs of initiatives by both sides to make contact and negotiate differences.

The Chinese Initiative

Even as the PRC announced in April 1979 that the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union would not be renewed, it initiated new contacts in the hope of settling some troublesome border and foreign policy issues. This eventually led to Chinese-Soviet-Vietnamese discussions, and, in June, to agreement on a series of meetings on Sino-Soviet issues. At Soviet insistence, the official purpose of the meetings was to be designated as the promotion of "the principles of peaceful coexistence"—the rationale used for talks with non-communist states. The USSR was clearly signaling that, in its view, relations with China were "non-comradely."

Soviet and Chinese negotiators exchange documents at the first plenary session of October 17, 1979, talks in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto

Talks began with the arrival of the Chinese delegation in Moscow in September 1979. From the beginning, it was clear that Soviet intentions were to confine the talks to bilateral issues, while Chinese intentions were to include such matters as Soviet policy in Vietnam and, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, with Soviet policy in that country as well. The talks, which began promisingly in September, were soon suspended when the Chinese denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and asserted that the USSR "bullies, enslaves, and exploits other countries."[17]

The Soviets were doubtless less bothered by such polemics than by the mounting evidence of Sino-American military cooperation and by Chinese appeals for Japanese, American, and European cooperation against Soviet policies. On April 7, 1980, following US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown's visit to Beijing in January, and PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin's visit to Washington in March to discuss the coordination of Chinese and American security policies, an article in *Pravda* (under the official Politburo by-line of I. Aleksandrov) accused China of seeking to provoke an

[14] *Beijing Review*, Jan. 12, 1979.

[15] Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook of International Communist Affairs 1980*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution, 1981, p. 85.

[16] This remarkable book, published in New York by Times Books, described the restiveness of China's minority peoples and implied that this could be used as a pretext for a Soviet-backed separation from China of territories inhabited by non-Chinese.

[17] *Beijing Review*, May 19, 1980.

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American-Soviet war. A subsequent article, on April 26, charged the Chinese with seeking to form an anti-Soviet alliance that would comprise China, the members of NATO, and Japan.[18]

The Soviets also fretted about growing Chinese influence among other communist parties, which threatened the USSR's position of leadership within the world communist movement. The PRC continued its efforts to revive and expand good relations with both East and West European communist parties as part of its standing policy to end Chinese isolation and exert pressure on communist parties and states to seek greater independence from Soviet domination. Its success in that area was evident in the failure of Soviet efforts to organize support against China among the European communist parties in April 1980. It was also evident in the harsh and worried tone of Soviet accusations concerning the PRC's "splitting activity" within the movement, and the warnings to communist parties not to cooperate with such activity.[19]

The Soviet Initiative

Despite this apparent impasse, the Soviets perceived some positive trends in China that gave them hope for putting their relations on a less hostile level. In early 1980, China departed even more from Maoism and it suspended its ideological campaign against "revisionism" that had been directed chiefly at the CPSU. Yet, the official Soviet assessment of chances for improving Sino-Soviet relations was at best cautious. In his report to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev stated:

Time will show to what extent the present Chinese leadership will find it possible to overcome the Maoist legacy. However, as yet, one unfortunately cannot speak of any changes for the better in Beijing's foreign policies.[20]

Referring elsewhere in the report to "Beijing's barbaric aggression" against Vietnam—hardly the language of conciliation—Brezhnev nevertheless affirmed that "our proposals aimed at normalizing relations with China remain in force . . . ."[21]

The Chinese consented to Brezhnev's proposal to establish ties "on a good-neighbor basis."[22] This, however, did not stop them from repeating that ". . . the Soviet Union has a global strategy to dominate the world,"[23] while also expressing doubts about the Soviet capacity to reach so ambitious a goal.[24] Still, the number of meetings between Chinese and Soviet representatives on everything from border river navigation to esoteric scientific topics began to grow.

Throughout all this, Soviet concern about Chinese foreign policy remained. During 1981, Soviet press commentaries repeatedly addressed the issue of Chinese arms talks with the Americans, Chinese appeals for broad cooperation against Soviet "expansionism and hegemonism," and the new and increasingly sensitive issue of Chinese criticism of Soviet policy toward Poland. One example of that criticism was the Chinese statement that:

So long as the Soviet Union persists in a policy of controlling or plundering some East European countries or putting them under occupation, struggles against this will . . . break out in those countries . . . Soviet colonial rule and military are sitting on an active volcano which is going to erupt one day.[25]

The Soviets were particularly bitter about Chinese criticism of their "advisory" letter to the Polish communist party (PZPR) in June.[26] At this point, they accused China of "interference in Polish internal affairs" even as they repeated their standard criticisms of China for insisting upon a special Chinese road to socialism and ignoring "the general laws [i.e., Soviet-devised laws] governing the construction of socialism."[27]

The CCP's official evaluation in June 1981 of the history of the CCP, which includes a critique of "mistakes" by Mao, somewhat reassured the Soviets that ideological differences inhibiting a Sino-Soviet rapprochement were slowly disappearing.[28] The USSR secretly offered to resume talks in September. The Chinese, apparently concerned about developments in Poland, requested that talks be deferred for the time being.

[18]Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1981*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1982, pp. 322–23.

[19]*Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, August 1980.

[20]Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, *The Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress*, Washington, DC, vol. 1, Feb. 24, 1981, p. 9.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Brezhnev's statement on good-neighborly relations was part of his report to the 26th CPSU Congress. See ibid.

[23]*FBIS-CHI*, May 21, 1981, p. C/1.

[24]*FBIS-CHI*, June 23, 1981, p. W/1-2.

[25]*Beijing Review*, June 15, 1981.

[26]See e.g., Tass (Moscow), June 30, 1981. The Soviets were particularly sensitive to Chinese charges that the Soviet Union was interfering in Poland's internal affairs and was impeding the process of political and economic reform in Poland. Some analysts argue that the Soviets' intentions in writing the letter were to criticize certain policies and raise fears of Soviet intervention in Poland in the hope of encouraging the reformist elements in the Polish party leadership to support a more conservative policy.

[27]*Pravda* (Moscow), July 5, 1981.

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The Turning Point

A real turning point in relations was reached in 1982. In March of that year, Brezhnev delivered a speech in Tashkent calling for Sino-Soviet cooperation and commenting favorably on the main lines of change in China—albeit with familiar reservations about Chinese foreign policy. He sought to appeal in the speech to the Chinese leadership by saying that the USSR had never denied the socialist character of the Chinese system and that it supported the Chinese claim to Taiwan.[29]

Brezhnev's initiative ought not to have surprised anyone. The Soviet had pursued rapprochement with the Chinese quite consistently since Mao's death, only to be rebuffed by the Chinese or to have promising beginnings disrupted by other developments that had negative impact on their relations, such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in Poland. But the general trend of Chinese foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping was increasingly positive from the Soviet point of view—especially as he had dropped the appeals for an alliance with Japan and the United States and adopted a more even-handed approach to the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet Union's position and relations were deteriorating badly both in the East Asian region and globally. The Euromissile confrontation with NATO was increasingly serious; Eastern Europe—especially Poland—remained unstable; the Soviets were bogged down in a difficult struggle in Afghanistan (with rebels being supported by the Chinese); and the American, with Japanese support, were rapidly rebuilding their commitment and their military forces in East Asia. It was becoming increasingly desirable—even urgent—to improve relations with China.

Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov arrives in China on December 21, 1984, his first visit to the country in 15 years.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Negotiations opened shortly after the Tashkent speech with the arrival in Beijing of Leonid Ilichev. The first such talks to take place since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they produced no results, since the Chinese insisted upon discussing Vietnam and Afghanistan, and the Soviets refused.[30] Later that year, however, at a reception following Brezhnev's funeral in November, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua was given special attention, making it evident that relations with the People's Republic of China were a high priority for the new Soviet leader, Yuriy Andropov.

The course of reconciliation was not smooth, however. Even by late 1983, after three rounds of Sino-Soviet talks, little progress had been made. Although the Chinese now took a consistently "equidistant" position between the two superpowers, they continued (albeit in milder form) to criticize Soviet foreign policy. The effort at a balanced approach was evident during Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States in January 1984. In contrast to Deng Xiaoping's 1979 visit to the United

[28]The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, held in June 1981, not only made important changes in the CCP leadership, but also adopted an immensely important "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." See *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1981. The resolution did a skillful job of combining general praise for Mao and Maoism ("a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary strategist and theorist") with a rejection of the notion that his ideas provided an "immutable truth which must be mechanically applied everywhere." Having disposed of Mao's infallibility, the Resolution hit hard at the specifics of his historical record. Mao was accused of over-emphasizing the class struggle and making serious mistakes in economic policy even before the Cultural Revolution. On balance, however, his performance was given a favorable review. But the Cultural Revolution itself was judged to be "a comprehensive, long-drawn out and grave blunder." The combination of this reevaluation of Mao's historical record with government leadership changes favorable to Deng Xiaoping and the 1978 reform provided positive signals to the Soviet, which they were quick to understand. The Resolution tended to take a more balanced view of the sources of earlier Sino-Soviet conflict, particularly in sharing the blame. For an interesting discussion of the party's reevaluation of Mao's record see David S. G. Goodman, "The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger?" in *The China Quarterly* (London), September 1981, pp. 518–27.

[29]*Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 25, 1982.

[30]*FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 18, 1982, p. C/2.

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States when the Chinese media were attacking Soviet foreign policy vociferously, there were virtually no such attacks during Zhao's visit. Moreover, the Chinese let the Soviets know that they were prepared to seek normalization of relations without the preliminary removal of the "three obstacles."

The process of "normalization," delayed for some months by the Soviets' abrupt cancellation in May 1984 of the planned visit to Beijing by Ivan Arkhipov, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, did, however, eventually move forward. Arkhipov's visit was rescheduled for December and proved highly successful; it even included a meeting with Premier Zhao. At a meeting after Chernenko's funeral in March 1985, the leader of the Chinese delegation, Li Peng, stressed interparty ties, addressed Gorbachev as "comrade," and extended greetings from Hu Yaobang, the general secretary of the CCP. For his part, the new General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, pronounced Sino-Soviet relations to be of central importance to him. In the months that followed these events, both sides rapidly agreed to expanded cooperation on all levels. Foremost was economic cooperation, which was assured in June by the signing of a large ($14 billion) five-year trade agreement in Moscow.

The Current Phase

Gorbachev's report to the 27th Congress of the CPSU clearly expressed the Soviets' understanding of the state of relations with China in early 1986. In the report, the General Secretary noted "a certain improvement" in relations, although differences between the two sides remained, "particularly on a series of international problems." He held out the possibility "of acting together on the basis of principle and equal rights without prejudice to third countries."[31]

While appreciating the positive tone of the address, the Chinese leadership fully understood that "without prejudice to third countries" meant the Soviets would not exert pressure on Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Gorbachev's expression of a wish "in the nearest future to bring Soviet forces—situated in Afghanistan at the request of the government—back to their homeland" had little meaning for them given the Soviet precondition of "a prior political settlement," on Soviet terms, which could not be realized without the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[32]

[31]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *The 27th CPSU Congress: An Agenda for Change*, Washington, DC, Apr. 11, 1986, p. 63.
[32]Ibid., p. 72.

The second half of 1986 brought important movement in Sino-Soviet political relations, initiated by Gorbachev in his speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986.[33] For China, the most important element of that speech was that it addressed two of the three obstacles to Sino-Soviet relations. In it, Gorbachev announced that six Soviet regiments would soon be withdrawn from Afghanistan, that some troops might be withdrawn from Mongolia, as well as that the Soviets were prepared to discuss the reduction of force levels along the Sino-Soviet border. With regard to the disputed Amur River border, he offered to accept China's request that the main navigation channel serve as the border line. The General Secretary also offered Soviet support for the construction of the Urumqi-Kazakhstan railroad and invited the Chinese to participate in Soviet space exploration.

Although Chinese reaction to this overture was publicly cautious and skeptical, improvement in relations became soon apparent. While the Chinese noted the inadequacy of the projected troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, and the failure to address the Cambodian "obstacle," they now manifested a willingness to deal directly with the Vietnamese and the Mongols, thereby accepting at least in part the Soviet position that China's grievances concerning Cambodia and Soviet troops in the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) had to be negotiated in Hanoi and Ulan Bator. The Chinese also made an offer to give Vietnam development aid in exchange for withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. In fact, in August, Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing visited Mongolia. In early 1987, at a meeting of Chinese and Soviet foreign ministers at the United Nations, agreed to reopen the border negotiations, which had been suspended nearly five years earlier.

The pace and scope of change for the better have been marked during the past three years—particularly the last two. This is evident in the expansion of economic relations and the regular press coverage given to every new agreement. It has also been apparent in the steady expansion of cross-border trade and the opening of new centers for its conduct, as well as in the increase in cultural and scientific exchanges and in the media coverage given to these events on both sides.

The fact that meetings on normalization of relations (the tenth round was just completed) are now routine is another indicator of the change for the better. While it is true that the Chinese still emphasize Soviet failure to deal with the famous "three obstacles," and that party relations between the CPSU and the CCP have not been reestablished, negotiations go on, and economic and cultural contacts are expanding. Moreover, the meet-

[33]*Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

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Chinese Vice-Premier Yao Yilin, in the Soviet Union for the second conference of the Soviet-Chinese Committee on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation, meets with Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov on May 13, 1987.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ings between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships now take place at ever higher levels, with the Soviet representation including high-ranking party and state officials. This, of course, raises the question whether the re-establishment of party-to-party relations—when it comes—will not be a mere formality.

A further change has been the positive tone of press reportage on the budding relationship. If one takes a sample of typical articles published in the Chinese and Soviet press over the past three years and compares it with reports from, say, 1979–81, the contrast is striking. The polemical tone has nearly disappeared, except in discussion of the familiar three obstacles, and even here the tone is less hostile than in the past. Equally important is the very positive tone of Chinese reportage on the impressions of various PRC delegations to the Soviet Union, and of reports by Soviet visitors to China. Given the change in tone and the enormous increase in media coverage of essentially constructive developments in the relationship, one cannot but conclude that the leaders on both sides are implementing a conscious policy of conveying to their respective populations a new and substantially more positive impression of the other side's society, culture, and economy, as well as of relations between them. In China and the Soviet Union, where these matters depend largely on political decisions at the top, such developments reveal much about the current state of the Sino-Soviet relationship.

Trends and Prospects

Sino-Soviet relations are structured by a complex and changing mix of political-ideological, strategic, and economic considerations, any of which can foster either friction between the two states or greater cooperation. Any effort to define current relations between the two states must examine recent trends in those areas.

Ideology. Ideological differences created by the Maoist version of left-wing communism were a major factor contributing to friction in Sino-Soviet relations from the late 1950's until 1976. Maoism shaped the negative assessment of Soviet achievements and greatly influenced the condemnation of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Once Mao's successors started to move away from his ideological preoccupations, ideological disagreement played a smaller role in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Today, ideological differences have apparently ceased to be a source of conflict, and instead, ideology has become a significant force for unity and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the growing sense of shared experience and of potential for expanding cooperation associated with the Soviet and Chinese reform efforts. The dramatic renewal of the reform initiative under Gorbachev has produced a greater Soviet understanding of Chinese economic reforms. Meanwhile, Chinese concern about both the cultural and political consequences of their own reforms, whether expressed in the campaign against "spiritual pollution" in late 1983 and early 1984, or in the attacks on "bourgeois liberalization" in the wake of student demonstrations in December 1986, has tended to strengthen China's ties to the communist world, including the Soviet Union.

The current Chinese evaluation of the Soviet achievements and their relevance to China's future is notably positive, indicating a strong ideological foundation for future cooperation. Chinese analysts portray their country and the Soviet Union as sharing both a pattern of socialist society deriving from the October Revolution and a search for effective means of reform and modernization within that tradition. Critical of Mao's policy after 1958, they give the Soviets credit for more effective reform efforts than their own, at least up to the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in 1978. They

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also feel that the Soviets have now come to accept the principle of equality among communist parties/states and can contribute in a constructive fashion to Chinese reform efforts. Moreover, they share with the Soviets the view that capitalist societies, whatever their scientific, technological, and economic achievements, are decadent and destined to be replaced by socialism. Finally, they believe that, like the Soviet Union and other communist states, they too face the challenging task of acquiring what is needed from the capitalist world while protecting and developing their own communist ideas and institutions.[34]

International relations. The foreign and security policies of the USSR and the PRC are another major source of Sino-Soviet conflict—today as in the past. In this area of the relationship, ideological issues can play and have played a major role, but, as recent trends suggest, friction and conflict are possible even in the absence of significant ideological differences.

Soviet military deployments in Northeast Asia, were, as noted, part of the history of conflict over security issues in the 1950's. The expansion of these deployments in the 1960's was a response to perceived danger from China: the PRC's territorial claims aroused concern for the security of Soviet Outer Mongolian and Manchurian territories that lie along the frontier with China and lack natural defenses. Anxiety increased with the developments in the 1970's—especially Chinese proposals for military collaboration with the United States and Japan. The purpose of the expanded forces deployed during the 1970's—a quarter of the Soviet Union's ground and air forces and a third of its naval forces—was not only to limit Chinese options against the Soviet Union or its Vietnamese client, but also to protect against the possibility of the encircling alliance which China sought with the United States and Japan.

On the Chinese side, the Soviet military buildup in the late 1970's, as in the 1960's, led China to perceive the USSR as the main challenge to its security, and to search for cooperation with capitalist states on matters of security and military modernization. Sino-Soviet tensions decreased during the 1980's as the PRC's leaders became less concerned about Soviet intentions, at least partly because of the restoration of American security commitment and military power in East Asia. It was in this new atmosphere that Chinese leaders decided to reduce the size of the PLA (1985) and to cultivate a more even-handed relationship with the two superpowers.

The Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia—a matter of great concern for both Japan and the United States—elicited less concern in China, because it was directed mainly at Japan and the United States, and partly because the PRC had improved its nuclear retaliatory capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In any event, there was probably little chance that China alone could secure a reduction of Soviet nuclear forces in Northeast Asia, but some possibility that it could secure a reduction of conventional forces; consequently it concentrated its efforts on bringing about the latter.

Differences and competition over influence in Third World countries were and continue to be an important source of friction affecting the Sino-Soviet relationship. As mentioned before, during much of the Mao era the conflict centered on Soviet policy toward Third World revolutions: the Chinese favored support for radical revolutionary leaders and movements while the Soviets chose to collaborate with many Third World nationalist leaders. Sino-Soviet competition in the Third World peaked during the 1960's. The Chinese competed vigorously in Africa, to some degree in Latin America, and also in Southeast Asia. Such headway as they made was largely lost during the Cultural Revolution, but the competition reopened in the early 1970's, focusing on Southeast Asia and Africa.

Indochina became an especially contested area of Sino-Soviet competiton. The Soviets had provided considerable—and decisive—military and diplomatic support for North Vietnam's conquest of the South. After the war, Hanoi looked to the Soviet Union for support in its effort to control the whole of Indochina. As the Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict escalated, the Soviet Union and China found themselves supporting opposing sides. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 and installed there a client regime, the Chinese, fearing further Soviet-Vietnamese strategic gains in Indochina, invaded Vietnam. While the situation was both awkward and politically dangerous for the Soviets, their strong support for Vietnam was rewarded with permission to establish bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. The aggressiveness of Vietnam brought mixed responses from countries in Southeast Asia, which belong to ASEAN. While a number of them reacted negatively to Vietnamese actions, in such states as Indonesia and Singapore the Chinese invasion of Vietnam raised anew the fear of China's use of its regional power. However, the Chinese sought to allay such fears by renouncing their support for communist-led insurgencies in ASEAN states.

In the early 1970's, China began to compete once again with the Soviet Union in Africa (Central and Southern). The Soviets countered Chinese support for the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) with greater support for the Popular Movement for the Liber-

[34]Gilbert Rozman, "China's Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship" *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1985, pp. 463–64.

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The acting General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, left, reviews an honor guard with General Secretary of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party János Kádár during a June 15, 1987, visit to Budapest.

—Eastfoto.

ation of Angola (MPLA), facilitating the latter's victory. As a result, a widespread shift of movements and governments in neighboring Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, and Tanzania away from China and toward the Soviet Union took place. Soviet Middle Eastern policy impinged relatively little on China. In Southwest Asia, however, the communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978 that brought a pro-Soviet regime to power was followed by a Soviet invasion of the country in December 1979. This event made Afghanistan—together with Indochina—the focus of Sino-Soviet disputes.

The early 1980's saw new currents in Chinese Third World policy. Chinese anti-Sovietism was replaced by a more complex analysis of world politics and a critique of superpower Third World policies that divided blame between the two more evenhandedly. In a thoroughly pragmatic style, the Chinese aided both sides in the Iran-Iraq war, supported anti-Soviet guerrilla forces in Afghanistan, joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and portrayed themselves as a Third World state sharing interests with other Third World countries.

Since approximately 1982, aside from differences over Indochina and Afghanistan, the conflict of Soviet and Chinese Third World interests has been much reduced. The harsh polemics have virtually disappeared on both sides, while Chinese criticisms of US policies in the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Central America tend to resemble those of the Soviets. Yet the Afghan and Cambodian issues remain formidable obstacles to improved relations. China continues to insist that Soviet troops must be withdrawn from Afghanistan, and the Soviets continue to attribute part of their problem there to Chinese intervention. But in general, the sharpness of the polemics has been reduced.

The Chinese have recently moderated considerably their Indochina policy, abandoning demands for the closing of Soviet bases in Vietnam and for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Laos. While they still stress the Cambodian issue, they do so less stridently than before 1982. Indeed, circumstances seem to require Vietnam to work hard to prevent a Sino-Soviet agreement at Vietnam's expense.

The reemergence of China from its self-imposed isolation from the international communist movement has both positive and negative implications for Soviet-Chinese relations. The end of Maoist criticism of Soviet institutions and policy, and the reduction of revolutionary competition in the Third World are undoubtedly welcome. However, the reestablishment and expansion of

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Chinese relations with other communist parties and states, and the moderation and success of Chinese domestic and foreign policies, have given China a more powerful voice in the communist movement in general.

Even when European communist parties disliked Maoist policies, they found the Chinese a valuable counterweight to Soviet efforts to dominate all communist parties. A prosperous, successful, and cooperative China, pursuing an independent policy and insisting upon the right of other communist parties and states to do the same, is a counterweight to Soviet influence. China's internal economic innovations, its success in trade and investment arrangements with capitalist states, the ease with which it sends students and other specialists abroad for training, its reduced emphasis on military power and competition—together provide a highly competitive alternative to the Soviet communist model. Yet, the volte-face in Chinese policy since the end of 1986, with the repression of the student protests, the removal of Hu Yaobang, and the campaign against "bourgeois liberalization," all suggest that the Chinese leadership may find itself closer in spirit to the Soviets than at any time in recent years. Both face the challenge of achieving effective reform without risking or challenging the party dictatorship or the communist model of the economy.

Economic policy. Soviet policy-makers clearly regard the restoration of economic relations with China as both a logical expression of the communist system they share and a means of drawing closer together. They recall fondly the closeness of the 1950's, when the Soviet Union was by far China's most important economic collaborator. Yet, trade with China barely exceeded two percent of Soviet foreign trade in 1985, and was rising only slowly in proportionate terms, and this in a period when China had become one of the world's major trading nations.

Soviet analysts once argued that trade would rise with political reconciliation, becoming again a major factor in the economies of both countries. Their arguments stressed China's need for Soviet middle-range technology and production methods, as well as the fact that the two countries had socialist institutions. Certainly, there is a basis for Sino-Soviet economic cooperation, as the various new economic agreements attest. But the many years of separation and conflict have greatly altered the character and compatibility of the two economies. By the beginning of the 1980's, China had established its major foreign economic relationships with the market economies of East Asia—chiefly Japan—and with the United States, and in important ways had become a Soviet competitor for advanced Western technology.

The Soviet predictions that China would experience negative political side-effects from its economic relations with the West, though overstated, were not without foundation, as the Chinese reports of economic speculation and corruption and the campaigns against "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalism" demonstrate. Moreover, whatever the limitations, there is still a solid basis for Sino-Soviet economic cooperation. The Soviet Union represents a ready market for Chinese foodstuffs, textiles, and mineral products, while the Soviets have both products (heavy machinery, trucks, and timber) and technologies (oil, gas, and electrical power) needed in China. They have the additional advantage of being in a position to engage in barter trade with China and thus avoid a drain on their respective hard-currency reserves. Finally, the Soviets offer the advantage of close markets (via border trade) for many Chinese goods, and of overland transportation to the industrialized portions of the Soviet Union and to Europe.

Only a radical shift of the course of Chinese economic policy could restore the preponderance in Chinese foreign trade which the Soviet Union enjoyed in the 1950's. Today the Soviets rank only sixth among China's foreign trade partners, though there are a number of opportunities for future growth of Sino-Soviet trade and for broader interaction with the Soviet economy. Soviet overland transport, especially if rail connections through Central Asia are expanded, will play an important role in Chinese trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern and Western Europe. Moreover, China possesses reserves of labor that could potentially play an important part in the development of the Soviet Far East.

It is worth mentioning that there is in China a growing and positive interest in the Soviet economic experience—a factor that could have a role in the development of broader economic relations in future.

In general, it would appear that the trend both of Soviet and Chinese economic policy and economic development is conducive to expanded economic ties in the future. This trend could have a positive impact on the bilateral relationship, though it is unlikely to damage or diminish the growing Chinese interaction with the capitalist economies. In the 1950's, 90 percent of China's trade was with the Soviet Union; today over 80 percent of its greatly expanded trade is with the major capitalist states or with the Asian newly industrializing countries. In the 1950's, China depended wholly on Soviet industrial technology; today the advanced capitalist economies are the source of almost all new technology and the Soviets have the menial task of refurbishing the industrial installations that they built a generation ago. Where the Chinese once accepted the Soviet communist model unquestioningly, they have now outdone the Soviets

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in reforming that model, with a thoroughgoing restoration of individual incentive and production in agriculture, a broad expansion of private enterprise in the urban service and manufacturing economy, and the acceptance of foreign investment. As a result, they were first the object of nervous criticism and then of cautious emulation by Soviet economists and politicians.

The scale, diversity, and level of development of the present Chinese economy would seem to make it proof against heavy dependence upon the Soviet economy. Moreover, the fact that China's economy is growing much faster than the Soviet Union's would suggest a gain in the PRC's relative economic position vis-à-vis the USSR.

Conclusion

It is indicative of the quandary of Sino-Soviet relations that the PRC's reportage on contacts with the USSR in recent years documents steady and impressive progress in all spheres except the political. The three obstacles that the Chinese see as impeding full normalization of relations have not been removed. Comments in the press indicate China's growing frustration and irritation over Soviet policies in Afghanistan, where the Soviets are seen as making only token troop withdrawals and refusing serious negotiations for withdrawal, in Pakistan, where the Soviets are applying pressure that only compounds the strain of absorbing millions of Aghans seeking refuge;[35] and in Cambodia, where Soviet support sustains the Vietnamese occupation.[36] The Chinese say that the Soviets offer meaningless reductions of their forces in Mongolia and none along the Sino-Soviet border; that they are meddling anew in the internal politics of North Korea; and that they are continuing the strategic expansion in East and Southeast Asia that has, since the acquisition of naval bases in Vietnam, become a search for bases in the Southwest Pacific.

For their part, the Soviets seem intent on their present policies—policies that either challenge Chinese security or traditional interests, or both—and it would appear that there is little China can do to stop them. They seek Chinese cooperation, though on their terms, which means subordination of China to the senior Soviet partner, a position the Chinese are unwilling to accept. It is clear, therefore, that Soviet foreign policy will continue to be a powerful impediment to further major advances in the Sino-Soviet reconcilation.

It is also clear that the Chinese will seek to maintain political cooperation with the United States and Japan, cooperation that has been central to both Chinese security policy and economic modernization. But the evidence of the Sino-Vietnamese war is that though US-PRC cooperation may make the Soviets more cautious, the Soviet alliance system and superior military power place severe limits upon Chinese action. In a military-strategic sense China is encircled. On the other hand, China has conventional military forces capable of imposing prohibitive losses on an invader, and is unique among states in her development category in possessing both nuclear weapons and a missile delivery system. Meanwhile, China continues to press—however ineffectually—for a voluntary reduction of Soviet military power on the Chinese border.

Apparently, Chinese leaders feel that time is their ally. They argue that the long-term capabilities of the Soviets fall short of their ambitions, that Soviet military power has weak economic and social foundations, and that the weakness will become more apparent with the passage of time. They point to the costly foreign commitments, such as Afghanistan, and to the severe internal economic and demographic problems that bode ill for the future of Soviet power. Above all, they seem disinclined to worry about a direct military threat to China, arguing that Soviet power is directed mainly at regions and countries more vulnerable to penetration than China.

The aim of Soviet policy, meanwhile, is to work steadily to broaden the base of contacts and cooperation with China, to discourage its military and political cooperation with Japan and the United States, and to win its support for Soviet policies with respect to the world communist movement and the world as a whole. The evidence of the past few years, and of the Gorbachev years in particular, is that much can be accomplished by these policy directions even within the present context of Soviet foreign policy. With a modification of that policy favorable to Chinese interests, especially if the Chinese leadership should feel threatened by internal popular reform pressures that challenge the very system of rule which it shares with the Soviets, the prospects for reconciliation and cooperation would be much expanded.

[35]Among many articles from the Chinese press see Wu Zu, "Show Sincerity!—Commenting on the Soviet Attitude Toward the Political Settlement of the Afghan Issue" in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 29, 1986, pp. C/2. A more recent article, entitled "Does the Soviet Union Really Want to Withdraw Its Troops From Afghanistan?" noted that the much-advertised Soviet pullout of troops "had an insignificant effect on the Soviet forces' combat effectiveness." See *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 30, 1987, pp. C/2.

[36]The head of the Chinese delegation to the negotiations on normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, Qian Qichen, asserted on the eve of the 10th round of these negotiations that Soviet-Chinese political relations "have yet to be dealt with through negotiations." He stressed Deng Xiaoping's willingness to visit the Soviet Union "provided that the Soviets will take action to solve the Cambodian issue." See *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 6, 1987, pp. C/2.

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China after Deng: Toward the 13th CCP Congress

Parris H. Chang

The abrupt dismissal of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 1987 and the subsequent drive against "bourgeois liberalization" have once again highlighted the leadership conflict and issues of contention inside the party. Despite Premier Zhao Ziyang's appointment as acting general secretary of the CCP and repeated assurances by various Chinese officials that the prevailing reform programs and "open-door" policy will not change, the struggle continues, as the rival leadership groupings move toward a showdown at the 13th CCP Congress scheduled for October. Power and policy in China hang in the balance, for the outcome of the showdown is likely to affect the future elite line-up, structure the leadership succession, and shape the direction of China's political and economic developments for the rest of this century.

The Role of Deng Xiaoping

The rise of Deng Xiaoping as the most powerful leader and his crusade for modernization are two of the most salient political developments of the past decade in China. Not long after he was reinstated as party vice-chairman, vice-premier, and chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in July 1977, Deng mounted a series of political offensives to challenge the leadership of CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng, who had staged a coup in October 1976 and inherited Mao Zedong's mantle. By December 1978, Deng and his allies had managed to neutralize Hua's influence and capture control over the policy councils, although they allowed Hua to keep the title of party chairman until June 1981.[1]

In order to consolidate his control and cement support for his modernization programs, Deng has over the past 10 years initiated reforms and fashioned bold measures designed to speed up economic growth. To facilitate these tasks, Deng has striven to remove from key leadership posts remnant Maoists as well as those officials opposed to his programs, and to force many more inept or old cadres to retire.

Moreover, in order to ensure leadership stability and policy continuity, Deng has groomed younger and like-minded officials as possible future leaders. In September 1980, when Hua was forced to resign as premier, Deng nominated to the position Zhao Ziyang, a talented leader who had distinguished himself as a reformer in Sichuan. A few months later, Deng picked his protégé Hu Yaobang to replace Hua as party chairman.[2]

Deng could have kept these positions for himself, but he did not have to—he was already China's most prominent and powerful leader. Since December 1978, he has been the chief architect of China's reform and open-door policies and the prime mover of China's foreign policy. The 12th CCP Congress, held in September 1982—which Deng has compared to the 7th Congress

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[1]For a fuller account of this period, see Parris H. Chang, "Chinese Politics: Deng's Turbulent Quest," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1981, pp. 1–21.

[2]"CCP Politburo Meeting Circular," approved unanimously by the Politburo on Dec. 5, 1980, in *Selected Important Documents Since the Third CC Plenum,* Vol. 1, No. 1, Beijing, People's Publishing House, 1982, p. 598. Hu took over the party chairmanship formally in June 1981 as the reshuffle was approved by a Central Committee Plenum.

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China's top leader, Deng Xiaoping.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

(in 1945) that officially legitimated Mao's leadership status—formally endorsed the Dengist policy line and put a stamp of approval on Deng's leadership. In addition, a large number of Dengists were elected to the central party organs, including Hu Yaobang, who assumed leadership of the party as general secretary.[3]

By 1987, Deng and Hu had been close comrades in arms for four decades. After Deng was rehabilitated in July 1977, Hu held in succession the key posts of director of the Party Organization Department, director of the Propaganda Department, secretary-general of the Central Committee, and, after the Secretariat was reestablished in February 1980, general secretary. Hu was instrumental in Deng's political ascendancy and was widely considered his most important "brain-truster" as well as his apparent successor.

How, then, are we to explain China's recent leadership upheaval evidenced by Hu's sudden ouster? Many Western analysts were surprised by the leadership shake-up and the renewed strength of China's conservative faction, because they subscribed to the "Deng in command" school of analysis and erroneously assumed that he possessed virtually absolute power. Such a model does not accurately reflect China's political realities, for Deng has never enjoyed really unrivaled authority, however prominent politically he has been. When Mao was still alive, Western writers were apt to apply the same framework of analysis to him, i.e., "Mao in command."[4] Even in Mao's time, such a simplistic approach was inadequate to explain China's major political developments.

Obviously, Deng does not exercise the same kind of great personal authority and enormous political power that Mao used to wield. The late Chairman governed much like an emperor, but Deng is only the primus inter pares and has had to share the leadership role with a number of "senior statesmen" inside the party. Moreover, most Chinese leaders have experienced and suffered from Mao's autocratic rule and personal dictatorship and would never let Deng succeed Mao as China's latest emperor even if Deng tried.[5]

Rule of Oligarchy

In fact, the post-Mao leadership structure itself has undergone far-reaching changes. It has ceased to be an autocracy and has evolved into a complex mixture of oligarchy and gerontocracy, combining both the elements of collegial rule and fragmentation of leadership. In effect, the party's high command consists of "three echelons" of leaders, with an informal and imprecise division of labor among them.[6] The first echelon of leaders includes Deng, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, and several other "senior statesmen" who are all in their eighties but, according to an authoritative source, continue to decide "China's major policies."[7]

The second echelon of leaders comprises top party and state officials who are in their sixties and seventies, including Premier Zhao Ziyang and, until his January demotion, former General Secretary Hu Yaobang. Although in terms of protocol, Hu and Zhao have stood at the head of the party and government hierarchy, they have not often made policy; their main function has been "day-to-day administration of policy" that has first been approved by the elders in the first echelon.[8] The third

[3]Hu succeeded Hua Guofeng as party chairman in June 1981, but the post of chairman that had been created by Mao in 1945 was abolished at the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982, and the office of general secretary has since become the highest party post.

[4]See, e.g., Michel Oksenberg, "Mao's Policy Commitments, 1921–1976," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1976, pp. 1–26.

[5]Western writers erroneously believe that the Chinese have a cultural and ideological need for a single strong leader and that Deng has fulfilled this need since Mao's demise. In fact, none of Deng's peers has considered his authority absolute, and Chen Yun and Ye Jianying used to challenge his policies and decisions. A person like Deng, who has been ousted from office twice in 10 years and has had to confess his mistakes on several occasions, has too many political scars.

[6]See An Zhiguo, "Three Echelons of Leading Cadres," *Beijing Review*, July 4, 1983, p. 4.

[7]Parris H. Chang, "Interview with Hu Yaobang," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1983, p. 69.

[8]Ibid.

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Vice-premiers Li Peng (right) and Tian Jiyun seen at a press conference on March 28, 1987, when the National People's Congress was meeting.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

echelon of leaders includes vice-premiers Li Peng and Tian Jiyun and party secretary Hu Qili, who are in their fifties or younger. They have been trained and promoted since the early 1980's in anticipation of greater leadership responsibilities in the future. In apprenticeship, their influence is less than that of the leaders in the second echelon.

Three points need to be emphasized. First, the CCP leadership system is based on the rule of man, in which politics is highly personalized and hardly institutionalized; hence the power or influence of a leader depends more on who he is and his *guanxi* (networks of personal connections) than on his official position.

Second, the system is far-reaching in its gerontocracy. The elders dominate and exercise greater influence than the younger leaders regardless of what titles each may hold. Thus, a vote is rarely taken in the Politburo, and the formula "one man, one vote" does not apply.[9]

Third, and this may be most consequential, the leadership system is now essentially collective in nature. Mao was both the ruler and the "high priest"—he performed such major leadership functions as legitimation and initiation of policy, conflict resolution, and political integration. In short, he filled the paramount role of "law giver." By contrast, Deng has never been an established ideologist, and is not capable of combining all the key leadership roles. The collective rule that inevitably followed in the wake of his rise to power has led to dispersion and fragmentation of power, which in turn has tended to generate leadership disunity. To maintain a viable coalition, Deng has had to rely on a mix of persuasion, cajolery, compromise, and threat. Often he has been forced to make concessions. Hu Yaobang's plight is partly due to the fact that he had to serve several "masters" who did not agree with one another.

Struggle over Power and Policy

Many Western analysts also make the mistake of underestimating the leadership differences and exaggerating the consensus in CCP policy councils. They err in believing that various factions agree on main objectives (e.g., modernization, reforms, etc.), and differ only on the tactics and means to accomplish agreed-upon goals. However, as Hu's forced departure and the subsequent campaign against bourgeois liberalization

[9]Indicative of the great respect Chinese hold for seniority, the enlarged Politburo meeting on January 16, 1987, that decided Hu Yaobang's fate did not have to take a vote among the participants—when the party elders called for it, the decision was unanimous, as usual.

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have shown, there have been sharp conflicts at the top, which are not only over methods, but also over power, policy, and personality.

In the Politburo, several veteran leaders harbor strong reservations about Deng's open-door policy and reform programs. Heading the list is 82-year-old Chen Yun, who, like Deng, is a member of the five-man Politburo Standing Committee, the regime's top policy-making organ, and an authoritative spokesman on China's economy and party discipline. At the party's National Conference in September 1985, Chen was outspoken in his criticism of Deng's reform measures. He attacked what he viewed as a lack of central planning and excessive reliance on the market mechanism in the economy and "the worship of money" with its attendant corrosive influence on the party's work habits and on social mores generally. Without naming names—but unmistakably with Deng in mind—Chen urged that all major policy decisions be made collectively after full consultation and declared emphatically, "No one should try to have the final say."[10]

Another Deng critic is Peng Zhen, currently a Politburo member and chairman of the National People's Congress.[11] Peng is more than 85 years old, but exhibits vigor in health and strength in politics. Peng is regarded by some Chinese as a "restorationist," who would prefer to go back to the orthodox system of the "command economy" of the 1950's, albeit with some adjustments.[12] Both Peng and Chen are highly critical of current efforts at structural reform and the use of market forces, as well as of the organizational tinkering that has accompanied these efforts. Their views remain surprisingly popular in the bureaucracy because many cadres have become accustomed to a system of party control and bureaucratic planning and see change as a threat to their personal power.

For several different reasons, PLA officers also have been critical of de-Maoization, of the repudiation of the Cultural Revolution, and of the policies of opening China to the outside world and of reform promoted by Deng and his associates. Many PLA cadres are bitter because Deng's policy to send the PLA "back to the barracks" has compelled PLA officers to yield the party and government posts that they had taken over from civilians in the 1960's. This has led to a devaluation of the PLA's status and political role and the loss of power and privileges for numerous PLA cadres.

Chen Yun delivers a speech on September 25, 1985, to the National Conference of the Chinese Communist Party.

—New China Pictures Company via Eastfoto.

It is no secret that many military leaders detest the regime's laissez-faire rural policy. In their view, the policy has undermined the ability of the PLA to recruit and retain soldiers. Young people, they say, have been lured away by economic opportunities at home and are no longer attracted to the rigors of barracks life.

In theory, the PLA should welcome Deng's modernization drive, because it stands to benefit from the modernization of national defense. In reality, however, because military modernization has been given low priority and military budgets have been shrinking in both relative and absolute terms for a number of years,[13] the PLA has remained unenthusiatic about the drive.

Many PLA cadres have also been antagonized by specific reform policies. For example, the policy of retiring old cadres and promoting younger and better-educated ones—a major plank in Deng's platform that was pushed by Hu with excessive zeal—threatens the

[10] *Beijing Review*, Sept. 30, 1985, p. 20.

[11] In 1986 and 1987, Peng Zhen has been a highly active defender of socialism, and has often criticized exponents of "bourgeois democracy." One of his speeches was published in *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing) on January 15, 1987.

[12] Wang Juntao, "An Analysis of China's Past, Preent and Future," *The Seventies* (Hong Kong), No. 134, March 1981, p. 69.

[13] The military budget for 1987 is reportedly set at 20.4 billion yuan (US$5.5 billion), slightly below last year's budget and a record low 8.2 percent of the 1987 state budget. This compares to a 20 percent share at the time of China's 1979 invasion of Vietnam and 40 percent during the Korean war in the early 1950's. See Julian Baum, "Deng Finesses the Streamlining of China's Army," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), July 30, 1987, p. 12.

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jobs and perquisites of veteran officers. Hence, they have resisted the policy and dragged their feet on another of Deng's key measures—the plan to cut PLA troops by one million. By the end of 1986, more than two years after the proposed cut was publicized, only 40 percent of Deng's goal had been realized.[14] Moreover, many PLA leaders are strongly opposed to Hu Yaobang; they objected to Deng's earlier suggestions (in 1985 and 1986) that he step down from the chairmanship of the party Military Affairs Committee (MAC) and elevate Hu to that post.[15] Hu has antagonized the PLA both because of his stinging attack on Mao and because of his defense of intellectuals, including a playwright named Bai Hua, who was denounced by the official organ of the military for "uglifying the socialist motherland, blackening the image of the party and the country, and defaming the people's army" in his movie script, "Bitter Love."[16] When the PLA held an enlarged conference on political work during December 11–25, 1986, Hu is said to have come under harsh criticism for, among other things, the decline in military spending and neglect of ideological work.[17]

Although Deng's modernization drive and daring reforms have achieved remarkable results, they are not an unqualified success. The "open-port" cities that were established to attract foreign capital and technology were such failures that 10 of the 14 had to be "closed" in June 1985. Despite marked improvements in living conditions in the rural areas of China's coastal provinces, most urban residents suffer from soaring prices and annual double-digit inflation.

Furthermore, because of policies that encourage people to get rich, corruption has become rife among cadres, and the gap is widening between the "haves" and "have nots," and between resource-rich and resource-poor communities. Beijing's promises of economic modernization and a better life have aroused the material desires of average Chinese, without providing the means to satisfy these new desires; as a result, unfulfilled expectations have turned into discontent and alienation. Moreover, the regime's open-door policy has fostered "bourgeois tendencies" in Chinese society and undermined the faith of the populace in the regime's ideological teachings.

All of these problems have provided Deng's critics with heavy political ammunition. The critics mounted a campaign against "spiritual pollution" in 1983–84 and used it as a weapon to constrain Deng's open-door policy and reform programs. Although the campaign was short-lived and Deng Liqun, the conservative ideologue who had masterminded the campaign and given it a big push, was dismissed by Hu from his post in the CCP's Propaganda Department, the conflict between the reformers and their critics has continued.

In the fall of 1985, at the party's National Conference, the conservatives again strongly asserted themselves.[18] They urged the party to devote special attention to ideological education and "socialistic ethics." In September 1986, they scored a major victory when they blocked planned political reforms championed by the reform camp and, instead, pushed through the 6th Plenum of the party's Central Committee (CC) a lengthy resolution that stressed "socialist spiritual civilization" to cope with the crisis of belief in China.[19]

The current leadership conflict and Hu's forced resignation is best understood in the broad political context set out above. The student demonstrations that began in December 1986 and Hu's "mismanagement" of them only brought a simmering crisis to a head. There is no question that the conservatives and many more cadres with vested interests are not happy with Deng's programs and that the recent conservative upsurge has had a distinct anti-Deng overtone.

As the party's chief executive and the "manager" of Deng's reform movement, Hu could not have avoided the onus for the problems that emerged. When Deng helped set up the pro-democracy movement last year by calling for political reforms he said were essential to economic reforms, Hu was on the front line in operational terms. When student protest almost got out of hand, it was Hu that had to bear the blame. To make matters worse, Hu—unlike Deng and other Chinese officials who regard democracy and the students as tools and as a means to other goals—was seen by his colleagues as becoming "too soft." His defense in Politburo meetings of students' constitutional rights and his tendency to

[14]Xinhua (Beijing), of Dec. 12, 1986, reported that the number of troops had been reduced by 410,000. By mid-1987, however, China apparently reported completion of the one-million man demobilization. See Baum, loc. cit.; also Daniel Southerland, "Chinese Army Seen Lagging in Efficiency, Weapons Technology," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 6, 1987.

[15]Xiao Yi, "Why Has the Military Opposed Hu Yaobang," *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), April 1987, pp. 20–21. When Hu succeeded Hua as party chairman in June 1981, he failed to gain concurrent chairmanship of the Military Affairs Commission (MAC), which Hua and Mao had enjoyed; his inability to secure military support then and in later years proved to be politically fatal.

[16]During April 17–20, 1981, *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation Army Daily—Beijing) published a series of attacks on Bai Hua, but *Renmin Ribao* was silent. Four months later, on August 18, the party organ felt compelled to print a self-criticism conceding its error in not criticizing Bai Hua and other writers in good time.

[17]Xiao Yi, loc. cit.

[18]See the speeches of Chen Yun and Li Xiannian prominently published beside Deng's in *Renmin Ribao* on September 24, 1985.

[19]See "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society With an Advanced Culture and Ideology," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 6, 1986, centerfold pages I–VIII.

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Student demonstrators hold up a banner reading "Strive for freedom. Struggle for democracy" as they surge past a police cordon to enter Tiananmen Square in Beijing on January 1, 1987.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

speak like an advocate of Western democracy and political freedoms is said to have annoyed even Deng.

Hu had other political liabilities as well. Until his forced departure, he operated very much in the shadow of his mentor. Consequently, his own leadership qualities remained largely unproven. Moreover, Hu's tendency to promote largely his former associates from the Communist Youth League (e.g., Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, Wu Xueqian, Hao Jianxiu, and Wang Zhaoguo) made him vulnerable to charges of factionalism, and alienated officials of other leadership factions.

Moreover, Hu tended to make too many enemies. In 1986, he did two things that especially alienated and provoked many powerful people, prompting them to take joint action to have him toppled. First, Hu is said to have used the campaign against corruption, which was launched in January 1986 with immense publicity, as a political weapon against the conservatives and the critics of Deng's reforms. In a drive to strike at the "tigers," the big perpetrators, Hu reportedly approved the arrests of many high officials and their relatives, including Hu Shiying, a son of Politburo member Hu Qiaomu.[20]

Second, in his zeal to rejuvenate the policy-making councils, Hu Yaobang became too much of a threat to veteran officials. He is said to have called for the retirement of one-third of the present CC members, and in the autumn of 1986, he proposed an extensive leadership reshuffle, including the retirement of Deng Xiaoping and many other elders, and prepared a list of future leaders to be approved at the forthcoming party congress.[21]

Thus, the student demonstrations provided a convenient pretext for Hu's critics. On December 27, 1986, according to sources inside China, Peng Zhen and six other conservative party and PLA leaders went to see Deng

[20]According to sources inside China, Peng Zhen's daughter was also implicated in a bribe scandal and was investigated by police, but was exonerated and set free later. Miss Ye Zhifong, an official at the State Economic Commission and daughter of Ye Fei, former commander of the navy and currently a vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, received 17 years in prison for accepting a bribe from a foreign company.

[21]Lu Keng, "The True Story Behind China's Political Shakeup," *Pai Shing* (Hong Kong), Apr. 1, 1987, p. 3.

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Xiaoping to make their case against Hu Yaobang.[22] They attacked the General Secretary for, among other things, what they felt to be his poor leadership in ideological work and his protection of writers who had spread anti-party and anti-socialist ideas that had created conditions for the growth and dissemination of bourgeois liberalization, and asked for his dismissal. This created a very difficult choice for Deng. After all, Hu was his close aide and hand-picked successor, and as recently as the spring of 1986, Deng had expressed his confidence in Hu by telling foreign visitors that if the heavens were to collapse, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang could hold them up. If Deng completely reversed himself under the prevailing circumstances, he ran the risk not only of calling into question his own judgment but also of exposing his political weakness.

On the other hand, if Deng continued to back Hu, he risked alienating large numbers of China's power-holders, a move that could have endangered both his own leadership status and his modernization programs. Deng, a quintessential pragmatist throughout his political career, knew when to make a deal.[23] In order to cut his losses, Deng decided to let Hu go, but replaced him with Zhao Ziyang. In so doing, Deng sought to keep control of the situation and continue the course of reform and the open-door policy at home while projecting an image of leadership stability and continuity abroad.

On January 16, 1987, the New China News Agency (Xinhua) formally released the news that in an enlarged meeting of the CCP Politburo earlier that day, Hu Yaobang had made a "self-criticism of his mistakes on major issues of political principles in violation of the party's principle of collective leadership" and resigned as general secretary.[24] The enlarged Politburo meeting, added the news report, had accepted Hu's resignation and appointed Zhao Ziyang acting general secretary. The report also announced that these two decisions would be submitted to the "next plenary session of the Central Committee for confirmation."

Since, according to Article 21 of the Constitution of the CCP,[25] the party general secretary can be appointed and dismissed only by a CC plenum, the actions of the enlarged Politburo meeting are "unconstitutional." Why did the CCP leaders chose not to convene a CC meeting to approve such an important decision? Is it possible that Hu commanded sufficient support in the CC to block or challenge the elders' plan? In any case, the information in the January 16 Xinhua report that four members of the party Secretariat, 17 leading members of the Central Advisory Commission, two leading members of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and "other comrades" attended the enlarged Politburo session and joined the full and alternate members of that body to decide on the dismissal and replacement of the party general secretary helps shed light on China's political life.[26] Clearly, the group of old men who were pushed into political retirement against their will have refused to "fade away," and seek to reassert themselves. For example, Bo Yibo, vice-chairman of the Central Advisory Commission, is—at the age of 78—politically more active than ever and has a major role in preparations for the 13th CCP Congress.[27] Deng's widely publicized plan for an orderly, stage-by-stage leadership succession faces a grave test.

Conservatives on the Rise

Early this year, the party launched a campaign to combat "bourgeois liberalization," which is officially defined as "an idea negating the socialist system in favor of capitalism." According to a *Renmin Ribao* editorial of January 6, 1987:

Today, there are a few people who advocate bourgeois liberalization and propose to shift all the capitalist baggage to China. When we talk about economic structural reform, they want to take the capitalist road; and when we talk about political structural reform, they want to copy capitalist practice. In fact, they intend to lead China's current policies in the direction of capitalism.

To fight the spread of bourgeois liberalization, the editorial stressed "adherence to the four cardinal principles" (the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the communist party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought) and called for the party to strengthen "leadership over ideology, theory, literature and art, and education."

[22]Ibid. These leaders were Yang Shangkun, Yu Qiuli, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, Hu Qiaomu, and Deng Liqun. Yang and Yu are members of the Politburo and also PLA leaders; Hu, a member of the Politburo, and Deng Liqun, a member of the Secretariat, are two ranking conservative ideologues; Wang, formerly a PLA general, and Bo are vice-chairmen of the Central Advisory Commission.

[23]Deng Xiaoping is reported to have made a self-criticism in 1966 and to have written self-deprecating letters to Hua Guofeng in 1976 and 1977 to secure his personal reinstatement. See *Mainland China Monthly* (Taipei), Dec. 15, 1983, pp. 47–48.

[24]*Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 17, 1987.

[25]See Beijing Xinhua in English, Sept. 8, 1982, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Sept. 9, 1982, p. K/10.

[26]See fn. 24.

[27]See Bo's article and interview in *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 17 and Feb. 14, 1987. Bo is included in an ad hoc group (which initially had 13 members, but now only five) that is preparing for the 13th CCP Congress. See *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), June 12, 1987, p. 5.

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

Peng Zhen, Chairman of the National People's Congress, seen in September 1985.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Early in 1987, a number of well-known and well-respected intellectuals and writers were expelled from the party or dismissed from their administrative positions in order to intimidate their colleagues. For example, Fan Lizhi, a professor of physics and vice-president of Hefei's University of Science and Technology, who is known as China's Andrey Sakharov for having advocated human rights and Western democratic ideas, was expelled from the CCP on Deng Xiaoping's orders and transferred to a research position in Beijing. Liu Binyan, a highly popular investigative reporter at *Renmin Ribao* who has exposed corruption among party cadres and other ills in the system, and Wang Ruowang, a Shanghai dissident writer, were also stripped of their party memberships at Deng's urging. As part of the campaign to tighten control over the media, censorship was strengthened and scores of journals and newspapers have been forced to suspend publication. Zhu Houze, the head of the CCP Propaganda Department appointed by Hu Yaobang in 1985, lost his job in the wake of Hu's dismissal and was replaced by a conservative ideologue named Wang Renzhi, formerly a deputy editor of the party's theoretical organ *Hong Qi* (Red Flag).

This ideological offensive was also accompanied by the resurgence of many conservative veteran party officials, who had gradually faded into the background. Peng Zhen is among the most notable: for example, a speech of his defending the correctness of Marxist general principles, originally given at a symposium in Beijing on October 28, 1986, was published prominently in both *Renmin Ribao* and *Hong Qi* in mid-January.[28] In addition, Chinese television and print media publicized many activities attended by Peng and other elders and gave prominent coverage to their remarks. When the National People's Congress (NPC) met in March and April, Peng held a press conference in his capacity as NPC chairman and used the occasion to publicly criticize Hu Yaobang.[29] In addition, Bo Yibo, Wang Zhen, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, and Yu Qiuli are also actively pursuing the campaign against bourgeois ideas and have been outspoken in defense of the four cardinal principles.[30]

When acting party General Secretary and Premier Zhao Ziyang delivered a government report to the NPC meeting at the end of March, his message reflected the ambiguity of the current political scene. Zhao went out of his way to reassure audiences inside and outside China that the economic reforms, policies of opening to the outside world and of invigorating the economy through market forces, and other practical measures remain unchanged. Specifically, he called for further reform of enterprise management and of the labor and wage systems. At the same time, Zhao had harsh words for exponents of bourgeois liberalization, who he said were "trying to break away from the leadership of the Communist Party and negate the system in favor of capitalism," and he placed great emphasis on upholding the four cardinal principles, which he characterized as "the central task in the political-ideological sphere." To eliminate pernicious ideological influences, he also reaffirmed strict ideological controls over the mass media, the schools, and publications.[31]

Nevertheless, in an attempt to arrest excesses of the campaign in some of China's provinces, Zhao also sought to set limits on the campaign and confine it to the party and the political-ideological domain. He stated emphatically that the struggle against bourgeois liberal-

[28]See Peng Zhen, "Several Questions Concerning the Guiding Thought on the Construction of the Socialist Spiritual Civilization," *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 15, 1987, and *Hong Qi* (Beijing), Jan. 16, 1987.

[29]Peng's public attack on Hu was reported in *Renmin Ribao* and virtually all major Chinese newspapers on April 9, 1987. Earlier, in March, a CC document No. 8, which was distributed to select cadres throughout China, detailed political, policy, and personal errors committed by Hu in the past years. See Qi Wen, "A Glance at the Central Committee Documents," *The Nineties* (Hong Kong), June 1, 1987, pp. 34–35.

[30]The publicity subsided considerably after mid-May, which signifies a major shift in the political trends in favor of the reformers.

[31]*Beijing Review*, Apr. 16, 1987, pp XII–XIII.

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Premier Zhao Ziyang delivers the opening address to the March 25, 1987, session of the National People's Congress of China.

—Forrest Anderson/Gamma-Liaison.

ization should be devoted to solving the "problems of basic principles and orientation" and not be concerned with "policies of economic reform, rural policies, scientific and technological research, exploration of literary and artistic styles and techniques, or the everyday life of the people," nor be conducted in rural areas.[32]

When Zhao delivered his report, Hu Yaobang was present and sat in the NPC presidium with other delegates. This marked Hu's first public appearance in 1987, and reportedly occurred at Deng Xiaoping's urging—as a demonstration of leadership unity.

As of late spring there were indications that the international business community had not been reassured. As reflected in Premier Zhao's NPC report, the proclaimed policy to espouse simultaneously the objectives of both the reformers and the conservatives is highly self-contradictory. Zhao will have to perform a political balancing act in attempting to juxtapose their positions, i.e., adhere to the four cardinal principles and at the same time promote reform and open-door policies. Reconciling and integrating the two highly divergent lines into a coherent and integrated government policy promises to resemble the unproductive endeavor or trying to square a circle. Moreover, foreign businessmen have noted the lack of any new reform intiatives in Zhao's report; undoubtedly, they must be disappointed that the NPC Standing Committee failed to approve both a draft enterprise law, which was to regulate conversion of state-owned enterprises into joint-stock corporations, and the long-debated law on bankruptcy.

Foreign investors have adopted a wait-and-see attitude, and investment has dropped markedly in the first half of 1987. This drop came on top of a 47.6 percent decline in foreign investment in 1986 (US$3.3 billion compared to $6.3 billion in 1985).[33] Furthermore, due to a huge trade deficit in 1986 ($11.98 billion), strict controls have been placed on foreign exchange, and imports have been cut by more than 10 percent so far in 1987. Although the PRC may increase foreign borrowing (it leaped 96.3 percent to $6.93 billion in 1986) to finance imports needed for modernization, protectionism in the United States and the European Economic Community seems likely to slow China's export growth in 1987. All of

[32]Ibid., p. XVII.
[33]*Daily Yomiuri* (Tokyo), Jan. 25, 1987, p. 4.

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these problems, in combination with political uncertainties and the ideological campaign, will inevitably have an adverse impact upon the Chinese economy.

The Reformers' Response

Concern over this prospect has prompted the reform forces to mount a counteroffensive to rein in the conservatives and to slow the tempo of the political-ideological campaign and minimize its disruptive effect. According to a Hong Kong report of early June, which was based on sources inside China, Zhao summoned more than 600 cadres from the media and publication circles to a conference in Beijing, where he delivered a lengthy speech which, he said, was approved by Deng Xiaoping personally and also contained input from not a few veteran cadres.[34] In this speech, Zhao supported both the campaign to combat bourgeois liberalization and the policy to continue reforms and the open door, but he instructed the regime's publicists to place emphasis on the latter, as it is still new to the people and not well understood. Zhao also defended the responsibility system in the countryside and other reform measures, refuted the arguments of the critics point by point, and admonished conservative ideologues (like Deng Liqun, but without naming names) for being too rigid and dogmatic and for shackling China's productive forces.[35]

Deng Xiaoping, in meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries in May, was at great pains to reaffirm China's open-door policy and to stress the danger of leftist trends. For example, he suggested to North Korean leader Kim Il-song that he pay a visit to Shenzhen, one of China's four special economic zones, which Deng apparently sees as a showcase of China's policy of opening up to the world. He told Singapore's First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong on May 29 that because of ultra-leftist excesses, China had stagnated during the 20 years between 1957 and 1978.[36]

There were other signs of a counteroffensive in the late spring of 1987. In a move to show that the policy on intellectuals remains unchanged despite the media attacks and selective firings, Premier Zhao personally approved an exit visa for Professor Fan Lizhi to go to Europe at the end of May to attend an academic conference. Before his own departure for an 18-day tour of Eastern Europe in early June, Zhao named Hu Qili and senior Vice-Premier Wan Li to be temporarily in charge of the party Secretariat and the State Council, respectively, during his absence. The move was symbolically significant, because Hu Qili is believed to be Hu Yaobang's close associate and was often mentioned by the latter as his the man to succeed him in the post of general secretary, while Wan Li is widely seen as a reform-minded moderate. Both have been the targets of conservative assault.

Former party General Secretary Hu Yaobang applauds Premier Zhao Ziyang's report to the National People's Congress on March 25, 1987.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Perhaps even more important over the long run, leaders in the reform camp have spoken out again in favor of political reform, which was blocked by conservative forces at the 6th CC Plenum of September 1986.[37] Deng Xiaoping is reported to have told the visiting governor-general of Canada in March that he was still committed to China's political reform and that "China's open-door economic policy is sure to facilitate political reform." Zhao Ziyang also insisted that political reform remained on the agenda and that a blueprint for such reforms would be presented to the upcoming party congress.[38]

[34]Guo Ke, "Zhao Ziyang Dueled with Deng Liqun Once Again," *The Nineties*, June 1, 1987, p. 6.

[35]Ibid. Editorials of *Renmin Ribao* on May 17 and 22, 1987, weighed in on behalf of the counteroffensive mounted by Zhao and Deng Xiaoping.

[36]*Renmin Ribao*, May 30, 1987.

[37]See Premier Zhao's conversation with Singapore's Vice-Premier Goh Chok Tong in ibid.

[38]Julian Baum, "Political Reform Is Still on the Agenda in China," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 29, 1987, p. 1.

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Table 1: China's Aging Elite: Members of the CCP Politburo of the 12th Central Committee Elected in 1982 and 1985

Names	Age	Concurrent post(s)
Standing Committee		
Zhao Ziyang[1]	68	Premier
Deng Xiaoping	83	Chairman, Central Advisory Commission; Chairman, Military Commission
Li Xiannian	82	President of the PRC
Chen Yun	82	First Secretary, Central Discipline Inspection Commission
Hu Yaobang[2]	72	
Full members		
Peng Zhen	85	Chairman, National People's Congress
Yang Shangkun	80	Permanent Vice-Chairman, Military Commission
Wan Li[3]	71	Vice-Premier, State Council
Yao Yilin[4]	70	Vice-Premier, State Council
Yu Qiuli[3]	73	Director, PLA General Political Department
Yang Dezhi	77	PLA Chief of Staff
Xi Zhongxun	74	Vice-Chairman, National People's Congress
Hu Qiaomu	75	Chairman, State Council Committee on Academic Degrees
Fang Yi	71	State Councillor
Qiao Shi[3 4]	63	Vice-Premier, State Council
Wu Xueqian[4]	66	State Councillor; Foreign Minister
Hu Qili[3 4]	58	Permanent Secretary, Party Secretariat
Li Peng[3 4]	59	Vice-Premier, State Council
Tian Jiyun[3 4]	58	Vice-Premier, State Council
Ni Zhifu	54	Director, All-China Federation of Trade Unions; Secretary, Tianjin Municipal CCP Committee
Alternate members		
Qin Jiwei	73	Commander, Beijing Military Region
Chen Muhua (female)	66	State Councillor; President, Bank of China

[1]Appointed acting General Secretary of the party on January 16, 1987, as Hu Yaobang resigned.
[2]"Resigned" from post of General Secretary on January 16, 1987.
[3]Also a member of the party Secretariat.
[4]Elected in 1985.

The republication on July 1, 1987, in *Renmin Ribao* of Deng's lengthy speech on leadership reforms, which had been delivered to an enlarged Politburo meeting on August 18, 1980, unmistakably reveals the intentions of the Dengists and indicates their rising influence. Members of the CCP Secretariat are hard at work to present to the Congress for approval a draft document on how to reform the authoritarian one-party political system, but those against change could try to defeat the efforts or water down the reform, as in the past.

One thing is quite certain. As the party congress draws nigh, the maneuvering and conflict inside the CCP leadership will intensify. Already, the reformist forces and the conservatives are jockeying for position and bargaining on practically every issue concerning power and policy.

The 13th CCP Congress

The two most important decisions to be made at the forthcoming party congress in October are the selection of China's new leadership line-up and the approval of future policies for the next five years. According to the CCP Constitution, the party congress will elect a new Central Committee, which in turn will elect a new Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, and Secretariat.

At the present time, the CCP high command is dominated by superannuated leaders, who constitute the oldest ruling group in any of the world's major powers. The average age of the CCP Politburo, which has the final say on the regime's policy (see Table 1), is close to 70; of its 20 members and two alternate members, 14 are 70 or older, and of these five are in their 80's. In addition, the party constitution (Art. 22) has permitted members of the Standing Committee of the party Central Advisory Commission (CAC)—a group of prestigious veteran party and military leaders who have retired—to attend Politburo sessions in a nonvoting capacity.[39] As pointed out earlier, 17 "leading members" of the CAC took part in the January 16 enlarged Politburo session that acted on Hu Yaobang's resignation. Moreover, since then, three vice-chairmen of the CAC, Bo Yibo (78), Wang Zhen (79), and Song Renqiong (78) have become actively involved in the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. It is true that the party's daily decision-making organ, the Secretariat, is composed of younger leaders (see Table 2), as a result of the shuffle carried out at the National Party Conference in September 1985; however, these leaders belong to the second and third echelon of leadership, and they primarily carry out the policy set by the elders.

It should be noted that for years Deng Xiaoping has campaigned for the rejuvenation of the leadership and sought the retirement of aging leaders, but that he has

[39]See *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 9, 1982, p. K/11.

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Table 2: Members of the Secretariat of the 12th CCP Central Committee

Name	Year elected	Age
Zhao Ziyang, Acting Gen. Sec.[1]	1982	68
Hu Qili[1]	1982	58
Wan Li[1]	1982	71
Yu Qiuli[1]	1982	73
Qiao Shi[1]	1985	63
Tian Jiyun[1]	1985	58
Li Peng[1]	1985	59
Chen Pixian	1982	71
Deng Liqun	1982	72
Hao Jianxiu (female)	1985	52
Wang Zhaoguo	1985	46

[1]Also members of the Politburo.

encountered stubborn resistance and his efforts have been only partially successful. In order to induce, if not compel, the Old Guard to quit this time, Deng may step down from the Politburo and ask those members who are over or close to 75 to do the same. When he resigned the post of the vice-premiership in August 1980, he also effected the resignations of six other vice-premiers, including Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. Deng served his notice on June 4, 1987, that he wanted to retire at the October party congress because of his age; he reportedly told visiting Japanese Komeito Chairman Junya Yano that "one of the most important tasks of the congress is to rejuvenate the party ranks; old people such as those of my age should retire from the Politburo."[40]

If Deng has his way, drastic leadership changes would be effected. But will he? While it is not possible to predict at this time specific personnel changes before the showdown at the party congress, we can nonetheless analyze the discernible broad political trends and assess the impact of Hu Yaobang's dismissal and the political resurgence of the conservatives on the leadership structure and composition. According to some Chinese sources, when Deng told his colleagues at a central work conference in Baidaihe in July 1986 that he wanted to retire, he was greeted with a chorus of opposition. Rival political forces wanted Deng to stay on, each for their own reasons. Reformers need Deng to back them up and want him to retain his leadership posts. Some veteran officials do not want Deng to go, because if he does, they themselves would also have to go. Finally, not a few veteran leaders have opposed Deng's retirement because they did not have full confidence in Hu Yaobang at the helm and trusted Zhao Ziyang even less.

In this connection, Chen Yun's words in 1982 are still relevant. He declared at the 12th Party Congress that since the ranks of cadres showed a gap between the old and the young, the old comrades could not leave the leading bodies all at once and, in accordance with circumstances and practical needs, some should remain at the "front line" for the time being. Instead of handling heavy daily business, Chen added, the veteran cadres should devote their energies mainly to "helping and guiding younger cadres, passing on experience to them, giving advice on major issues, and keeping a close watch on the basic orientation of the system."[41]

It seems most likely that this type of argument will again be employed to counter Deng's efforts to remove old cadres from leading posts before and during the party congress. If anything, the political resurgence of the Old Guard following the ouster of Hu Yaobang has made it even more difficult for Deng to push veteran leaders out. Like Deng, they survived the Long March, made the revolution, were victimized during the Cultural Revolution, and staged a political comeback after Mao's demise. As their activities in the campaign against bourgeois liberalization indicate, they see themselves as the defenders of the values of the Communist revolution; they maintain that revolutionaries never retire and have asserted their inalienable right to "serve until the last moment of life."[42]

Instead of accenting the issue of leadership rejuvenation as the past years, the Chinese media have since early 1987, played up a different theme—"the integration of the old, the middle-aged, and youth" in the leadership councils—which may presage a new trend in leadership composition. The appointment of Wang Fang (66) as Minister of Public Security in April seems to signify the return of the old cadres. Wang is beyond the age of retirement (65) for ministerial positions, and the official that he replaced was only in his 50's.

Thus we can surmise that, barring extraordinary changes prior to the party congress in October, not only will most of the Old Guard in the Politburo stay on, but they also will nominate and promote their own protégés to leadership posts and help structure the future leadership line-up. In addition, both Peng Zhen (85) and Yang Shangkun (80) have a good chance to move up to the Politburo Standing Committee.[43] On the other hand, in order to demonstrate that leadership rejuvenation remains on the agenda, several up-and-coming officials who are in their 50's also are likely to be elevated to the

[40]*Daily Yomiuri*, June 5, 1987, p. 1.
[41]*Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 7, 1982, p. 2.
[42]Ibid. That was a remark made by Marshal Ye Jianying at the 12th CCP Congress, when he was 85 and ailing but reluctant to step down as a member of the Politburo's Standing Committee. He finally stepped down in 1985 and died the following year.
[43]Yang will be the most likely person to succeed Deng Xiaoping as chairman of the MAC, should Deng decide to relinquish the post.

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Politburo.[44] To make room for the newcomers, either the Politburo and its standing committee will have to be expanded, or a higher turnover of the incumbents will be necessary.[45] That Hu Yaobang will be dropped from the Politburo seems already a foregone conclusion; like Hua Guofeng before him, Hu will most likely be treated with courtesy, retained in the Central Committee, and perhaps even be given a highly visible, but less powerful post, especially now that the leadership struggle has become more civilized. Whether or not Hu's departure will adversely affect his reformist protégés like Hu Qili and Qiao Shi remains uncertain. Their future will probably depend a complex process of political balancing within the leadership.[46]

Who will become the new party general secretary is far from being settled. There is still a possibility that Zhao Ziyang will decline the position and choose to remain premier, as he has hinted to foreign visitors. The names of Hu Qili and two conservatives, Xi Zhongxun and Yao Yilin, have been advanced as possible candidates for general secretary if the post should be opened up. Zhao, however, would have to choose the party post if Deng Xiaoping insists; he almost certainly will have no difficulty winning confirmation at the 13th Congress. If Zhao assumes the post of general secretary, an acting premier will be appointed, pending the selection of a new premier by the NPC in March 1988. The serious contenders for this position are Wan Li, Yao Yilin, and Li Peng (the last a youthful Soviet-trained technocrat).

Insofar as future policies are concerned, the party congress is likely to adopt a platform embodying the new lines of compromise between the conservative and reformist elements of the leadership. As already evident in the Chinese media in recent months, the party will stress simultaneously the campaign against bourgeois liberalization and the policies continuing reform (opening up and invigorating the domestic economy), linking the latter with adherence to the four cardinal principles. New Dengist initiatives on political reforms as well as on economic reforms will be proposed at the party congress, but they are likely to be watered down. While the conservatives do not oppose reform and open-door policies per se, they want to maintain a centrally planned economy and travel on the "socialist road." They will attempt to set limits on market mechanisms.

[44]These might include Li Ruihuan, Mayor of Tianjin; Song Jian, State Councillor and chairman of the National Committee on Science and Technology; Wang Hanbin, NPC secretary-general and a protégé of Peng Zhen; Wang Hai, commander of the air force; and Li Tieying, formerly minister of the Electronics Industry and newly appointed chairman of the Committee on Institutional Reforms.

[45]Among those who may be dropped from the Politburo are Chen Muhua, Ni Zhifu, and Fang Yi.

[46]Hu Qili, standing secretary (number two) of the Secretariat and the person mentioned as the likely successor to the general secretary, has suffered at least a temporary eclipse in the wake of Hu Yaobang's ouster. However, he and Qiao appear to have regained some of their previous influence, as they are reportedly members of the five-man group in charge of preparations for the 13th Congress. Wang Zhaoguo, the youngest member of the Secretariat, who won rapid promotion as a result of Hu Yaobang's patronage, could be removed. Another Secretariat member, Hao Jianxiu, also seems likely to be removed.

Political Uncertainty Lies Ahead

It was ten years ago that Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated. Since then, he has staged a dramatic political comeback, campaigned for China's modernization, set in motion a chain of reforms and, in the process, emerged as China's most powerful leader. Over the past several years, however, opposition forces have gradually coalesced, and their strong backlash, which resulted in the ouster of Hu Yaobang and the campaign against bourgeois liberalization, has put Deng's reforms and open-door policies in danger. In response, Deng is taking steps to groom future successors who will share his power as well as his vision to ensure recent reforms will continue and survive him. He will most likely make Zhao Ziyang the next general secretary and do whatever necessary to support him. The question is how much longer can Deng, who is 83, remain active?

This is quite crucial, because Zhao just does not appear to have Deng's charisma and political authority. At present, he wields even less influence than did Hu Yaobang, his predecessor, because he lacks an extensive network of personal ties with the powerholders in the party and in the military, and, unlike Hu, was not a Long Marcher. There is reason to be concerned about whether or not Zhao and his associates can cope with the conservatives, and especially the Old Guard, and continue the reforms in the face of formidable opposition if Deng is not around.

As the ousters of Hua Guofeng and Hu Yaobang indicated, the power of leadership in China cannot be inherited—it has to be won. For Zhao or any future party leader to stay at the top, in time he must develop his *own* political strength and perform well, thereby validating to his allies and challengers alike his claim to leadership. Unlike Mao and his peers, who enjoyed an aura of authority as the founding fathers of the revolution, post-revolutionary leaders must perform and deliver in concrete, contemporary terms if they hope to consolidate their power. If Zhao fails in this regard, he, too, will suffer the same fate as Hua and Hu did, because the struggle to determine "who gets what, when, and how" has become more intense in China.

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Notes

Soviet Economic Interests in Afghanistan

M. Siddieq Noorzoy

SOVIET ECONOMIC interests and policies in Afghanistan, which can be traced over a period of nearly 70 years, should be viewed in the context of overall Soviet policies and interests in similar small developing countries. Such policies have demonstrably been based on economic as well as political and military considerations and designed to achieve long-term geopolitical goals. Recognition of this reality should help dispel the sort of naive analysis that views the Soviet Union's invasion of 1979 and its subsequent policies toward Afghanistan as merely hasty defensive responses to an unexpected threat to the Soviet Union's southern borders, or as an unintended misadventure, and should permit a clearer recognition of the nature of the long-term Soviet threat to that country.

One can trace from the very beginning of Afghan-Soviet relations in the 1920's a distinct set of consistent Soviet economic policies aimed at penetration, manipulation, control, and eventually exploitation.[1] After a setback in the 1930's and 1940's, Soviet efforts at economic penetration revived and took on greater complexity, operating at different levels for multiple purposes. After the 1979 invasion, these "softer" approaches gave way to a more overt effort to reshape the Afghan economy for de facto integration with the Soviet economy and to exploit more fully important Afghan natural resources (whose existence was almost unknown to the rest of the world, but was well-known for many years to the USSR).

Even the limited data available belie the almost universal assumption that the war in Afghanistan is a financial drain on the Soviet Union. They demonstrate that, to the contrary, the USSR is shifting the costs of the war to the Afghan people and eventually expects to make economic gains from its involvement in Afghanistan.

Larger Framework

Before examining events in Afghanistan, it is useful first to review briefly Soviet international economic policies. Since World War II, Soviet foreign economic policies have been projected on a global basis with complexities and workings that, because of the nature of the Soviet bureaucratic system, are still in large part uncomprehended.[2] Yet it is increasingly recognized that these policies and their implementaton are rarely the result of ad hoc decisions.

Since the 1920's, Moscow's basic economic decisions—both domestic and foreign—have been based on intermediate (five-year) and long-term (25-year) plans. Moreover, the USSR is a monolithic state, and

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[1]For the political history of Soviet-Afghan relations, see Leon B. Poullada, "The Road to Crisis, 1919–1980," in Rosanne Klass, Ed., *Afghanistan–The Great Game Revisited,* forthcoming from Freedom House.

[2]See, for example, P. Gruzinov, *The USSR's Management of Foreign Trade,* New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1979.

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hence it (or its agencies in international trade) forms not only one of the world's largest monopoly (single-seller) suppliers of commodities but also one of the world's largest monopsony (single-buyer) purchasers of imports from certain individual countries and even world markets. In these circumstances, trade tends to lack the corrective market forces of supply and demand and be susceptible to political manipulation by Moscow.

The "effectiveness" that this singular combination of long-term planning, monolithism, and combined monopoly/monopsony market powers provides becomes even more pronounced when trade is conducted on a bilateral basis—which is the basic Soviet approach to trade with small, underdeveloped countries. A significant portion of this trade is, in fact, carried out on a barter basis for which only implicit, unannounced prices may exist. Soviet-Afghan bilateral barter agreements have existed for agricultural products since the 1950's. Even when nominal price agreements for traded goods do exist, the Soviet government is often able to isolate its price agreements from world market prices (as in the case of Afghan natural gas).

The Soviet Union generally rejects the theory of comparative advantage in international trade whereby trade patterns are determined by comparative costs of production in a pair of countries or worldwide. Instead, there is a vague concept of domestic surplus as a basis for exports and domestic deficiency as a basis for imports. Even these criteria for generating a flow of commodities tend to be overridden by political circumstances and priorities.

In the global context, Soviet foreign economic policies have the following objectives:

- To expand economic relations through international, preferably bilateral, trade;
- To expand Soviet economic and political influence by creating economic dependency;
- To create economic complementarity with the Soviet economy, i.e., to export surplus Soviet goods and import scarce commodities;
- With respect to mineral resources, to export Soviet raw materials in return for high-tech imports, to enhance Soviet monopoly in various minerals by obtaining exclusive access to resources of underdeveloped countries, and to use such access to deny access to the United States and other free-world economies;[3]
- With respect to the less-developed countries, to foster dependency through rapid expansion of bilateral trade ties, the granting of long-term credits at nominally low interest rates, the offering of low-bid contracts that non-communist traders cannot or will not match, and the dumping of Soviet goods on LDC markets at prices below local domestic production costs.

Most of these objectives and methods can be seen in the history of Soviet-Afghan economic relations. Let us turn to this history, starting first with the long period of gradual penetration that preceded the 1978 communist coup and 1979 Soviet invasion.

Pre-1978 Economic Relations

Soviet economic efforts in Afghanistan before 1978 can be divided into roughly two periods. Between 1921 and 1955, Moscow tried, but on the whole failed, to obtain trade concessions from the Afghans or otherwise penetrate the Afghan economy for political as well as economic gains. From 1955 to 1978, the Soviets finally gained a foothold in Afghanistan and began to pursue the following goals:

- To penetrate the Afghan economy in various sectors and at multiple levels by diverting Afghan trade from free-world makets; by granting large-scale credits at uneconomically low, nominal interest rates of two percent or less;[4] and by insinuating direct Soviet participation into Afghan economic planning and policy formulation for sectoral allotments of government investments through targeted grants and credits and the attendant provision of advisers.
- To increase Afghan dependency on the Soviet economy through a rising volume of bilateral trade; through increased transit trade via the USSR to other markets (skillfully taking advantage of Afghan-Pakistani friction to encourage the Afghans to rely on Soviet transit alternatives);[5] through increasing Afghan debt obligations; and through complex monetary and barter arrangements (whose term structures are still unknown).

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[3]John R. Thomas has recently argued that natural resources, both within the Soviet Union and in the LDC's, play an important and special role in Soviet foreign policy. In the case of Siberian resources, the Soviets are trying to entice and intimidate Japan into trading technology for resources; in the case of LDC's, Soviet policy is twofold: obtaining access to LDC resources, and denying such access to the United States and its allies. See Thomas, *Natural Resources in Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York, National Strategy Information Center, Agenda Paper No. 15, 1985.

[4]This interest rate was applied to the first major Soviet loan to Afghanistan—$100 million in 1955. The USSR easily converted such a low nominal rate of interest to a much higher real rate of cost of borrowing by raising export prices of the goods that such a capital loan was to be spent on, by lowering the monetary or barter prices of Afghan exports to the Soviet Union, and by raising the costs of the services that accompany transfer of capital loans, e.g., the salary and benefits of Soviet technical advisers. See also John F. Shroder and Abdul Tawab Assifi, "Afghan Mineral Resources and Soviet Exploitation," in Klass, op. cit.

[5]Observable transit trade through the Soviet Union to markets in Europe has substantially increased since the invasion, though the actual volume cannot be determined from available trade data.

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Early relations. Having inherited the empire and expansionist ambitions of tsarist Russia, the new Soviet government was determined not merely to regain and hold the old imperial territories but to extend them. Despite rhetoric denouncing colonialism and exploitation, the communist regime ruthlessly crushed the independence movements in Central Asia.

During the reign of King Amanullah—which roughly coincided with the first decade of Soviet government—there was extraordinary good will on the part of Kabul toward the still-unknown new regime in Russia. This was a result of the Bolsheviks' liberal rhetoric. However, actual Soviet relations with Afghanistan and the Muslim states were highly revelatory of long-term Soviet intentions regarding their neighbors, Afghanistan in particular. These actions were a more accurate reflection of policy than Lenin's effusions of friendship.

Direct evidence that the new Soviet regime shared old tsarist ambitions in Afghanistan soon presented itself in connection with Panjdeh, an Afghan territory north of Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat, which had been invaded and annexed by tsarist Russia in 1885 in violation of treaty commitments. Despite a February 1921 Soviet-Afghan treaty providing for the return of Panjdeh to Afghanistan,[6] this never occurred. Instead, the territory was incorporated into the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union.

That same 1921 treaty acknowledged the independence of the Muslim states of Bukhara and Khiva, in accordance with Lenin's assurances of good intentions toward the Muslim kingdoms and his encouragement of Amanullah's pan-Islamic leadership ambitions. Yet even as the treaty was being signed, the Muslims in Bukhara, Khiva, and other independent states in Turkestan were being attacked by communist forces. For some years, Afghanistan supported the vain struggle of Soviet Muslims to retain their independence, accepting more than 200,000 refugees and providing assistance to the Muslim freedom fighters, known as the "Basmachi."[7] Eventually, the Soviets, by a combination of inducements and threats, were able to persuade Afghanistan to cut off its support. Thus isolated, the Muslim states were eventually subdued in a war of attrition.

To consolidate control, Moscow settled Slavs in these regions.[8] The Soviet Union also laid the groundwork for economic dependency by encouraging the local population to concentrate on the production of raw agricultural commodities such as cotton to be exported to the European part of the USSR in exchange for manufactured goods. Essentially, with some exceptions, this economic pattern still predominates.[9]

Meanwhile, the Soviets were already attempting to penetrate Afghanistan itself economically. Moscow proposed that the 1921 treaty, which provided for an exchange of consulates, should permit Soviet trade with private merchants as well as with the Afghan government.[10] Had this proposal been accepted, the Soviets would have had wide access to Afghan citizens through consulates in the key cites of Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Maimana, and Ghazni, as well as through the Soviet embassy in Kabul. Soviet officials could have used their overwhelming state-based monopoly/monopsony power in direct trade with individuals and private firms, and trade access would, of course, have facilitated political access.

Although this project was rejected, the treaty did allow Afghan goods to enter the USSR duty-free, while the Afghan duty on Soviet goods was cut to 5 percent. The result was a substantial increase in bilateral trade: Afghan exports to the USSR rose from 1.3 million rubles in 1923/24 to 11.7 million rubles in 1928/29,[11] while imports from the USSR in the same period jumped from a mere 69,000 rubles to 7 million rubles.[12] After Amanullah's abdication in 1929, the Soviet consulates were closed, and Soviet-Afghan trade stagnated.[13]

But Moscow did not give up. When a new commercial treaty was under negotiation in 1936, the Soviets proposed—with no success—to open consulates with trading privileges in all major Afghan cities. Eventually, under threats of invasion from the north, Afghanistan signed a new trade treaty with the Soviet Union on July 28, 1940. (As we shall see below, this interaction of military and economic pressures was to repeat itself in the late 1970's when Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud gave signs of trying to decrease his government's dependency on the USSR.)

[6]For the provisions of this treaty, see Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan 1900-1923: A Diplomatic History*, Los Angeles, University of California Press, Near Eastern Center, 1967, 188–91. Article No. IX of the treaty states that ". . . Russia agrees to hand over to Afghanistan the frontier districts which belonged to the latter in the last century . . . ."

[7]See Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1982, pp. 40–43.

[8]Ibid., pp. 59–64.

[9]For a discussion of Russian economic policies in these Muslim republics, see Francis Newton, "Soviet Central Asia: Economic Progress and Problems," in Elie Kedouri, Ed., *The Middle East Economy*, London, Frank Cass, 1976, pp. 87–107.

[10]See Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century*, Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1974, p. 56.

[11]The Afghan fiscal year runs from March 21 of a given year through March 20 of the following year.

[12]See Vartan Gregorian, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: 1880-1946*, Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University Press, 1969, pp. 146, 196 and 254. No appropriate afghani/ruble exchange rate is available for the period under discussion. Even the trade data are available only for some years.

[13]Thus, in 1955 Afghanistan reportedly exported some 10 million rubles worth of goods to the USSR and imported 12 million rubles worth from that country. See *United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* (New York), June 1967.

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In the aftermath of World War II, the United States began technical and then financial assistance to several major projects in the Helmand and Arghandab valleys of Afghanistan. Perhaps more important than this economic competition, in Soviet eyes, was Washington's effort in 1955 to include Afghanistan in the Baghdad Pact (together with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Britain, and the US) to block southward expansion of the USSR. Kabul's refusal and the related US refusal to provide military assistance to Afghanistan opened the door for a new era of Soviet economic and political penetration.

Economic relations in 1955–78. Afghan Prime Minister Daoud started accepting Soviet offers of military equipment and training beginning in 1956. In addition, in December 1955, Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolay Bulganin visited Kabul and offered the Afghans a $100-million loan at a nominal two percent interest rate.

By 1967, Soviet committed and uncommitted credits to Afghanistan totaled $570 million, and by 1978, the total had climbed to $1.265 billion. By contrast, US credits and grants, which were first extended prior to 1955, totaled only $470 million by 1977. Clearly, the Soviets intended to outperform the US in granting financial aid, as a means of seeking wider political as well as economic influence. In the period 1955–75, Afghanistan ranked third in terms of Soviet largesse to LDC's, outstripped only by Egypt and India.[14] This occurred despite repayment difficulties.

From the Afghan perspective, both the absolute magnitude of Soviet credit and its distribution by economic sector were important. As foreign debt grew, so did Afghanistan's repayment burden, as indicated by the fact that the country was forced to reschedule debt repayments. Moreover, the greater the concentration of Soviet loans in any given sector of the Afghan economy, the greater the dependency of Afghan policy-making in that particular sector on Soviet advice and decisions. By 1978, Afghanistan had more than 2,000 Soviet technical and economic advisers in its midst (only Algeria, Iran, and Iraq had more).[15]

Soviet influence was exerted through the term structure of loans, repayment schedules, and the introduction of barter payment in commodities, the price structure of which depended perforce on negotiated arrangements rather than world market prices. (This seems to have been applied especially to the development, pricing, and export of natural gas to the Soviet Union: the price and value of the exports of this commodity were determined by the schedule of debt repayments to Moscow.)[16] Increasingly, the Afghan government found it difficult to argue for better terms of trade, such as an increase in the price of Afghan gas exports.

This widespread Soviet involvement in the Afghan economy, structured and applied to complement the simultaneous growth of Afghan military dependency,[17] was used to promote political influence both externally (with respect to Afghanistan's foreign policy) and internally (with respect to penetration of Afghan political and military organizations) for long-range Soviet objectives. The presence of thousands of Soviet specialists in Afghanistan provided an opportunity for Soviet personnel to work more freely inside that country than ever before to achieve a multiplicity of goals.

Arguably, the short-run goal of many of the Soviet economic programs—mainly consumer-oriented ones—was to disarm traditional Afghan suspicion of Russian intentions and to generate acceptance of a Soviet presence.[18] Long-term objectives were more complex, and also less evident. Two significant aspects of Soviet economic policies in Afghanistan from 1955 to 1978 indicate their long-term nature and the subtlety of their application.

First, during the formalized planning period that began with the first Five-Year Plan (initiated under Daoud in 1957/58), the USSR gradually became Afghanistan's largest supplier of capital and technical advice; it became increasingly involved in the planning processes, especially after the end of the first plan (in March 1962). Not surprisingly, Soviet aid was directed at promoting the Kabul government's participation in economic life at the expense of the Afghan private sector. And, indeed, quantitative evidence for the fiscal years 1957–72 demonstrate that private investment (and therefore private capital formation) was in fact minimized.[19] To some extent this can be blamed on the constraints operating in the economy in general, but in large part, reduced levels of investment in the private sector by the government reflected conscious allocation of aggregate public investment to the disadvantage of the private sector, in disregard of national economic self-interest. As a result, a

[14]Orah Cooper and Carol Fogarty, "Soviet Economic and Military Aid to the Less Developed Countries, 1954–78," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change: A Compendium of Papers*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 648–62.

[15]See ibid.

[16]See Shroder and Assifi, loc. cit.

[17]See M.S. Noorzoy, "Long-Term Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretive Study," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (Cambridge, England), Vol. 17, No. 2, 1985, pp. 151–73 and sources cited therein. In the post-invasion period, the patterns of building more airports and enlarging existing ones, of road construction, and of construction of a railroad through Hairatan (1983) all complement military usage even though these are ostensibly being carried out for economic reasons.

[18]Ibid., pp. 160–61.

[19]See M.S. Noorzoy, "Planning and Growth in Afghanistan," *World Development* (Elmsford, NY), Vol. 4, No. 9, 1976, pp. 761–73.

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hitherto largely private-sector economy was transformed increasingly into a largely state-controlled one.

It is often argued that this was largely due to Daoud's policy position. However, it must be pointed out that the Daoud government only was in power for the First Five-Year Plan period and the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan (1962/63), whereas these policies continued through the whole period of planning.

The strategy was most evident in agriculture, which was almost entirely privately owned and operated, primarily by small farmers. Although agriculture was the most important single economic sector, it received a disproportionately small share of public investment.[20] As a result, nearly 50 percent of the arable land, most of which is dependent on irrigation, received little water and/or no cultivation during the three five-year plans (for 1957–72), despite a two-year drought-induced famine in some areas. It is noteworthy that the sole Soviet aid to this sector before 1978 was the establishment of a single model state-owned farm in Nangarhar province, the crops of which were exported to the USSR.

As we shall see, after the 1979 invasion, the Soviet attack on private agriculture in Afghanistan became much more direct and brutal. The Soviets' discouragement of sizable investment in privately-owned agriculture during the earlier period becomes all the more comprehensible if one assumes that the USSR anticipated the ultimate de-privatization and collectivization of Afghan farming. Such a process seems to have been at work since 1978, interrupted more by circumstance than by intent.

Second, in the manufacturing sector and, particularly, in the area offering Afghanistan the greatest potential for rapid growth—mining and mineral exploitation—Soviet economic aid was almost entirely limited to projects that were linked, directly or indirectly, with the Soviet economy. This policy prevented the development of an Afghan industrial base that could have raised national income and led to training and development of skilled labor and utilization of the often-wasted capabilities of Afghanistan's new educated class. Although the USSR formally agreed to help finance and develop basic industries,[21] it has reneged on the agreements.

These policies parallel those applied in Soviet Central Asia, i.e., the fostering of a colonial dependent relationship in which the periphery provides raw materials and minerals in exchange for manufactured goods. It seems clear that the Soviets were extending this policy to the Afghan economy long before the communist coup of 1978 or the 1979 invasion. The basic mechanism for creating this dependency was a selective aid policy and development of a growing volume of bilateral trade that increasingly tied the Afghan economy to that of the Soviet Union. Table 1 documents the swelling importance of the Soviet Union in Afghan foreign trade during this period. As can be seen, the upward swings correlate with the periods when Daoud (1953–63 and 1973–78) or communists (1978–) were in power. The low point in Soviet imports came in 1972–73, when there was very little international (US) interest in aiding Afghanistan.

Table 1: Soviet Share in Afghan Trade, 1957-86

(in percent)

SOVIET SHARE OF TOTAL AFGHAN EXPORTS	
1957/58 (first Daoud period)	29
1977/78 (second Daoud period)	37
1978/79 (first year under communist regime)	64
1981-86 (post invasion)	68
SOVIET SHARE OF TOTAL AFGHAN IMPORTS	
1958/59 (first Daoud period)	42
1962/63 (" " ")	58
1972/73 (last year of the constitutional period)	8.5
1977/78 (last year of the second Daoud period)	34
1979/80 (communist regime)	87
1985/86	na[1]

[1]Direct imports from the Soviet Union, as a proportion of total imports, have declined from the high of 1979/80. Taken together, in 1985/86, the USSR/East Bloc received 76 percent of Afghanistan's total exports and provided 67 percent of its total imports.

SOURCES: For trade data up to 1981/82, see M. Siddieq Noorzoy "Long-Term Economic Relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretive Study," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (Cambridge, England), Vol. 17, No. 2, 1985, Table 2, p. 164, and pp. 163-66. More recent data are reported on an ongoing basis in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC).

Post-Invasion Policies

It has been widely assumed that the invasion of Afghanistan has burdened the Soviet Union with an ongo-

[20]See M.S. Noorzoy, "Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan," a paper originally presented at the December 1980 meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Washington, DC, and subsequently published in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1983, pp. 25–45.

[21]On Soviet commitment to finance a petroleum refinery, new chemical fertilizer plants, gin and press plants for Balkh and Kunduz, a textile plant in Kunduz, a dye factory in Poli-Khumry, and a copper smelting operation, see *First Seven Year Plan (March 1976-March 1983)*, Ministry of Planning, Kabul, 1976, Vol. 2, pp. 69–80.

A. T. Assifi has described Soviet constraints on iron and copper development in Afghanistan and refusal to extend a gas pipeline from the Shibarghan gas fields to production and consumption centers inside Afghanistan. See his article, "The Russian Rope: Soviet Economic Motives and the Subversion of Afghanistan," in *World Affairs Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1982–83, pp. 253–66; also Shroder and Assifi, loc. cit.

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Table 2: Selected Soviet Exports to Afghanistan Since the Communist Takeover

(in US dollars)[1]

Year[2]	Machinery, equipment, transport vehicles	Geological equipment: drilling and extraction	Aircraft	Trucks	Petroleum, petroleum products
1979	$128,113,680	$31,367,400	$ 1,052,940	$17,825,460	$54,429,960
1980	156,425,840	36,790,800	963,240	28,426,620	102,884,000
1981	223,298,400	50,407,040	78,616,100	30,799,920	97,578,640
1982	299,219,040	27,563,120	125,110,480	46,087,680	98,396,000
1983	246,158,640	23,372,960	57,685,760	42,943,360	157,862,000
1984	455,744,160	22,679,360	222,470,160	66,450,960	162,684,560
Totals	$1,307,991,200	$192,180,680	$485,898,740	$232,534,000	$673,835,160

[1]Domestic dollar/ruble rates differ from foreign trade rates. The conversion rates applied here are US$1.38 per ruble for 1979/80 and $1.36 thereafter.
[2]The figures in this table are for the international calendar year, not the Afghan fiscal year (which begins March 21).

SOURCES: The statistical compendia *Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984,* Moscow, USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1981, 1983, 1984, and 1985.

ing economic drain; indeed, this is part of the rationale for the frequent description of Afghanistan as "Moscow's Vietnam." An examination of the economic data suggests, however, that far from facing an economic drain in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is forcing the Afghan economy to bear much of the military cost—and that in any case, the Soviets expect to make economic gains in the long run.

Information on the Afghan economy and trade since the invasion—and for that matter since the communist takeover in April 1978—is perforce based in part on data provided by Moscow, by members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), and by the puppet regime of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (all data that is limited and, in the case of Kabul, unreliable), plus extrapolations from announcements of trade agreements and new loans, as well as data provided by international organizations. But even these limited data indicate that what passes for "economic development" and "trade relations" is far from the international norm—that under the rubric of international trade, the Afghans are being forced to pay for the invasion and occupation of their country. The data also demonstrate that the Soviets are giving priority to the implementaton of a long-planned exploitation of Afghanistan's major mineral resources in ways that will benefit only the Soviet economy, and that the Afghans are being forced to pay for this despoilation.

As Table 2 indicates, in the period 1979–84 alone, the Soviets "sold" to Afghanistan more than two billion dollars worth of heavy equipment, most of it military, including more than $718 million in aircraft and trucks. These include, of course, the aircraft that bomb and strafe Afghan villages and spray incendiaries over the crops, and the trucks on which the Soviet and Afghan armies and their supplies move.[22] (By way of comparison, in the two years preceding the communist takeover, Afghanistan imported a total of only $4.2 million worth of trucks, most of them for ordinary commercial use, and international trade figures for the years 1974–79 show no aircraft purchases at all.)[23]

Equally important is the nature and intended use of what are seemingly nonmilitary items. "Machinery, equipment, and transportation vehicles" (codes 10–19 under Standard International Trade Classification) totaled $456 million for 1984 alone, and $1.3 billion for 1979–84. Although the exact nature of these items is not specified and is not readily ascertainable, almost certainly a significant part of them is military in nature, for there is no sector of the Afghan economy that could absorb such a large quantity of imports on a continuing basis. This is further evidenced by the fact that Soviet exports of machinery and equipment to the main sectors of the Afghan economy are listed separately in the trade statistics—agricultural equipment (codes 181–82), manufacturing machinery for textile (code 144) and chemical (code 150) industries, road construction equipment (code 154), and the geological equipment included in Table 2, plus several other categories of vehicles, such as passenger cars and tractors.

Some of these unspecified items of equipment may be destined for the construction and enlargement of So-

[22]The figures on aircraft, trucks, and petroleum also serve to indicate the intensification of the war, e.g., there was a four-fold increase in aircraft exports to Afghanistan between 1983 and 1984.
[23]*Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,* New York, United Nations, 1980, p. 63.

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viet air bases at Shindand, Bagram, Kabul, and elsewhere, and for the underground installations reportedly being built in several areas. Some may be for the construction of housing for Soviet personnel (which goes on apace), for the repair of major highways damaged by the ongoing war, or for the missile emplacements that have reportedly been constructed. It is likely that some items might be for use in constructing the railroads that the Soviets intend to run beyond Hairaton and or Turghandy from the border to key supply depots.[24]

Soviet sales of petroleum and petroleum products reveal again the exploitative, colonialist Soviet approach to developmental aid. The Soviet Union never built the petroleum refinery envisaged under Afghanistan's Seven-Year Plan (1976/77–1982/83). Although the fact is not shown in Soviet trade statistics, as late as 1982, Afghanistan exported $44.66 million of crude oil to the USSR while purchasing $98.4 million in refined petroleum and petroleum products.[25] Since prices were not made public for either set of transactions, there is at least room for a presumption of exploitation: low prices for Afghan crude (as is the case with Afghan natural gas), and high prices for Soviet refined products. This, along with similar trade in other commodities, reflects a strategy of keeping value-added low in Afghan products and exports and reserving for the Soviet Union the production of items with a greater value-added—a communist neo-mercantilist policy, so to speak.

Neither Soviet trade data nor international trade statistics show any Afghan exports of mineral resources other than natural gas to the Soviet Union, although these are known to occur. In addition to the crude oil mentioned above, there are widespread reports of Soviet mining of uranium and the seizure of government stores of lapis lazuli and emeralds. Efforts to begin mining copper at Ainak have also begun,[26] though the war has hampered them.

Meanwhile, of the petroleum products being "sold" to Afghanistan, a high proportion must be flowing through the Soviet-made pipeline to Soviet military installations for use by the invading forces, since civilian usage is much diminished by war conditons and the population flight. Kerosene and bottled gas, used for cooking and heating in the major cities, is often in short supply.

As for the geological equipment for drilling and extraction, that is a clear-cut indication of Soviet intentions to exploit Afghanistan's known major mineral resources and its potentially significant hydrocarbon resources, as discussed in more detail below. The USSR treats as expendable those sectors of the Afghan economy that are not significantly useful to the Soviet Union, either economically or politically.

Agriculture

Agriculture is the sector most severely affected by policies of destruction and neglect: the rural economy is rapidly approaching large-scale economic disaster. Before the invasion, Afghanistan was essentially self-sustaining in food production except during sporadic regional droughts. Indeed, it was a food-exporting country, selling fresh and dried fruits and nuts throughout the region. The Seven-Year Plan (1976/77–1982/83) under Daoud had envisaged a major contribution of agricultural output to an overall growth of 53.4 percent in gross national product from the fiscal 1975/76 level.[27]

The share of agricultural output in GNP was 56 percent before 1978, and more than 87 percent of the population lived in some 22,750 rural villages. The basic values of Afghan society are found in their purest form in these communities: a strong faith in Islam and a firm belief in freedom, private property rights, and private enterprise, along with a largely self-sufficient structure of production, which also produced a surplus for the cities and for exports. Most of the rural population consisted of small, independent farmers. Large land holdings were rare, especially in the case of irrigated land, where holdings commonly did not exceed five or six hectares (12–15 acres); for dry farming, some individual land holdings were as extensive as 200 acres or more.

The first large-scale dislocations in the agricultural sector occurred after the communist takeover in 1978, the result of a forced land redistribution carried out along doctrinaire lines by the regimes of Noor Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin. Indeed, it was this "reform" that initially sparked rural resistance to the communists.

Since the December 1979 Soviet invasion and the installation of the Parchami faction in Kabul, communist policies on land redistribution have remained unclear. However, other Soviet policies have severely damaged agriculture and the rural communities. Most salient has been the policy, evident from the outset in 1979, of depopulating much of rural Afghanistan. This has been pursued by a combination of massive bombardments aimed at destroying crops, livestock, orchards and vineyards, and the intricate underground irrigation sys-

[24]The actions of the mujahedin have thus far prevented construction of these lines, or at least there are no confirmed reports of large-scale activity by the Soviets in building railroads.

It might be noted that an Iranian-financed railroad network had been contemplated in 1976–83. See *First Seven-Year Plan,* op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 194–95.

[25]See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SAS*), July 28, 1982, p. C/2.

[26]See Shroder and Assifi, loc. cit.

[27]For details, see *Seven-Year Plan,* Vol. 1, pp. 25–30.

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tems (*karez*) on which production depends, and a campaign of terror, massacres, and atrocities aimed at Afghanistan's rural inhabitants.[28]

These actions have resulted in the large-scale abandonment of farming and farmland, much of which will revert to desert without continuous care and maintenance. The losses are revealed by figures published by the Kabul regime itself. In the Afghan fiscal year 1975/76, three years before the communist takeover—3.882 million hectares (9.59 million acres) of land were under cultivation. In 1984, the Kabul regime reported that only 2.9 million hectares (7.16 million acres) were under cultivation.[29] Thus, by the communists' own (presumably understated) account, more than one-quarter of existing arable land had already been abandoned by 1984. Since then, attacks on villages have intensified, and the number of refugees continues to increase. It can be assumed that by now, over 50 percent of the arable land of Afghanistan is no longer being cultivated.

Recent studies show a dramatic deterioration in agriculture in the period 1978–82—an estimated 5 million animals destroyed; drops of 80 percent in output for wheat, 77 percent for corn, 74 percent for barley and rice, and 88 percent for cotton; and a 52 percent decline in farm labor supply.[30] Farmers and rural villagers comprise the overwhelming majority of the massive refugee population of the nearly 5.5 million Afghans now in Pakistan and Iran,[31] and another 2 million living as displaced persons inside Afghanistan. Many of the latter are in Kabul (which has grown from about 931,000 to 1,287,000 since 1979),[32] while others have fled to the mountains and valleys that are relatively securely under the control of the mujahedin. When coupled with an estimated one million lives lost in the fighting, this means about 42 percent of the pre-invasion 1979 population of 15,534,000 has disappeared from their homes, villages, and towns.

The deliberate attacks on the agricultural structure, combined with drought conditions in some provinces in 1983/84 and again in 1984/85, have led to what have been described as "pre-famine" conditions in some areas.[33] The Soviets and the Kabul communist regime are unconcerned about the possibility of famine in the countryside; indeed, rural famine serves to weaken the mujahedin. As for Kabul and the few other major towns or selected districts either under regime control or wooed by the government, food shortages are eased with imports of wheat from the Soviet Union.[34]

The reason for the Soviet policies of depopulating rural Afghanistan and destroying rural life are evident. Since 1978, the rural communities have been the strongholds of opposition to communism and have provided the support base for the mujahedin. Moreover, on an ideological plane, agricultural land is largely privately owned and farmed, and the farmers who resisted land redistribution can be expected to resist Soviet-style collectivization. By destroying food supplies in the rural areas—as well as purchasing any available local surpluses at inflated prices—the Soviets exert economic pressure on the mujahedin and the resisting population as a whole. While the countryside hungers, surviving Afghan fruit crops are used to help pay the bill for Soviet "aid": dried fruits and nuts from Afghanistan are shipped to the USSR and Eastern Europe, and sometimes resold to Western Europe.

Manufacturing

In the manufacturing sector, the Seven-Year Plan had projected a substantial increase in industrial capacity, largely through the establishment of heavy industries (steel, copper smelting, petrochemicals, oil refining, and machine tools) in order to minimize economic dependency on foreign sources. And it was no secret that Daoud's government meant by this a reduction in dependency on the Soviet Union.[35] Previously, industrial output had a very modest share in GNP (6.7 percent in

[28]This discussion is drawn from Noorzoy, "Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan," loc. cit., pp. 34–38, 43–44; and idem, "Long-Term Economic Relations . . . ," loc. cit., pp. 166–69. See also, United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Economic and Social Council, *Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan*, Document A/40/843, (Nov. 5, 1985), and Document A/41/778 (Oct. 31, 1986); and Michal Barry, Johan Lagerfelt, and Marie-Odile Terrenoire, *International Humanitarian Enquiry Commission on Displaced Persons in Afghanistan*, Field Mission Inside Afghanistan, Oxford, Central Asian Survey Incidental Papers No. 4, 1986.

[29]Cf. *First Seven-Year Plan*, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 146–49; and *FBIS-SAS*, Sept. 20, 1984, p. C/7. The plan envisaged a total of 3.93 million hectares under cultivation by 1983.

[30]See M. Qasim Yusufi, "Effects of the War on the Agricultural Situation in Afghanistan," in S. B. Majrooh and S.M.Y. Elmi, Eds., *Sovietization of Afghanistan*, Peshawar, Afghan Jehad Works Translation Center, 1986, pp. 157–58; also Azam Gul and Grant Farr, "Decline in Afghan Agricultural Production 1978 to 1982," mimeo, 1983.

[31]According to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, Iran reported between 2 and 2.25 million Afghan refugees in its country in early 1987, and calculations based on Commission data indicate 3.23 million refugees in Pakistan at the end of 1986. For Iran, see UNHCR, *Refugees*, No. 38, February 1987, pp. 10–12. The figure for Pakistan is an extrapolation from August 15, 1986, totals on the assumption of some 7,000 per month (the UN estimated 6,000 to 8,000); see UN General Assembly, Document A/41/778, p. 7.

[32]According to official DRA figures. See *Afghanistan Forum* (New York), Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 42, which gives a report from *Kabul New Times*, Jan. 8, 1987.

[33]See Barry, et al., op. cit., also Frances D'Souza, *The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan*, London, Afghan Committee, 1984.

[34]According to various annual volumes *Foreign Trade of the USSR* (Moscow, USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade), the Soviet Union shipped the following values of wheat to Afghanistan in the years 1979–85: US$6,207,000; $6,544,000; $14,001,000; $21,488,000; $12,954,000; $4,444,000; $12,209,000.

[35]See *Seven-Year Plan*, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 25–30.

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1975/76); it consisted largely of consumer goods industries, cement, and urea. During the Seven-Year Plan period, industrial output was targeted to increase 87.5 percent, rising by the end of the period to 8.7 percent of the GNP.

It was also common knowledge that the Soviets had participated heavily in the formulation of the Seven-Year Plan, having as many as 25 planning experts and advisers (four from the USSR State Planning Commission —Gosplan) working on it along with Afghans and other nationals. The USSR had the second largest financial commitment to Afghanistan's Seven-Year Plan projects, some US$640 million in project and commodity assistance programs (Iran committed $1,291 million).[36]

However, what is of interest here is the fact that after the coup d'état of April 27, 1978, the Khalq-cum-Parcham coalition regime in Kabul rejected the Seven-Year Plan as "ambitious," despite prior Soviet commitments, and hastily announced a new "five-year" plan (for 1979/80–1983/84) under Taraki in August 1978.[37] To assess what has actually transpired in the manufacturing sector since the invasion is very difficult, given the sketchy, contradictory, and unreliable information emanating from Kabul and Moscow.[38] What is one to make of Kabul's claim that "more than 79 industrial enterprises" have been established?"[39] What do they produce, where are they established, how are they financed, where is the output sold, and how could they be established under conditions of massive social dislocation, war, and population loss? How do they relate to the 41 projects envisaged under the Seven-Year Plan, which assumed peaceful conditions and the participation of some 15 national and multinational organizations?[40]

Perhaps the best evidence of conditions prevailing in Afghan manufacturing can be gleaned from what the Kabul regime itself states about unfulfilled goals. For example, Babrak Karmal has been quoted as stating:

In 1364 [fiscal year 1985/86], we did not succeed in resuming the extraction of petroleum, barite, and lapis; in expanding to a great extent the geological development gas mines; or in beginning the industrial exploitation of copper, coal, gatch, phosphate, and other natural wealth; or in fulfilling the envisaged volume of work in land irrigation, the construction of government farms, transport stations, power transmission lines, telephone connections, and other necessary affairs for the national economy.[41]

The communists attribute these failures to "counterrevolutionary forces," i.e., the mujahedin. Yet, as shall be noted below, they also result from Soviet policies.

Soviet policies toward manufacturing in Afghanistan appear to have several objectives. The first of these is to discourage the development of heavy or light industries that (a) require large capital investment and/or (b) would result in substitution for Soviet-produced goods. Such a long-term policy of creating dependency on the part of the Afghan economy was what Daoud sought to reverse through the industrial strategy of the Seven-Year Plan.

A second policy is evident when one examines Soviet data on bilateral trade between the two countries. They reveal that raw materials make up the bulk of exports to the USSR, even where Afghanistan has domestic manufacturing capacity—e.g., cotton textiles and chemical fertilizers. Thus, cotton fiber is exported to the Soviet Union, and cotton thread and textiles are imported by Afghanistan. Urea is exported to the Soviet Union despite an existing chemical fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif and plans to construct another one with Soviet help.[42] Moreover, crude oil is exported from Afghanistan and refined oil imported, despite the Soviet commitment, noted above, to build an oil refinery inside Afghanistan.

Third, the Soviet Union seeks to promote the development of Afghan industries that produce consumer goods, such as prefabricated houses and bakeries, whose output is, by its very nature, limited to local or regional markets. It also is interested in developing certain other industries, such as cement and reinforced concrete, whose products have high transport costs, which making the importation of Soviet products impractical.

Otherwise, in general, both state and private manufacturing industries established in Afghanistan prior to 1978 today suffer from shortages of labor and raw mate-

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[36]Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 39–143.

[37]Announced in *Kabul Times*, Aug. 15, 1978. For a brief discussion of this plan, see my "Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan," loc. cit., pp. 32–33.

[38]N. Yakubov, writing in *Pravda* (Moscow), of Jan. 27, 1986, stated that "in 1981–85, [Afghanistan's] national income exceeded the level reached prior to the April Revolution both in total volume and per capita." This ignores the growth forgone as a result of invasion and destruction and arrives at per capita figures based on a drastically reduced population.

Babrak Karmal in early 1984 proudly claimed that there were some 685,000 students currently enrolled in schools in Afghanistan. See *FBIS-SAS*, Apr. 7, 1986, p. C/2. The UNESCO *Statistical Yearbook* (Geneva) for 1986 shows 1984 enrollment of 645,688 in primary and secondary schools; moreover, this was a severe decline from the total of 1,122,808 reported for 1979 in ibid., 1982. Cf. Tables 3.4, 3.7, and 3.11 in the two volumes. See also S.M.Y. Elmi, "The Impact of the Sovietization on Afghan Education and Culture," in Majrooh and Elmi, op. cit., pp. 72–125. Elmi gives the names, ranks, and faculty affiliations of 36 professors of the University of Kabul executed by the communists and subsequently replaced by the Soviets.

[39]*FBIS-SAS*, Jan. 7, 1985, p.C/4.

[40]See *Seven-Year Plan*, Vol. 2, pp. 39–143.

[41]See Karmal speech *in FBIS-SAS*, Apr. 7, 1986, p. C/2.

[42]See *Seven-Year Plan*, Vol. 2, p. 71.

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rials, power outages, and idle capacity. The private sector also suffers from great uncertainty, lack of financing, and drastically reduced domestic markets due both to social dislocations and population losses and to reduced incomes and consumer spending. In the province of Balkh, only 42 private industries were still operating in the first quarter of 1986, compared to 85 such industries in earlier years.[43] These conditions are repeated in other provinces and in small as well as major urban areas such as Kandahar and Herat, where much fighting has taken place over the past seven years. The general picture of decline is clear, only the actual magnitudes are not known.

The Resource Payoff

As noted above, by 1978 the Soviet Union had advanced to Afghanistan a total of US$1.265 billion in credits. In April 1985, the Kabul regime announced that since 1978, the USSR had provided an additional $946.64 million, bringing the total to more than $2.2 billion. Although Kabul termed $448.47 million of the latest credits a generous "grant,"[44] this still left Afghanistan in debt to Moscow to the tune of $1.763 billion dollars as of 1985, with more "aid" to be paid for every day as the war goes on. On the basis of published Soviet trade statistics, it appears that in the years 1979–84, Afghanistan's cumulative balance-of-trade deficit with the USSR (the value of imports from the Soviet Union minus the value of exports to the Soviet Union) amounted to $849.19 million. This accounts for some 90 percent of the recent Soviet credit extensions. Since the trade deficit grew by another $372 million in 1985/86, one could, by extension, estimate that the total debt was in excess of $2.1 billion by the end of 1986.

Afghanistan's small and declining manufacturing sector and its decimated agricultural sector cannot possibly generate enough output to meet Afghanistan's debt payments to the USSR. Aside from some occasional reports of export of some Afghan manufactures such as textiles and cement, Afghan exports to the USSR consist largely of agricultural products (fruits, cotton, and wool being the major items). These agricultural exports, along with urea and crude oil, are clearly insufficient to reduce the growing trade deficit, let alone pay off the large debt to the USSR. (The possibility of large, *unrecorded* trade in these commodities is slim given the damage known to have been done by the war.)

How then is a ruined, depopulated, and destitute country ever to pay off such a debt? There are clear indications that the Soviet government has been thinking about this matter for many years and knows exactly what payment it wants. In any ranking of Soviet economic interests in Afghanistan, direct and unlimited access to Afghan mineral and energy resources must head the list. For decades, the Soviets worked to gather information about these resources, and in the process, they have made sure that neither Afghanistan nor any international investors developed them without Soviet participation. It is quite clear that the USSR planned to control the exploitation of these resources to benefit its economy and/or to advance other Soviet purposes.

Northern Afghanistan is geologically related to areas of Turkestan where some of the Soviet Union's richest and most accessible mineral and hydrocarbon resources are found. The Soviets therefore had good reason to expect that a survey of Afghan resources would yield significant discoveries, and since at least the mid-1950's, they have pressured the Afghan government to make sure that, especially north of the Hindu Kush, nobody but themselves would be allowed to explore or develop them.[45]

Eventually the Soviets were instrumental in conducting and compiling the most comprehensive survey of mineral resources ever made in Afghanistan. The report, a 419-page document completed in 1977, pinpointed mineral locations on a series of detailed maps. It showed Afghanistan to be rich in mineral resources, with nearly 1,400 mineral "deposits," "occurrences," or "showings," including many of international economic or strategic importance (see Table 3). Although the details of this survey and of Soviet dealings with Afghanistan in this connection, as well as of Soviet moves to exploit the massive resources discovered, are beyond the scope of the present article,[46] the potential of these resources is significant in assessing the economic aspect of overall Soviet policy toward Afghanistan.

From the Soviet perspective, the exploitation of these and any other subsequent discoveries can meet policy needs in several possible ways. First, some resources would be useful to the Soviet economy if their production and transportation costs are comparable to or lower than those of other existing sources, including Soviet domestic sources. Afghanistan's copper ores and possibly its massive deposits of high-grade iron ores, among others, fall into this category, especially if the railroad is built south of the Soviet border through Hairaton and/or Turghandy.

[43]See UN General Assembly, supplementary material to the interim report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Document A/41/778. Annex, May 23, 1986, p. 13.

[44]*FBIS-SAS*, Apr. 1, 1985.

[45]Indeed, for some time, foreigners were forbidden even to visit certain areas of the north as tourists without special permission from the Afghan Ministry of Interior.

[46]For a fuller treatment, see Shroder and Assif, loc. cit.

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Table 3: Mineral Resources in Afghanistan as of 1977, as Compiled by Afghan and Soviet Geologists

(In parentheses, number of deposits, occurrences, and showings)

Solid combustible materials (58)
Coal (45), lignite (3), peat (9), shale (1).
Metallic minerals (898)
Ferrous metals (85), iron (69), manganese (2), chromium (14), copper (242), lead and zinc (92), aluminum (7), tungsten (136), tin (174), bismuth (12), mercury (141), cadmium (1), beryllium (27), lithium (44), cesium and ribidium (11), tantalum and niobium (32).
Radioactive elements (4)
Uranium, thorium, and rare earths.
Precious metals (105)
Lode gold (95), placer gold (5), silver (5).
Non-metallic minerals (118) (of which, 36 chemical raw materials)
Sulphur (8), fluorite (7), barite (17), celestite (2), borosilicate (2).
Mineral fertilizers (2)
Other non-metallic minerals (80)
Muscovite (22), asbestos (26), talc (7), magnesite (2), graphite (6), gypsum (17).
Salts (14)
Precious and semi-precious stones (21)
Ruby (1), emerald (7), kunzite (2), garnet (1), lazurite (1), serpentine (4), tourmaline (5).
Electronic and optical minerals (23)
Quartz (18), calcite (5).
Industrial materials (69)
Limestone, dolomite, and marble quarries (5); facing and ornamental quarries (20); sand and gravel quarries (15); cement raw materials—including, limestone and marl quarries (8), limestone and dolomite fluxes (4), refractory clays (3), clays for brick, flooring tile, etc. (7), porcelain and pottery clays (4), glass raw material and siliceous sandstone (3).

SOURCE: Prepared by the author from Abdullah Shareq et al., Eds. *Mineral Resources of Afghanistan*, Kabul, Ministry of Mines, 1977, 2nd ed., trans. from Russian by G. M. Bezulov, pp. 73-79.

Second, for strategic minerals such as uranium and rare earths, costs are not a primary consideration. High-content deposits of rare earths, uranium, and strontium, among others, have been discovered in Helmand province, and since 1980, there have been persistent reports of secret Soviet mining of uranium there and near the city of Kabul.[47]

Third, even if the Soviet Union may not itself need some of Afghanistan's rich mineral resources, it may want to have control over their disposal as leverage in the overall framework of a zero-sum game that the USSR plays with the free enterprise economies, particularly with the United States.

Finally, control over the development of essential resources is useful in negotiating for economic *and* political gains with developing economies that require such resources for their own industrial growth.

What evidence of this Soviet policy is there in the available statistics? First and foremost are the substantial imports of Soviet equipment for mineral exploration, extraction, and drilling; as shown in Table 2, they amounted to more than $192 million in the period 1979–84.

What benefit is accruing to the USSR from these investments? Soviet trade statistics show no imports of minerals from Afghanistan except natural gas and urea. Press reports of exports of crude oil, uranium, coal, gems, and semiprecious stones are sporadic and unconfirmable. That does not mean that unrecorded exports of these and other minerals to the USSR are not taking place—only that there is no clear evidence yet. It is certainly suspicious that an Afghan economy that includes imports of geological equipment in its deficit trade with the USSR records no domestic production in the mineral sector. Clearly, payoffs for the Soviets either exist or are expected. And if minerals are being exported to the USSR, why are such exports not recorded?

A look at the exploitation of Afghan natural gas—the first major development of a resource in Afghanistan—offers some possible answers to these questions, and also indicates the economic benefits that the Soviet Union expects to reap and how it plans to reap them.

The Case of Natural Gas

The Soviet Union has participated actively in the development of natural gas resources in northern Afghanistan for several decades. Since 1967, gas supplies from those fields have largely been exported to Soviet Central Asia. As a result, the Afghan economy has been experiencing rising opportunity costs in exploiting its own natural gas for internal use and development. The rising exports of natural gas have offset a steady decline in other Afghan exports to the Soviet Union in the period 1979–85 (the last period for which consistent data are available). At the same time, it seems that the

[47] *New York City Tribune*, Jan. 12, 1984; and *The Economist* (London), Feb. 2, 1984.

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rapid development and export of natural gas, especially during 1979 and 1980, when exports of gas rose by 73 and 16 percent respectively,[48] have slowed down. A shortfall in the planned production of 2.7 billion cubic meters for 1986 has been predicted.[49]

Ostensibly geared to balancing the cost of Afghan imports for development purposes, these shipments now appear to be helping defray the cost of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The gas thus delivered has released Soviet supplies for transmission to European Russia and to Eastern and Western Europe, thereby contributing indirectly to the hard-currency earnings of the USSR. Thus, the integration of Afghan gas reserves into the Soviet supply network seems to be part of long-term Soviet energy strategy.[50] It is not by accident that the gas fields in the north, in the Shibarghan area, are among the most heavily guarded Soviet installations.

What makes matters even worse are the very low prices assigned to Afghan gas delivered to the Soviet Union. Although limited, the available statistics (including Soviet trade data) on the pricing of Afghanistan's gas exports tend to confirm the judgment that the USSR has been exploiting this important Afghan resource without appropriate compensation.[51] That the gas meters are located inside the Soviet Union—and hence are inaccessible to the Afghans—makes it likely that the loss is even greater than the figures suggest. But, even on the basis of published figures, it is possible to estimate some part of the loss of revenue to Afghanistan.

From the Soviet data, one can calculate that in the two Afghan fiscal years 1979/81, the USSR imported 5.2 billion cubic meters of Afghan gas at a price of approximately US$48 per 1,000 cubic meters. This compares to an international price of $114.78 per 1,000 cubic meters at that time. Calculated thus, the loss of revenue to Afghanistan for those two years alone was approximately $335.8 million.[52]

[48]See my "Alternative Economic Systems for Afghanistan," p. 33.

[49]See *FBIS-SAS*, June 2, 1986, p. C/2.

[50]See J.B. Hannigan and C.H. McMillan, *The Soviet Energy Stake in Afghanistan and Iran*, Ottawa, Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, Carleton University, August 1981.

[51]On the development, manipulation, and pricing of Afghan natural gas, see Shroder and Assifi, loc. cit.

[52]*Nouvelles d'Afghanistan* (Paris), No. 7, November 1981, calculates that the Soviets paid $44.45 per 1,000 cubic meters for Afghan natural gas in the period 1976–81. Although this was some 176 percent higher than envisaged under the 1976–83 seven-year plan, the price of Soviet gas in the same period had moved from $50 to $180 per 1,000 cubic meters, and Iranian gas had risen from $21.50 to $121. The Soviets would appear to have paid the Iranians an average of $71.25 during the 1976–81 period.

In 1979, the USSR agreed to pay Afghanistan $83.37 per 1,000 cubic meters—a figure that was still 25 percent below world prices. However, it did not honor this "agreed-upon" price. Even if it had, Afghanistan's loss (calculated as the difference between the "agreed-upon" price and the actual payment) would still have amounted to $175.5 million. See Noorzoy, "Long-Term Relations . . . ," loc. cit., pp. 161–62.

Afghanistan has clearly been experiencing substantial, cumulative losses in revenue from the exports of its natural gas to the Soviet Union. Such losses are, of course, Soviet economic gains. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will apply a similar hard-nosed economic calculus in the development and exploitation of other major Afghan natural resources.

Conclusion

For nearly 70 years, economic policies have been one of the main Soviet vehicles for developing economic and political influence in Afghanistan. Rapid expansion of bilateral trade, discriminatory pricing in barter exchanges, broad expansion of credit and debt, have all sought to foster Afghan economic dependency on the USSR, to promote an economic development strategy in Afghanistan that creates complementarity with the Soviet economy, and to maintain Soviet control over the present or future development of major Afghan mineral resources. Since the invasion, these policies have been continued, with the additional dramatic political/military/economic undertaking of destroying the country's rural production potential.

Given the impact of massive dislocation and losses of population and other war-induced problems on Afghan production, the economy seems on the path to collapse. Why then does the Soviet Union continue to ship machinery and goods into the country? For one, to maintain the war effort. However, the trade data (see Table 2, column 1) also suggest shipments of goods—beyond the obvious military hardware—which may be going for the building of Soviet bases, since there are no sectors in the Afghan economy capable of absorbing such large quantities of imports on a continuous basis. Furthermore, the Soviet trade in natural gas and its interest in other mineral resources of the country suggest another motive. As noted above, the prices paid to Afghanistan for natural gas have been substantially below world prices or even Soviet internal prices. These losses to Afghanistan create a strong presumption of similar losses in other areas of mineral production and export now and in the future—to Soviet advantage.

These facts refute the common assumption that the Soviets are paying all the economic costs of their aggression in Afghanistan, and that the venture represents an irrational economic drain that Gorbachev is unlikely to tolerate. In economic terms, at least, Afghanistan is certainly not "Moscow's Vietnam." No serious analysis of Soviet actions, intentions, strategy, or tactics regarding Afghanistan can fail to take into consideration these economic realities.

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Officer Education in the Chinese PLA

Lonnie D. Henley

IN 1978, Deng Xiaoping reinstated the ambitious Four Modernizations reform program that had been inaugurated by Zhou Enlai in 1975. Much has been written since then about this program and how it has been carried out, especially in the first three areas targeted for reform—agriculture, industry, and science and technology. This paper will focus on the impact of the program on the training and education of military officers—an essential aspect of the fourth area to be modernized, namely, national defense.

After a series of expensive mistakes in the late 1970's, Beijing has been forced by the high cost of modern equipment and a newly acquired sense of prudence to retreat from its early plan to rapidly introduce new technology into China. Although the procurement of advanced technology remains very much a part of China's game plan for the rest of this century, Beijing has learned the hard way that it is essential to lay the proper foundation before investing scarce resources. The central focus of the Four Modernizations is now, therefore, on the human aspects of modernization—on the organizational structures and educational base that will make it better able to absorb advanced technology. This is reflected especially clearly in the area of national defense. The Chinese have taken major steps both to restructure the military and to overhaul the military school system that forms its base.

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Restructuring the Military

The pattern for a major reorganization and rejuvenation of the armed forces was set by Deng in 1975 in a speech to the party Military Commission. Although the campaign to carry out this reorganization and rejuvenation faltered in Deng's period of political eclipse, between April 1976 and July 1977, it has proceeded with vigor ever since. Under the banner of a "modernized, regularized, and revolutionary army with Chinese characteristics,"[1] Beijing has made a number of significant changes that are primarily structural in nature. Since the late 1970's, the leadership has:

- made tactical-level changes in its ground forces that revolve around the move toward combined-arms operations employing infantry, armor, and artillery in a coordinated effort under a single commander;[2]
- reduced the number of military regions from 11 to 7 under the provisions of a June 1985 Military Commission decision, and retired many incumbent commanders and senior staff officers at the regional level;[3]
- strengthened and reorganized the militia to provide a reservoir of trained and organized personnel ready to

[1]Of the many sources, see esp. Yang Shangkun, "Building Chinese-style Modernized Armed Forces," *Hongqi* (Beijing), Aug. 1, 1984, pp. 2–8, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Aug. 21, 1984, p. K/8.

[2]For the 1985 Military Commission announcement that all main force armies had been converted to combined-arms-group armies, see New China News Agency (Beijing—hereafter Xinhua), Dec. 31, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Okinawa cable, OW 311204, Dec. 31, 1985.

[3]*Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), June 14, 1985, p. 2, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 14, 1985, p. W/1.

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augment the standing army;[4]

- inaugurated a program (in 1983) designed to force out elderly officers and sharply lower the average age of commanders and staff at all echelons of command.[5] In the spring of 1985, officers at the deputy chief of staff and deputy director level throughout the three General Departments were replaced.[6] At a Military Commission meeting in the same year, most incumbent military region commanders and political commissars were also replaced by younger men.[7] At the time of this writing, the dozen or so top leaders of the military, including Deng Xiaoping, Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi, and others retain their posts, pending a resolution of the overall succession question in the party and government as well as the military;
- undertaken (in 1985) the task of reducing China's standing forces, with the goal of demobilizing one million of the 4.2 million personnel on active duty by the end of 1987;[8]
- improved individual training programs and unit training. Basic training regiments have been established for new recruits,[9] and unit training increasingly emphasizes combined-arms and joint-service operations;[10]
- reduced the range of the political influence of the PLA.[11] In order to ensure the military's acceptance of a declining political role and of the reforms in general, Deng took the reins of military power directly into his own hands, as Chief of the General Staff (1977–80), and as Vice-Chairman (1977–81) and subsequently Chairman (1981--present) of the party Military Commission.

Reorganizing the Military School System

These structural reforms and the drive for reform and professionalization that they represent demand an educated corps of officers. In recent years the Chinese leadership has made a concerted effort to meet this challenge by overhauling the PLA military school system, the educational base for the military. Young officers of today's generation have been chosen for their successful academic background and provided with a decent general education at or near the college level. Furthermore, the non-academic portion of their training has emphasized technical proficiency in their military duties rather than political indoctrination. Senior officers have been screened to eliminate those lacking a basic high-school level of literacy and education, and nearly all have returned to military institutions for intermediate- or advanced-level professional development courses. With the brief exception of Yuan Shih-kai's New Army at the turn of this century, the armed forces being shaped now will be the first in China's history staffed for the most part with educated officers.

The three-tiered PLA system of formal schools for officers, which traces its origins back to 1927, when the first Red Army School for cadres was established at Mao Zedong's stronghold at Jinggang Shan,[12] underwent a period of extended decline after the fall of Peng Dehuai in 1959. With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960's, professionalism and specialization were denigrated, and the number of military schools dropped precipitously, from 140 to 40. Like education in general in China, military education ground to a halt.

Some time after the death of Lin Biao in 1971, the reconstruction of PLA schools was begun. One source credits Ye Jianying with beginning the improvement of officer training in 1972, reopening many schools, and instituting training detachments throughout the PLA.[13]

In December 1977, the Military Commission of the Communist Party Central Committee, led by Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping, issued a document entitled "Decision on Running Military Schools Well."[14] It was this landmark pronouncement that formally set in motion what has turned out to be a sustained program of improvement and expansion in the officer education sys-

[4]The 1984 Military Service Law created a new category of militia, referred to as "reserve service" (*yubeiyi*), replacing the previous "armed militia." See Xinhua, June 4, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 6, 1984, p. K/1.

[5]By July 1985, army-level commanders averaged 50 years in age; division commanders, 40; and regimental commanders, 30. See Xinhua, July 5, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 5, 1985, p. K/5.

[6]*Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), June 16, 1985, p. 1, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 17, 1985, p. W/1.

[7]*Wen Wei Po*, June 14, 1985, p. 2, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 14, 1985, p. W/1.

[8]Xinhua, Apr. 19, 1985, trans. in FBIS, Okinawa cable, OW 190642, Apr. 19, 1985; Xinhua, June 10, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 10, 1985, p. K/1.

[9]Xinhua, Mar. 24, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1985, p. R/1.

[10]A case in point being the exercise at Zhangjiakou, Beijing Military Region, in September 1981, which involved over 200,000 officers and men. See *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), Sept. 24, 1981, p. 8, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 24, 1981, pp. W/1–2.

[11]For further discussion, see Ellis Joffe, "Civil-Military Relations," in Gerald Segal and William T. Tow, Eds., *Chinese Defense Policy*, Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1984, pp. 18–35; and Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–1981*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

[12]In a history supplied by the PLA Military Academy in 1983, the Jinggang Shan school is omitted. For further information and a history of the PLA school system, see Liu Huinian and Zhang Chuntung, "To Run the Army Well, It is First Necessary to Run the Military Colleges Well: Xiao Ke on Building of Military Colleges," *Liaowang* (Beijing), July 20, 1983, pp. 12–13, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 84273, Sept. 8, 1983, pp. 72–77; also *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun junshi xueyuan* (PLA Military Academy), unpublished document provided to visiting US officers at the Academy in December 1982.

[13]Xinhua, Apr. 23, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 25, 1978, p. E/7.

[14]Xinhua, Apr. 23, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 24, 1978, p. E/11.

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tem. In early 1978, the Military Commission announced measures to improve training of all sorts throughout the PLA. A 1975 directive of the Military Commission, entitled Central Directive No. 18, was reissued in February 1978 after being suspended during Deng's period of eclipse in 1976–77. This document sets a course for military modernization that includes both improvement in military training and the procurement of modern technology.[15] In the same month, *Jiefangjun Bao* announced the revival of the 1964 "mass military training" movement, emphasizing military skills and technical proficiency and downplaying the role of political work in the military.[16] Together with the December 1977 Military Commission decision on military schools, these directives launched the reform of professional military education in China.

The reactivation of the military school system began immediately after the issuance of the Military Commission decision. The Military Academy, the Political Academy, and the Logistics Academy, which during the Cultural Revolution had been combined into one institution—the Military and Political University—were reestablished as separate institutions in January 1978, and began classes on March 1, 1978.[17] Details are more scarce on intermediate- and basic-level schools, but by 1980 there were 54 basic-level institutions accepting high-school graduates for training as cadres. These included both command and technical schools, with the latter accorded priority in the selection of qualified graduates. In that same year, nine regional teaching cooperative centers were established to facilitate the exchange of teaching materials and staff members among military schools.[18]

In addition to reactivating schools previously closed, the Military Commission has directed the improvement of existing courses of instruction presented at all schools, and instituted requirements that all officers receive training in formal schools. The change is most dramatic at the basic level of precommissioning training for officer candidates. The basic-level command course (which produces "grass-roots leading cadres," or entry-level officers, as opposed to technical cadres) has been expanded to a four-year college-level program from its previous two-year purely military curriculum. Experiments with a four-year curriculum began in 1982 at selected schools, and 20 schools instituted it in the autumn of 1983.[19] The purpose of the expansion is to provide a general college education in addition to military training.

Several other recent changes emphasize the new academic bent of military schools. Academic degrees are now awarded in both technical and command schools.[20] Graduate courses leading to Master's and Doctoral degrees have been instituted.[21] Professors from nearby civilian colleges have been recruited as instructors and academic advisors in the military colleges.[22] Officers on active duty who graduated from college before the Cultural Revolution have been preferentially selected to attend senior service colleges and graduate-level technical training courses.[23]

The future quality of military courses at basic-level military schools depends in part on how the Chinese deal with the problem of recruiting well-educated high school graduates as cadets. In the current period of reform, being a soldier in the PLA has lost much of its previous appeal and status. Given the political and economic climate of China in the 1980's, college graduates are in high demand in industry and government, and are both more respected and better paid in comparison to other urban workers. In the countryside, ambitious young men are devoting their energies to becoming "10,000-yuan householders," capitalizing on the effective privatization of agriculture since 1979. Furthermore, the reputation of the PLA has suffered badly from its poor showing against Vietnam in 1979, from the inclusion of senior PLA officers among the targets of recent campaigns against corruption, and simply from the fact that the army is no longer portrayed as the model of political rectitude as it was under Mao. For these reasons, the PLA has had difficulty attracting the brightest young students. The seriousness of the problem is illustrated by the fact that in 1980 the PLA recruited only 15,000 high-school graduates into military schools, and in 1981, the figure dropped to 10,000.[24]

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[15]Xinhua, Feb. 21, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 1, 1978, p. E/7.

[16]Xinhua, Feb. 25, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 1, 1978, p. E/2.

[17]Xinhua, Mar. 4, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 8, 1978, p. E/2.

[18]Xinhua, May 16, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 19, 1980, p. L/15; also Xinhua, Nov. 19, 1984, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CPS*), No. 84-085, p. 137.

[19]For the decision by the 12th Meeting on Military Academies and Schools (February 19–March 3, 1983) to institute four-year courses see, *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), Mar. 3, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 7, 1983, pp. K/17–18. For the decision to start courses at 20 military command schools, see *Yunnan Ribao* (Kunming), June 13, 1983, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 27, 1983, p. Q/2. See also Xinhua, Mar. 15, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 17, 1983, p. K/7.

[20]Xinhua, July 24, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 17, 1983, pp. K/16–17.

[21]Xinhua, Sept. 4, 1983, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 84381, Sept. 21, 1983, p. 72.

[22]Nanchang, Jiangxi, Provincial Broadcast, Apr. 1, 1983, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 83563, May 27, 1983, p. 94.

[23]Zhongguo Xinwen She (China News Service, Beijing), July 26, 1985, trans. in FBIS, Hong Kong cable, HK 261454, July 26, 1985; *Xinhua*, July 5, 1985, p. K/5.

[24]Xinhua, May 16, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 19, 1980, p. L/15. Also *Jiefang Ribao* (Shanghai), Apr. 27, 1981, p. 3, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 78576, p. 55.

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The decision to convert basic-level schools into colleges was undertaken to make recruitment of talented, ambitious students easier. In particular, the decision to grant academic degrees seems designed to serve chiefly as an incentive for academically-minded youngsters to choose the PLA. In 1981, the PLA sought to improve further its recruitment of high-school graduates by offering students the chance of early admission. Rather than recruiting from the pool of candidates who had successfully passed the nationwide standard college entrance examination, as other colleges did, the PLA offered its own examination between the time of high-school graduation and the time of the nationwide examination. A candidate who was nervous about his prospects could try for admission to a PLA school, and still be able to take the regular college examination.[25]

In addition to improving the standards of the military schools, the PLA has sought to meet the needs of senior officers who missed out on formal education in their youth. New part-time schools, called variously "spare-time universities" or "cadre cultural schools," have been established. The purpose of these schools is to raise the cultural (i.e., educational) level of all cadres to at least the secondary-school level.[26]

The PLA intends to make formal schooling a requirement for promotion or assignment to higher levels of command when PLA schools have been brought to the desired level of academic quality and officers have been either properly educated or eased into retirement. Deng outlined the eventual requirements in a speech before the Military Commission on March 12, 1983.[27] All platoon- and company-level officers are to be graduates of basic-level colleges; battalion and regimental officers are to be graduates of intermediate academies; and division and army (corps) officers are to be graduates of an advanced academy.

Strenuous efforts are under way to get all officers through some sort of school quickly. In July 1984, Han Huaizhi, the Assistant Chief of the General Staff charged with supervision of military education, announced that 96.5 percent of all "leading officers" (commanders and senior staff) at the corps level, 87 percent at the division level, and 71 percent at the regiment level had been trained in military academies and schools.[28] One suspects that these figures may be in part the result of crash courses, which are presumably only stop-gap, imperfect answers to the PLA's educational needs. In the long run, however, the policy should produce beneficial results.

Structure of the Officer School System

The schools of the PLA officer education system may be categorized according to the grade level of students enrolled and the nature of the school. The PLA operates cadre command and political schools at three levels, which shall here be termed basic, intermediate, and advanced. The standard Chinese reference to cadre training institutions mentions military "colleges/academies" and "schools" (*xueyuan* and *xuexiao*). The former generally refers to technical institutes and advanced-level schools, and the latter to less academically oriented command and staff schools, though usage varies greatly. In this article, the terms "school" and "academy" will be used interchangeably to refer to officer schools at various levels.

Basic-level command schools correspond to Western military academies, in that they prepare qualified high-school graduates or enlisted men of equivalent educational level to become entry-level line officers.[29] Training courses at these institutions have in the past been two years in duration, but recent decisions by the Military Commission, as outlined above, have extended basic-level training to four years.

Intermediate-level command schools provide one to two years of training to officers of 10 years' service who are preparing to take battalion command or regimental staff positions.[30] The emphasis at this level is on regimental combat tactics and combined-arms operations.

Advanced-level academies train candidates for division command or for staff positions at the division level or higher. The emphasis is on tactics and "campaigns," defined by the Chinese as a level of combat between tactical and strategic. Regiment, division, and army operations are taught—with the emphasis on the division level.[31]

The political school system is similarly structured, despite slight variation in the composition of entering students. Basic-level political schools select active company-level officers for training as company political officers; intermediate- and advanced-level schools accept battalion and division political officers, respectively, for training to advance to units at the next higher level.[32] Courses for political officers are also taught at

[25] *Jiefang Ribao*, Apr. 27, 1981, p. 3, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 78576, p. 55.
[26] Xinhua, Jan. 20, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 25, 1983, p. K/19. Also, Changsha, Hunan, Provincial Broadcast, Sept. 2, 1983, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 84381, Sept. 21, 1983, p. 81.
[27] *Wen Wei Po*, July 1, 1983, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 6, 1983, p. W/1.
[28] Xinhua, July 24, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 25, 1984, p. K/3.
[29] *A Brief Introduction to the Academies and Schools of the Chinese People's Liberation Army*, (Beijing, May 1981), *JPRS*, No. 78505, July 14, 1981, pp. 86–88. Hereafter cited as *Schools*.
[30] Ibid., p. 87.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.

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some command schools.

The stratification of technical colleges does not conform precisely to the three-tiered structure of the command and political school systems. Academic degree courses at the Bachelor's, Master's, and Doctoral levels are offered at various institutions, some of which are exclusively basic- or advanced-level and others of which offer degree courses at several levels. Technical schools of the various services operate as academic colleges along conventional civilian lines or, in a few cases, as purely military courses similar to US Army branch basic courses. The number of purely military technical courses has been declining as academic subjects are added to the curriculum. Each service of the PLA and each specialty field operates a separate system of schools, controlled by the appropriate subdepartment within the PLA General Staff Department. Within the services, technical schools operate separately from command and staff schools.

In addition to the institutions for active-duty officers considered in this study, a system of engineering and technical schools operates in service to the industries and factories under the National Defense Science, Technology and Industry Commission (NDSTIC, also abbreviated COSTIND). The flagship of this system is the National Defense Science and Technology University (NDSTU) in Changsha, Hunan province, founded in September 1953. As the successor to the PLA Military Engineering Academy, it conducts undergraduate and graduate engineering courses. In January 1985, it opened a graduate school, said to be the first in any PLA institution; however, as of the time of its 30th anniversary in 1983, NDSTU had reportedly already trained 200 graduate students.[33]

The Military Commission of the Central Committee is responsible for the overall control, administration, and political guidance of the military schools.[34] Although educational principles, policy, and training tasks are stated to be the purview of the Ministry of National Defense,[35] no departments of the Ministry were represented at the 11th All-Army Conference on Military Colleges and Schools in November 1980.[36] This triennial conference is convened by the Military Commission and seems to be the chief consultative body to the Commission for matters concerning cadre schols.

Direct control of military schools is exercised by the relevant services and branches of the PLA, with the exception of so-called army schools (*lujun xuexiao*), which are combined-arms basic-level schools for the ground forces. One school of this type was located in each of the former 11 military regions and thus fell under the control of the regional commander.[37] There has been no mention in the press of a reduction in the number of army schools since the consolidation of military regions in June 1985, and apparently all 11 are still needed and in operation. Although the officer corps has borne the brunt of the force reduction program, the "up or out" retirement system announced by the Military Commission together with the insistence that all officers henceforth must undergo formal schooling probably means the annual requirement for basic-school graduates will remain near previous levels.

Ground Force Schools

PLA ground force officers are trained either in combined-arms schools or in schools for specific branches, such as armor, engineering, or artillery. Combined-arms schools are subordinate to local military region commanders, while branch schools are subordinate to the appropriate subdepartment within the PLA General Staff Department. Details of individual schools are presented in Table 1.

Basic schools. As mentioned above, there are 11 army schools, formerly termed infantry schools. Graduates of army schools are commissioned as "grass-roots leading cadres" in either regional-force or main-force units in nearby military regions.[38]

Army schools currently offer one-, two- and four-year courses for officer candidates. The one-year course, for college graduates, was introduced in 1983, and 1,600 officers were commissioned from such courses in the summer of 1984.[39] The two-year course, for cadets entering from the enlisted ranks, was standard before the recent reforms, and is probably still offered. The four-year course was tested in 1982 and implemented the following year. As noted earlier, the PLA ground force intends to have all new officers graduate from four-year programs. In 1983, the PLA announced that 20 basic-level schools, presumably comprising the 11 army schools as well as the basic-level specialty schools operated by the various branches of the PLA ground forces (discussed in Table 1), were to begin four-year programs.[40]

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[33]Xinhua, Jan. 31, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-019, Mar. 1, 1985, pp. 143–44; Xinhua, Sept. 1, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 8, 1983, p. K/16.

[34]*Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Apr. 24, 1978, p. 1.

[35]*Schools*, p. 87.

[36]*Beijing Ribao*, Nov. 8, 1980, p. 4.

[37]*Schools*, p. 87.

[38]Nanchang, Jiangxi, Provincial Service Broadcast, Sept. 1, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 6, 1983, pp. O/3–4; also, Nanchang, Jiangxi, Provincial Service, Feb. 10, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 13, 1985, p. O/2.

[39]Xinhua Beijing English Broadcast, July 20, 1984, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 23, 1984, p. K/7.

[40]*Dazhong Ribao* (Jinan), Mar. 16, 1983, p. 3.

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Table 1: Officer Training Schools of the People's Liberation Army of China

Name	Location	Remarks
	GROUND FORCES SCHOOLS	
Army Schools		
Shijiazhuang Army School	Shijiazhuang, Hebei province	Beijing Military Region (MR).[1]
Nanjing Army School	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Nanjing Military Region.[2]
Jinan Army School	Jinan, Shandong province	Jinan Military Region.[3]
Wuhan MR Army School (?)	Unknown	Existence unconfirmed. Wuhan Military Region has now been absorbed into Jinan and Guangzhou Military Regions.
Nanchang Army School	Nanchang, Jiangxi province	Formerly Fuzhou Military Region, now Nanjing Military Region.[4]
Guilin Army School	Guilin, Guangxi province	Guangzhou Military Region.[5]
Xi'an Army School	Xi'an, Shaanxi province	Lanzhou Military Region.[6]
Dalian Army School	Dalian, Liaoning province	Shenyang Military Region.[7]
Chengdu Army School	Chengdu, Sichuan province	Chengdu Military Region.[8]
Kunming Army School	Kunming, Yunnan province	Formerly Kunming Military Region, now Chengdu Military Region.[9]
Ürümqi MR Army School (?)	Unknown	Existence not confirmed. Ürümqi Military Region has been incorporated into Lanzhou Military Region.
Branch Schools		
No. 1 Ground Artillery School	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Provides officers for 85-mm and 122-mm artillery battalions. Curriculum includes military courses (gunnery, fire operations, reconnaissance, topography), political instruction, and a general education in mathematics, physics, and electrical engineering. Had 1,850 cadets in 1981, all in three-year courses. Founded in 1947, closed during the Cultural Revolution, reopened in 1974.[10]
No. 2 Ground Artillery School	Unknown	Existence presumed, based on identification of No. 1 and No. 3 schools.
No. 3 Ground Artillery School	Unknown	Opened in 1978.[11]
Antiaircraft Artillery School	Unknown	Trains officers for ground forces antiaircraft artillery units. Officers for surface-to-air missile units trained at air force schools.[12]
Tank School	Probably Anhui province	The only known institution providing basic-level training for armor officers.[13]
Chemical Defense College	Miyun, Beijing Municipality	Basic-level training for chemical defense officers. May train officers for air force and navy also. Since no intermediate-level chemical school has been identified, training at that level may also be provided at this college.[14]
Physical Training College	Guangzhou, Guangdong province	Teaches military command and wire communications courses.[15]

[1]Xinhua, June 29, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), July 2, 1984, p. K/9.
[2]*Xinhua Ribao* (Nanjing), July 18, 1981, p. 3.
[3]*Liaowang* (Beijing), No. 12, 1982, pp. 32–33.
[4]Nanchang, Jiangxi, Provincial Service, Mar. 12, 1984, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China: Political, Sociological and Military Affairs* (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS-CPS*), No. 84-024, Mar. 28, 1984, p. 104.
[5]Xinhua, June 24, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 6, 1984, p. K/18.
[6]Xining, Qinghai, Provincial Service, Feb. 3, 1986, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS), Hong Kong cable, HK 080505, Feb. 8, 1986.
[7]*Liaoning Ribao* (Shenyang), May 28, 1982, p. 4.
[8]*Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), Mar. 12, 1981, p. 2.
[9]*Yunnan Ribao* (Kunming), May 31, 1983, p. 1.
[10]*A Brief Account of PLA No. 1 Ground Artillery School* (hereafter, *A Brief Account*), no date, provided to visiting US attachés in May 1981, unclassified. Also, Department of the Army, Combined-Arms Center, *Trip Report: Visit of the United States Military Education Delegation to the People's Republic of China, 11–26 May 1981* (hereafter, *Trip Report*), June 5, 1981, p. VI-20.
[11]Changsha, Hunan, Provincial Service, Oct. 26, 1978, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 72240, Nov. 15, 1978, p. 41.
[12]*Radio Press* (Tokyo), Jan. 18, 1981, p. 3; also *A Brief Account*.
[13]*Feiqing Ribao* (Taipei), No. 9, 1981, p. 116.
[14]*Beijing Ribao* (Beijing), May 28, 1980, p. 2, and May 30, 1980, p. 2; and *Xinhua Ribao*, June 18, 1981, p. 3.
[15]*Guangdong Huabao* (Guangzhou), No. 8, 1980, p. 30.

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Engineering Corps School	Probably Changsha, Hunan province	No other information available.[16]
Intermediate-level Schools		
Military Education Academy	Shijiazhuang, Hebei province	Formerly the Shijiazhuang Higher Army School; renamed in 1986. Now trains instructors for other PLA schools.[17]
Army Command College	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Formerly the Nanjing Higher Army School; renamed in 1986. Now the primary ground forces institution for training combined-arms commanders at the intermediate level.[18]
Armored Forces College	Shijiazhuang, Hebei province	The only intermediate-level command school for armor officers. Functions similar to those of Army Command College, except also trains prospective armor division commanders. Courses from one to two years. Curriculum for line officers is 70 percent military, 20 percent political, 10 percent science and technology. For political officers, proportions are 40, 50, and 10 percent respectively.[19]
Artillery College	Langfang, Hebei province	Created in 1957, when the PLA Military Academy was split up. Intermediate training for artillery officers; probably trains commanders and staff for division level also.[20]
Engineering Corps College	Unknown	No information available.[21]
Communications College	Unknown	Provides regimental officers' course, staff officers' course, political work course, and instructors' course.[22]
Technical Schools		
Armored Forces Technical School	Changchun, Jilin province	Presumably a school for maintenance officers at a lower level than the Armored Forces Engineering College.[23]
Armored Forces Engineering College	Beijing	Undergraduate courses cover operation and maintenance of tanks, fire control, and communications. Engineering students began receiving leadership training as well as taking technical courses in 1986. Graduate courses emphasize research on automation and control mechanisms.[24]
Higher Ordnance School	Shijiazhuang, Hebei province	Undergraduate curriculum in missile maintenance, gun design and manufacture, firearms, ammunition, radars, leadership, and front-line ordnance service functions.[25]
Artillery Technical College	Hefei, Anhui province	Undergraduate curriculum in gun artilllery, radars, and missiles.[26]
Communications Engineering College	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Graduate-level command automated communications course covers telegraphy, satellite telecommunications, data telecommunications, microwave communications, computers, and signal indicators and display. Course instituted in 1979, with 24 students. Undergraduate curriculum of unknown content.[27]
Electronics College	Hefei, Anhui province	Teaches electronic countermeasures and radar engineering; only an undergraduate curriculum identified.[28]
Engineering Corps Engineering College	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Undergraduate course in military engineering; no graduate course identified.[29]
Engineering Technical College	Zhengzhou, Henan province	Graduate and undergraduate courses in radio communications engineering.[30]

[16]Changsha, Hunan, Provincial Service, Jan. 24, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 28, 1981, p. P/7.
[17]*Xinhua Ribao*, Sept. 7, 1986.
[18]Nanjing, Jiangsu, Provincial Service, Sept. 6, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 12, 1986, p. O/1.
[19]*Trip Report*, p. VI-5.
[20]*Beijing Ribao*, May 28, 1982, p. 2.
[21]*Xinhua Ribao*, Aug. 14, 1981, p. 3.
[22]*Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), Sept. 24, 1981, p. 3.
[23]Telephone Directory, Changchun, Jilin province, 1980.
[24]*Renmin Ribao*, July 24, 1979, p. 2; Xinhua Beijing Domestic Service, Sept. 29, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 1, 1986, p. K/2.
[25]*Beijing Ribao*, May 28, 1980, p. 2, and June 27, 1981, p. 4.
[26]Ibid., May 28, 1980, p. 2.
[27]Ibid.
[28]Ibid.
[29]*Xinhua Ribao*, June 18, 1981, p. 3.
[30]*Beijing Ribao*, May 28, 1980, p. 2; *Radio Press*, May 19, 1980, and *Fujian Ribao* (Fuzhou), July 24, 1981, p. 3.

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Harbin Military Engineering College	Harbin, Heilongjiang province	Graduate engineering training for PLA and military industries.[31]
	AIR FORCE SCHOOLS	
Aviation Schools		
No. 4 Aviation School	Shijiazhuang, Hebei province[32]	This and other aviation schools may have been renamed Air Force Basic Colleges in 1986, reflecting the addition of college-level academic courses.[33]
No. 14 Aviation School	Probably in Sichuan.[34]	
Shenyang MR Aviation School[35]	Unknown	
Xinjiang Aviation School	Unknown	In operation since at least 1968, in desert area of Xinjiang.[36]
Other Schools		
Air Force Second Antiaircraft Artillery College	Sanyuan, Shaanxi province	One of two surface-to-air missile colleges to train officers for air force SAM units. "Second" indicates association with missiles rather than being an ordinal number. Courses include fire-control radar, high-frequency radar equipment, electronic countermeasures, automatic data processing, electrical engineering, flight instrumentation and test equipment, rocketry, and leadership.[37]
Air Force Second Antiaircraft Artillery College	Cangzhou, Hebei province	Presumably similar to the Sanyuan college.[38]
Air Force Antiaircraft School	Unknown	Probably trains officers for gun antiaircraft units of the air force. Courses are given for platoon and gunnery platoon leaders.[39]
Wuhan Air Force Radar School	Wuhan, Hubei province	Three-year course for radar engineering, technical instructors, and radar technicians; two-year course for radar platoon leaders; also a four-year advanced course. Short courses are offered four times a year on electronic data processors, digital technology, and electronic countermeasures.[40]
Chengde Air Force Radar School	Chengde, Hebei province	Presumably similar to Wuhan school.[41]
Air Force First Maintenance School	Xinyang, Henan province	No other information available.[42]
Shijiazhuang Air Force Communications School	Shijiazhuang, Hebei province	Trains "undergraduate students, commanders, and cadres" to be communications and navigation experts.[43]
Xi'an Air Force Communications School	Xi'an, Shaanxi province	No other information available.[44]
Air Force Weather College	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Courses include weather forecasting (four years), electronic weather instruments, meteorological radars, and meteorological observation. Graduates serve in all services.[45]
Air Force Engineering College	Xi'an, Shaanxi province	Trains officers in aircraft maintenance, airfield architecture, engineering, and foreign languages. Established in 1960. Two-year courses for students with prior military experience (40 percent of total); four-year course for recent high school graduates. The latter requires completion of a research paper. Graduation is a prerequisite for command of maintenance squadrons or higher units.[46]

[31] *Shaanxi Ribao* (Xi'an), Jan. 11, 1981, p. 1.
[32] *Trip Report*, p. VIII-1.
[33] *Xinhua Ribao*, Mar. 20, 1986, p. 1; *Shenyang Ribao* (Shenyang), Mar. 17, 1986, p. 1.
[34] *Sichuan Ribao* (Chengdu), July 16, 1980, p. 3.
[35] Harbin, Heilongjiang, Provincial Service, Feb. 27, 1984, trans. in *JPRS-CPS* , No. 84-027, Apr. 10, 1984, p. 43.
[36] *Jiefangjun Huabao* (Beijing), January 1983, p. 10–11.
[37] *Heilongjiang Ribao* (Harbin), July 27, 1981, p. 4; and *Beijing Ribao*, July 24, 1979, p. 2.
[38] *Hebei Ribao*, June 10, 1981, p. 4.
[39] *Beijing Ribao*, July 24, 1979, p. 2.
[40] Ibid., May 28, 1980, p. 2; and *Hebei Ribao*, July 10, 1981, p. 3.
[41] *Hebei Ribao*, July 10, 1984, p. 4.
[42] *Jiefang Ribao* (Shanghai), Aug. 1, 1979, p. 4.
[43] *Beijing Ribao*, July 10, 1981, p. 3.
[44] Ibid.
[45] *Xinhua Ribao*, June 18, 1981, p. 3, and July 31, 1981, p. 2; and *Qixiang Zhishi* (Beijing), No. 21, 1981, p. 15.

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Intermediate School		
Air Force College	Beijing	Discussed in text above.
	NAVY SCHOOLS	
No. 1 Surface Ship School	Lüda (Dalian), Liaoning province	Also known as Dalian Naval Academy—one of two schools training line officers for the surface fleets. Founded in 1950. In 1982, had 400 students and 1,800 midshipmen. First three years of four-year curriculum devoted to general education; final year is given over to naval courses, including radio, navigation, radar, gunnery, sonar, and surveying. A short on-board training session is included in the final year, but the bulk of shipboard training occurs at officer's unit of assignment.[47]
No. 2 Surface Ship School	Guangzhou, Guangdong province	Founded in 1979. Trains entry-level line officers for surface fleets. Four-year course trains officers for small vessels (Dalian graduates will be chiefs of departments on larger ships). Recruited 100 entrants in summer 1983; Dalian took 190 the same year.[48]
Naval Submarine School	Qingdao, Shandong province	The only submarine school, it teaches a four-year basic course; a four-year department head course at intermediate level; and a two-year course for submarine commanders. Also a two-year course for rescue and diving operations, and a one-year missile engineering course are taught. Had 1,745 students in February 1985. All new officers take a further year's course in the navy's submarine training squadron for at-sea training before reporting to an operational unit. School also trains enlisted submarine recruits in a one-year course, followed by another year at the training squadron.[49]
Navy Second Artillery College	Jinxi, Liaoning province	Trains missile technicians and department heads for guided-missile vessels. Courses for undergraduates listed in 1980 were missile engineering, guidance engineering, and automatic control engineering. Some 60 freshmen admitted in 1983.[50]
Naval College	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	The senior navy school, providing professional education to middle- and high-ranking commanders and staff. The only naval command school above basic level (except for submarine commanders). Established as the Naval Department of the PLA Military Academy in 1952 and became a separate college on October 8, 1957. Six courses taught in 1981 to student body of 554: (1) senior commanding officers class, a short-term course focusing on "professional research training" for prospective senior commanders; (2) combined-arms commanding officers class, a two-year intermediate-level program for commanders of "combined arms" defined to include naval aviation, as well as surface and submarine forces; (3) naval air force commanding officers class, a one-year intermediate-level program for prospective commanders of the shore-based PLA Naval Air Force; (4) rear services commanding officers class, a one-year intermediate-level course; (5) staff officers class, a one-year course; (6) political officers class, a one-year course for both middle- and high-ranking political officers. The college serves as the primary research institute for naval strategy and doctrine. In addition to regular students, there were 100 researchers enrolled in 1981.[51]
Naval Engineering College	Wuhan, Hubei (formerly Dalian, Liaoning province)	Graduate and undergraduate degrees in naval engineering. The four-year undergraduate program recruited 175 entrants in 1983; courses

[46]*Radio Press*, Oct. 16, 1979, p. 3; and *Heilongjiang Ribao*, June 27, 1981, p. 4. Also, *Trip Report*, p. VIII-3.
[47]*Jianchuan Zhishi* (Beijing), May 1983, p. 6. Also, *Trip Report*, p. VII-1.
[48]*Nanfang Ribao* (Guangzhou), Oct. 6, 1979, p. 3; Xinhua, Mar. 11, 1984, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 84-024, Mar. 28, 1984, p. 106; *Jianchuan Zhishi*, May 1983, p. 6.
[49]*Jianchuan Zhishi*, July 1981, p. 7, and May 1983, p. 6; *Xinhua Ribao*, July 18, 1981, p. 3; and Xinhua, July 31, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 7, 1984, p. K/4.
[50]*Beijing Ribao*, May 17, 1982, p. 2; and *Jianchuan Zhishi*, May 1983, p. 6.
[51]"A Brief Account of the Naval College of the People's Liberation Army," brochure provided to a delegation from the US National Defense University, April 1984. Also, *Trip Report*, pp. VII-2 through VII-11.

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		included marine electrical facilities engineering, naval architecture, nautical instruments engineering, ship degaussing, and control of internal combustion engines.[52]
Naval Advanced Electronic Engineering College	Taiyuan, Shaanxi province	Four-year undergraduate program in 1983 had courses on electronic countermeasures, terminal indications, sonar, reconnaissance equipment maintenance, and English and Russian. Took 110 freshmen that year. A 1981 report said the school took some non-military students, but did not elaborate. No graduate program confirmed.[53]

OTHER SPECIALTY SCHOOLS

Strategic Missile Force		
Second Artillery College	Wuhan, Hubei province	Probably trains commanders at all levels for strategic missile units.[54]
Second Artillery Technical College	Xi'an, Shaanxi province	Also known as the Missile Technical College. A four-year Bachelor of Engineering degree for guided missile technical officers was awarded to 46 students in 1982. A 1980 photo showed 90 students, 10 of them wearing naval uniforms, implying that submarine-launched ballistic missile technicians train here rather than at the Naval Second Artillery College or Submarine School.[55]
Political Schools		
Political Academy	Beijing	Trains candidates for regimental and higher political officer positions—the senior party school in the PLA. Courses range from one to two years, covering philosophy, political economics, socialist theory, party history, and political work in the armed forces. The 1983 class had 400 students. Absorbed into the National Defense University in 1985.[56]
Nanjing Political School	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Course in 1981 included philosophy, political science, economics, socialist theory, party history, military political work, and international relations.[57]
Xi'an Political School	Xi'an, Shaanxi province	Presumably for ground forces and similar to the school at Nanjing.[58]
Air Force Political School	Shanghai	August 1984 account tells of a student who entered after completing an enlisted tour in an airborne unit. The school probably also trains officers with some experience at the company level.[59]
PLA Arts Institute	Beijing	Educates artists and writers for political units and cultural troupes of the PLA's General Political Department
Logistics Academies		
PLA Logistics Academy	Beijing	An advanced school for logistics officers, coequal with the Military Academy, and since 1985 part of the National Defense University.[61]
Logistics Engineering College	Unknown	Teaches undergraduates in barracks construction, and in thetl stocking, supply, and usage of petroleum products.[62]
Transportation School	Tianjin	Not certain to be a cadre school, but its reported association with the General Logistics Department suggests that it trains commanders of motor transport units.[63]

[52] *Jianchuan Zhishi,* May 1983, p. 6.
[53] Ibid.; also, *Hebei Ribao,* July 10, 1981, p. 4; *Xinhua Ribao,* June 18, 1981, p. 3; and *Fujian Ribao,* July 21, 1981, p. 3.
[54] *Gongren Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 8, 1983, p. 2.
[55] *Jiefangjun Huabao,* No. 10, October 1980, p. 11; *Shaanxi Ribao* (Xi'an), July 30, 1982, p. 1; *China Daily* (Beijing), Mar. 4, 1981, p. 1.
[56] Xinhua, July 16, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* July 20, 1983, p. K/20; *Renmin Ribao,* July 9, 1979, p. 2; Xinhua Hong Kong Service, July 18, 1984, trans. in FBIS, Hong Kong cable, HK 180804, July 18, 1984.
[57] *Xinhua Ribao,* Sept. 22, 1981, p. 1.
[58] *Shaanxi Ribao,* Jan. 7, 1981, p. 3, and Feb. 11, 1981, p. 1.
[59] Xinhua, Aug. 31, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 6, 1984, p. K/1; *Jiefang Ribao,* Aug. 23, 1981, p. 1.
[60] *Jiefangjun Wenyi* (Beijing), No. 6, Sept. 1, 1984, pp. 3–7, trans. in *FBIS-CHI,* Nov. 8, 1984, p. K/18; *Jiefang Ribao,* Aug. 23, 1981, p. 1.
[61] *Renmin Ribao,* July 9, 1979, p. 2.
[62] Conversation with Colonel Al Wilhelm, US National War College, February 1986.
[63] *Tianjin Ribao* (Tianjin), Jan. 1, 1981, p. 1.

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Transportation Technical School	Tianjin	Probably trains technical officers for motor transport units.[64]
Railway Corps Engineering College	Shijiazhuang, Hebei province	Only an undergraduate course has been identified.[65]
Railway Corps Technical School	Changsha, Hunan province	Trains technicians for the Railway Corps. A parallel command school probably exists.[66]
Language Schools		
Luoyang Foreign Language College	Luoyang, Henan province	Undergraduate and graduate courses in English, Japanese, Russian, French, Korean, Arabic, and Mongolian.[67]
Nanjing Foreign Language College	Nanjing, Jiangsu province	Courses in English, Japanese, and Russian.[68]
Medical Schools		
2nd Military Medical School	Guangzhou Military Region.[69]	
Lanzhou MR Military Medical School[70]	Unknown	
Jinan MR Military Medical School[71]	Unknown	
Nanjing MR Military Medical School[72]	Unknown	
Wuhan MR Military Medical School[73]	Unknown	Status uncertain since 1986 absorption of Wuhan Military Region into Jinan and Guangzhou Military Regions.
Chengdu MR Military Medical School[74]	Unknown	
Fuzhou MR Military Medical School[75]	Unknown	Status uncertain since 1986 absorption of Fuzhou Military Region into Nanjing Military Region.
Naval Military Medical School[76]	Unknown	
General Logistics Department Military Medical School[77]	Unknown	
1st Military Medical College[78]	Beijing	
2nd Military Medical College	Guangzhou, Guangdong province	Founded October 1949; nursing department established in 1983.[79]
3rd Military Medical College[80]	Chongqing, Sichuan province	
4th Military Medical College[81]	Xi'an, Shaanxi province	
Medical Officer Refresher College	Unknown	Course content and duration unknown.[82]

[64] *Beijing Ribao*, May 28, 1980, p. 2.
[65] Zip Code Directory, Hubei Province, 1980.
[66] Changsha, Hunan, Provincial Service, June 21, 1978, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 23, 1978, p. H/12.
[67] *Xinhua Ribao*, June 28, 1981, p. 3; and *Hebei Ribao*, July 10, 1981, pp. 3–4.
[68] *Beijing Ribao*, May 28, 1980, p. 2.
[69] *Yangcheng Wanbao* (Guangszhou), May 24, 1981, p. 1.
[70] Gansu Provincial Zip Code Directory (Lanzhou), 1981, p. 21.
[71] *Dazhong Ribao* (Jinan), Mar. 25, 1981, p. 3.
[72] *Xinhua Ribao*, Mar. 10, 1981, p. 1.
[73] *Jiankang Bao* (Beijing), Aug. 6, 1981, p. 1.
[74] Ibid., May 24, 1981, p. 1.
[75] *Fujian Ribao*, Jan. 4, 1981, p. 2.
[76] *Jianchuan Zhishi*, May 1983, p. 6.
[77] *Jiefangjun Huabao*, No. 4, 1981, p. 31.
[78] *Xinhua Ribao*, June 18, 1981, p. 3.
[79] *Beijing Ribao*, May 28, 1980, p. 2; and Xinhua, Oct. 26, 1984, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 84-080, Dec. 3, 1984, p. 102.
[80] *Jiankang Ribao*, Nov. 6, 1980, p. 1.
[81] *Trip Report*, p. IX-1.
[82] *Jiefangjun Bao*, July 4, 1981, p. 1.

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Academy of Military Medical Science	Beijing	The highest PLA medical institution according to a 1982 General Logistics Department pamphlet.[83]
Naval Medical Research Institute[84]	Unknown	
Other Schools		
Veterinary College	Changchun, Jilin province	A five-year course for high-school graduates or qualified soldiers. Graduate course established in 1981.[85]
Cartographic College	Zhengzhou, Henan province	Undergraduate courses in aerial photographic survey, military engineering survey, and cartography.[86]
General Education		
Changsha Cadre Cultural School	Changsha, Hunan province	Founded September 1983; had 900 students, from all services.[87]
Wuhan University for Air Force cadres	Wuhan, Hubei province	A joint venture of Wuhan University and the Wuhan MR Air Force headquarters. Opened January 1985, accepting 74 officers for a two-year academic course. Reportedly one of 40 such joint courses being offered in the Wuhan Military Region in early 1985.[88]
University for Self-Taught Officer Cadres	Liaoning province	Founded in 1983 in association with Liaoning University. Had 9,581 students that year, 823 of whom received certificates in seven or more subjects.[89]
Modern Administration Institute of Shenyang MR	Shenyang, Liaoning province	Founded in March 1985.[90]

[83]*Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun weisheng gongzuo zuzhi yu guanli gai kuang* (The Comprehensive Status of the Organization and Management of Health Work in the Chinese People's Liberation Army), PLA General Logistics Department Medical Department, November 1982. Provided to visiting US officers in 1983, translated by US Army translators. Also, Xinhua, July 5, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 11, 1984, p. K/14.

[84]*Jiefangjun Yixue Zazhi* (PLA Medical Journal—Beijing), No. 4, August 1983, pp. 309–10, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *China Report: Science and Technology* (Washington, DC), No. 84-033, Oct. 24, 1983, p. 105.

[85]*Renmin Ribao*, February 25, 1983, p. 4.

[86]*Xinhua Ribao*, June 18, 1981, p. 3.

[87]Changsha, Hunan, Provincial Service, Sept. 2, 1983, trans. in *JPRS*, No. 84381, Sept. 21, 1983, p. 81.

[88]Wuhan, Hubei, Provincial Service, Jan. 23, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-019, Mar. 1, 1985, p. 146.

[89]Beijing Domestic Service, Mar. 23, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1985, p. S/1.

[90]Shenyang, Liaoning, Provincial Service, Mar. 25, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 28, 1985, p. S/1.

The four-year course represents a major change in the education of young officers. In addition to the military skills included in previous curriculums,[41] army schools now present a general academic education intended to be at the college level. For example, the Kunming Army School now offers 13 academic subjects, including higher mathematics, elementary electronic circuitry, basic computers, solid mechanics, and drafting.[42] It is not clear whether academic degrees are being conferred in army schools or not; Xinhua's announcement that Bachelor's degrees were to be granted by PLA schools did not specify which institutions were included, and news releases about the inclusion of military science among permissible degree categories did not mention Baccalaureate degrees.[43]

Nanchang Army School reported 498 graduates in 1980,[44] and had 200 cadets in its first four-year class entering in 1983.[45] Other information about the size of army schools is scarce, but if the 1980 class rather than the experimental four-year class in 1983 is typical, one may assume a student body ranging from 2,000 to 2,500 cadets at each such school.

Intermediate schools. Intermediate-level combined-arms schools train candidates for battalion or regimental command and for regiment and division staff posts. Until 1986, combined-arms officers attended one of two higher army schools (*gaoji lujun xuexiao*), formerly called advanced military infantry schools.

These two schools have now been renamed and their

[41]The two-year curriculum was standard for army schools prior to 1982. The purely military content of the two-year course was demonstrated in 1982, when the Jinan Army School was reported to teach combined-arms operations, joint operations, and tactics and strategy for the chemical and nuclear battlefield. See *Liaowang*, No. 12, 1982, pp. 32–33.

[42]Wang Zhao, "Kunming Infantry Academy Sets Up Four-Year Courses of Higher Education," *Yunnan Ribao*, June 13, 1983, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 27, 1983, p. Q/12.

[43]Xinhua, July 24, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 27, 1983, pp. K/16–17.

[44]See note 38.

[45]*Ibid.*

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missions redefined. The Nanjing Higher Army School is now called the Army Command Academy (*lujun zhihui xueyuan*) and will train all intermediate-level commanders for the ground forces. In 1981 it had 1,000 students and expected to expand to 1,500. Approximately 1,000 officers were assigned as staff and faculty.[46] The Shijiazhuang Higher Army School is now the Military Education Academy, and probably trains instructors for other military schools. The curriculum of these two institutions has not been revealed, but the Command Academy's curriculum is probably similar to the former higher army school program, which included one- and two-year courses. Candidates for regimental command entered the course between the ages of 28 and 33, while candidates for staff positions were generally 25–28 years old.[47] Four different courses were offered: [48]

1. Regimental operations course: a two-year course for outstanding battalion commanders and certain company commanders who were candidates for regimental command. Nomination for command and for attendance at this course came from the officer's parent unit. An entrance examination was administered by the school to nominated officers;
2. Regimental operations short course: a one-year shortened curriculum for regimental commanders who had assumed command without the benefit of the two-year course;
3. Staff course: a two-year course for company-grade officers who were candidates for regimental and division staff positions. Nomination by the officers' units and successful completion of an entrance examination were prerequisites;
4. Political officers' course: no information is available on this course.

Ground force intermediate-level branch schools perform a function parallel to that of the Command Academy. For those branches that have regimental-size field units, such as armor and artillery, both command and staff courses exist, while other branch schools train only staff officers.

Each of the specialized branches of the PLA ground forces operates schools for its technical cadres. Several such schools operate as universities offering undergraduate and graduate degrees in the sciences. Others function as technical training schools, preparing officers to perform the tasks required of them but little more. Many technical schools were accorded first priority in the selection of candidates in 1980.[49] Information is very sketchy on many of these schools. It is likely that graduate curriculums are offered at several more schools than are now known, especially at those designated "colleges" (*xueyuan*) rather than "schools" (*xuexiao*).

Advanced schools. The highest institution in the PLA school system is the National Defense University (*guofang daxue*—hereafter NDU). Created in December 1985, it incorporates the three previous senior schools—the Military Academy, the Political Academy, and the Logistics Academy.[50] Another national-level institution, the Academy of Military Science, is a strategic think tank rather than an officer training school, and does not seem to have been incorporated into the National Defense University. In theory, the three academies, which apparently retain their separate identities under the NDU, rank the same and serve the entire PLA. In practice, the Military Academy functions as the senior school for ground force officers. Although a few naval and air force officers attend, the curriculum focuses on joint-service operations from the ground commander's viewpoint, with little consideration of air power or sea power in their own right. In reality, the senior service schools for the other services are the Air Force College in Beijing and the Naval College in Nanjing. This may, however, change now that the Academy is part of NDU, which is consciously striving to broaden the professional and intellectual horizons of its students.

The Military Academy conducts three courses for officers ranging from "division level" (roughly the equivalent of colonels and brigadier generals) to "above–army (corps) level" (the equivalent of three- and four-star generals). The accelerated course, designed for incumbent division and army commanders and officers above army level, is one year long. The regular course is a two-year course for officers chosen to command divisions. Students are selected from among outstanding division-level officers and a select few regimental-level officers. The staff officers' course is also two years in length, and trains officers to head staff departments above the army level. The Academy announced in early 1985 that it would also enroll 20 young officers (less than 37 years old) with college degrees or intermediate military academy background for a two-year "postgraduate" course. Upon graduation, these officers were to assume teaching and research posts or staff assign-

[46]Department of the Army, Combined-Arms Center, *Trip Report: Visit of the United States Military Education Delegation to the People's Republic of China, 11–26 May 1981*, June 5, 1981, p. VI-10. Hereafter cited as *Trip Report*. The present study utilizes unclassified excerpts from this classified report.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid.

[49]*Renmin Ribao*, May 17, 1980, p. 3.

[50]*Jiefangjun Huabao* (Beijing), No. 3, 1986, pp. 16–17.

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ments.[51] Military subjects taught at the Academy include strategy, operations, and Soviet strategic thought and military operations. Research topics centered on how to defeat a technologically superior enemy in a defense of the Chinese homeland. Political topics included philosophy, economics, international relations, and Chinese foreign policy, as well as Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.[52] The student body at capacity includes 1,000 officers in the above courses plus several hundred on research fellowships.[53] The National Defense University also announced a new program beginning in mid-1986 whereby civilian officials from national, provincial, and city governments will participate in strategic studies in the university's research department.[54]

Air Force Schools

Air force pilots and commanders begin their education at aviation schools (*hangkong xuexiao*). Officers of air force antiaircraft units attend one of three air force antiaircraft artillery colleges, which also train technical cadres for surface-to-air missile units. At the intermediate command level, only one institution, the Air Force College, has been identified. Senior-level officers are eligible to attend the PLA Military Academy, though in practice few air force officers do so. Technical schools provide officer training, usually offering instruction at all levels. Identified air force schools are listed in Table 1.

Aviation schools. There are at least 10 and perhaps as many as 14 aviation schools in the PLA.[55] Basic pilot training is conducted in four phases over three years. The first eight months cover ground-force, political, physical, and academic training. The next four months are spent in preflight theoretical training. Topics include principles of flight, aviation, meteorology, aircraft structures and engines, aerial gunnery, navigation, air intercepts, radio and "special" equipment, and parachuting. A total of 490 hours are spent in class, and 250 hours in flight.[56] The third phase, a one-year primary flight training course, includes approximately 160 hours of flight in propeller-driven trainers, 30 percent of which is solo. Flight subjects include traffic patterns, two-plane formations, aerobatics, navigation, and night flying. The final phase, advanced jet flight training in the F–5 and F–5T (MiG–17 trainer) lasts one year. Students receive 95 hours of flying time, 30 percent of which is solo. Advanced air training in this phase covers flight traffic patterns, aerobatics, instrument flying, navigation, formations, and aerial combat. Ground training continues through both years of flight training, focusing on military and political indoctrination and physical fitness.[57]

Conversion to piloting of specific aircraft types is done at the pilot's first unit of assignment, rather than at aviation schools, though the schools seem to specialize either in fighters or bombers. Fighter training at the unit generally lasts three years, though an air division of undisclosed type was praised for reducing conversion training to 11 months.[58]

A shortened, two-year course for college graduates was instituted in May 1983 at one aviation school, probably in Guangzhou province. (The course was reported in *Guangzhou Ribao* as well as in the national *Guangming Ribao*.) The first group of 21 students were all graduates of the Air Force Engineering College. By 1984, the short course was in place at Shijiazhuang Aviation School, and probably at the remaining schools as well. The shortened course combines preflight and basic flight instruction in the first year with the standard advanced flight instruction in the second year.[59]

In November 1982, the General Staff Department announced that "university diplomas for specialized courses" would be granted to graduates of aviation schools, both pilots and navigators. This may or may not be regarded as the equivalent of a university degree, but in any case it should help with recruitment.[60]

Beginning in 1984, candidates for admission to aviation schools were required to pass the same entrance examination given other military school candidates. It covers mathematics, physics, chemistry, languages, and political knowledge. Political and physical screening is done by local officials. The 1984 recruitment period lasted from March 1 to mid-June, and was limited to male graduates of senior middle schools between 16 and 19 years of age.[61]

Other air force basic schools. Maintenance, radar, communications, meteorology, and anti-aircraft officers are trained at special colleges administered by the air force. Many of these provide both basic- and ad-

[51]Xinhua Beijing English Service, Feb. 12, 1985, in FBIS, Okinawa cable, OW 121021, Feb. 12, 1985.
[52]*Trip Report*, p. VI-10.
[53]Ibid, p. V–5.
[54]*Zhongguo Xinwen She*, May 16, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, May 21, 1986, p. K/12.
[55]*Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 9, 1985, p. 4, trans. in *JRPS-CPS*, No. 85-021, Mar. 7, 1985, p. 111.
[56]*Schools*, pp. 91, 93; also *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 10, 1979, p. 4.
[57]*Schools*, pp. 91, 93.
[58]*Yunnan Huabao* (Kunming), July 1981, pp. 2–3.
[59]See *Guangzhou Ribao*, May 26, 1983, p. 3; and *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), June 4, 1983, p. 4; also, Xinhua, July 24, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 27, 1984, p. K/2.
[60]*Guangming Ribao*, Nov. 12, 1982, p. 2.
[61]Xinhua, July 4, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, July 5, 1984, p. K/12; also, Harbin Provincial Service Broadcast, Feb. 27, 1984, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 84-027, Apr. 10, 1984, p. 43.

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vanced-level technical and command training. Details of the curriculum are addressed in Table 1.

Intermediate- and advanced-level schools. The Air Force College (*kongjun xueyuan*) in Beijing is the only school for intermediate- or advanced-level air force commanders. The college presents a six-month course at the intermediate level for air squadron commanders, focusing on air tactics and command and control, and a one-year senior-level course for commanders and staff of regimental rank.[62]

Naval Schools

The navy operates a small, academically-oriented system of officer training schools (see Table 1). The basic-level command schools are four-year colleges that offer a science and engineering curriculum along with training in nautical skills. Like the air force, the navy operates only one institution, the Naval College (*haijun xueyuan*), in Nanjing, for intermediate- and senior-level training.

In the late 1970's, the navy took the lead among the services in raising the educational level of its officers. Since 1980, all newly commissioned officers have been academy graduates.[63] As of 1983, all prospective commanders and executive officers of naval ships were required to be graduates of the Naval College, to have served a year's apprenticeship under their predecessor, and to have passed a written test to demonstrate their knowledge and competence.[64] In February 1983, 75 percent of regiment-level naval officers were university graduates, and 71 percent of division-level officers had a "university-level working knowledge."[65]

Students at the basic-level academies are drawn from three sources. Enlisted sailors with a high-school education may apply to the academies at the end of their five-year enlistment. These former enlisted men are accepted primarily into the three line-officer schools. High-school students may also apply to the academies directly after graduation. The third source is the pool of graduates of civilian colleges and universities. In May 1983, a short course was announced for these degree holders.[66] Presumably, it is a one-year course encompassing the non-academic aspects of the Surface Ship School curriculum. With the exception of degree holders, all candidates for admission must pass the standard national college entrance examination or the military school equivalent.[67]

Students at the intermediate level are either technical officers pursuing advanced degrees or, in the case of the Naval College, candidates for ship command. The advanced-level course, also taught at the Naval College, is for successful ship commanders selected for formation command. Naval officers are eligible for attendance at the PLA Military Academy, but as is the case for the air force, only a few officers studying joint-service operations actually attend.

Other Specialty Schools

The Second Artillery, China's strategic missile command, operates two officer schools, the Second Artillery College and the Second Artillery Technical School. Details of these and other specialty schools described below are listed in Table 1.

Many intermediate-level command academies have courses for political officers, with the graduates assuming positions in units of the parent service. The principal schools for political cadres, however, are the Political Academy and the political schools of the various services. The Political Academy is one of the three senior-level academies now subsumed under the National Defense University. The service political schools provide both basic- and intermediate-level training for political officers.

The General Logistics Department operates schools for logisticians, but little is known about their course content or student body. The Logistics Academy is the third senior academy under the National Defense University.

Foreign-language schools of the PLA train personnel for engineering and scientific research, for the military foreign attaché corps, and for contact with foreign military services, as well as for signals intelligence collection. Two such schools have been identified, but as this number is almost certainly inadequate for the PLA's needs, there are likely others.

PLA medical training schools fall into three broad categories. At the lowest level, the military medical schools (*jun yi xuexiao*) in each military region offer two- and three-year courses for medical technicians and unit medical officers. These schools provide both basic medical and basic military training for medical officers (the equivalent of US Army physician's assistants, or paramedics), nurses, and laboratory and X-ray technicians. One of them, the Guangzhou school, graduates approximately 100 medical officers and 200 nurses and technicians per year. The navy and the General Logistics Department each have a similar school; presum-

[62] *Trip Report*, p. V-3.
[63] Naval Chief of Staff Yang Guoyu, interviewed by Shen Shungeng, "The Developing Chinese Navy," *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), July 21, 1982.
[64] *Wen Wei Po*, June 1, 1983, p. 1.
[65] *Renmin Ribao*, Feb. 25, 1983, p. 4.
[66] *Guangming Ribao*, May 16, 1983, p. 2.
[67] *Trip Report*, p. VII-1.

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ably the air force has one as well. Graduates from the medical officer program generally go into line units rather than hospitals.

Above the military medical schools are four military medical colleges (*jun yi daxue*) that train doctors, surgeons, dentists, pharmacists, and practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine for military hospitals in each of the services. Students enter either directly from high school or from the enlisted or officer ranks, and pursue a five-year course. The colleges also provide graduate-level and advanced specialist training, normally in three-year courses. The college in Xi'an (see Table 1) had 2,500 students in 1981, and was reported to graduate approximately 420 students per year.[68] Research and advanced-level training are also provided. Above the colleges, are medical research institutes that offer specialized medical training and research on topics of concern to the military.[69]

A variety of institutions have been created to raise the educational level of officers who entered service before the recent improvements in precommissioning education. The first category, cadre cultural schools (*ganbu wenhua xuexiao*), seems to provide a resident course of secondary and post-secondary education for senior officers. "Culture" here refers to academic education. The Changsha Cadre Cultural School is associated with a military region, and there may be such schools in each region. The services have also established non-resident courses, with study groups at the unit level throughout the PLA. Air force non-resident schools are called "spare-time universities," and the army has "self-taught universities." Both award certificates of completion for individual courses and undergraduate degrees for three to four years of study.

There were more than 370,000 students in supplemental educational programs in 1983; 250,000 officers and enlisted men in college courses, 113,000 officers in secondary-education courses, and 10,000 officers in courses "similar to those in civilian polytechnical schools." Some 17,000 officers received certificates in the same year for completing one or more courses. In 1984, approximately 4,000 officers in the Urumqi Military Region alone received junior- or senior-high-school diplomas, and nearly 5,000 Jinan Military Region officers received junior-high-school diplomas. As of early 1985, the air force reported that it had 16,000 students in college-level courses, and had budgeted 2.19 million yuan for educational purposes in the Wuhan Military Region alone.[70]

Two other identified schools, for veterinarians and cartographers, are indicated in Table 1.

Conclusion

Officers commissioned in the late 1980's can expect a progression of schools and training during their careers very different from that of previous generations. Officers now nearing retirement entered the army during the guerrilla era, and with some exceptions had little or no education. Those who entered in the late 1950's and early 1960's may have attended secondary school, at least as far as lower-middle (junior-high) school, but few non-technical cadres had any higher education. Those whose formative years fell during the Cultural Revolution may not even have finished lower-middle school. With the reform in officer basic schools after 1978, young line officers will for the first time enter service with something approaching a college education.

Present middle- and high-level officers who did not enjoy a decent education in their youth are expected to catch up as much as possible through self-study or attendance at resident "cultural" schools. For older officers, as well as young lieutenants, education has become the path to success.

Professional military education during the course of an officer's career will likewise be superior to that of his predecessors. Intermediate-level schools have existed in the PLA since at least 1957, when the various branch colleges were split off from the Military Academy. Before 1978, however, attendance at these schools was not a prerequisite for command or promotion. Since the reforms, all officers must attend intermediate schools around their tenth year of service, and those destined for high command will attend advanced-level schools as well.

Despite this, it is unlikely that the PLA is near its goal of having all new officers be academy graduates. The annual number of graduates is available for only a few schools, but the known figures suggest that some 15-20,000 officers per year is the most the school system can currently produce. In the absence of data on the number of new officers needed each year by the PLA, one must rely on comparison with other nations. The US accepts just over 19,500 new officers yearly, and main-

[68]Ibid., p. IX-2.

[69]Information on the medical system of the PLA is drawn from *Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun weisheng gongzuo zuzhi yu guanli gai kuang* (The Comprehensive Status of the Organization and Management of Health Work in the Chinese People's Liberation Army), Beijing, PLA General Logistics Department Medical Department, November 1982—a brochure provided to visiting US officers in 1983, translated by US Army interpreters.

[70]For statistics in this paragraph, see the following three sources: Xinhua, Jan. 26, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 1, 1984, p. K/16; *Renmin Ribao*, Jan. 8, 1985, p. 4, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-021, Mar. 7, 1985, p. 117; Wuhan, Hubei, Provincial Service, Jan. 23, 1985, trans. in *JPRS-CPS*, No. 85-019, Mar. 1, 1985, p. 146.

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tains a total active force of 2.12 million officers and enlisted men.[71] The Soviet military school system commissions roughly 50,000 officers per year, out of a total force of 4.9 million—excluding troops of the KGB (Committee for State Security) and Ministry of Internal Affairs.[72] Thus for the PLA's projected 3.2 million-man force, it is probably desirable to commission in the range of 30,000 officers a year, significantly more than the present estimated capacity of the academies. The force reductions of 1985–86 will lower the yearly requirement for officers, but the demand for academy graduates will still outstrip the supply. It will still be necessary to select a portion of each year's new class of lieutenants from the enlisted ranks, who will have no more than a secondary-school education. As far as possible, however, the PLA will insist on at least senior-middle school education, in contrast to previous eras when there was almost no educational requirement. In addition, with the emphasis now placed on higher education, academy graduates are much more likely to be promoted, and in coming decades, the ranks of senior officers will be filled chiefly with graduates.

The reformation of the PLA officer education system is basically complete. Officer schools will continue to expand toward the size necessary to provide formal schooling for all officers. The academic content of various courses may be modified as graduates of the four-year academies reach the field in large enough numbers so that the effectiveness of their half-military, half-academic education can be evaluated. Also, as college-educated officers reach the intermediate and advanced schools, the curriculums at those institutions may be altered to exploit the increased educational level of the students. But aside from this sort of adjustment, the program to improve officer education has been completed, and the PLA's leadership can now refocus its attention.

Indications are that basic training and the structure of the militia and local forces are among areas of concern in early 1987. New basic-training regiments are being created, relieving combat units of the burden imposed by untrained recruits flooding their ranks each year.[73] The militia is in the midst of a total reorganization under the Military Service Law of October 1984, creating a Western-style reserve component in lieu of the armed "backbone" militia previously maintained.[74] The creation of the reserves has parallelled the deactivation of a significant number of active-duty units as part of the 25 percent strength reduction announced in 1985.

Whatever the course of future military modernization, the improvements made in the education of military officers since 1978 will be of great benefit. As the quality of the technology available for military equipment improves, a cadre of better-educated officers will be in place to develop the strategy, doctrine, tactics, and training necessary to employ modern weapons and equipment. Together with a concurrent emphasis on appointing younger officers to key positions, the changes in officer education will make a significant contribution to improving the quality of military leadership in China.

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[71]Fiscal year 1983 figures provided by the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations and Logistics, in a telephone conversation on Feb. 12, 1985.

[72]Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1981, p. 335; and Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power*, 2nd Edition, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 2.

[73]Xinhua, Mar. 24, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 27, 1985, p. R/1.

[74]Xinhua, June 4, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, June 6, 1984, p. K/1. For creation of reserve units, see *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 6, 1985, p. K/3; Nov. 19, 1984, p. P/5; July 20, 1984, p. T/1; Aug. 7, 1984, p. K/8; July 20, 1984, p. O/3; Aug. 24, 1984, p. Q/1; Aug. 31, 1984, p. S/2; Aug. 14, 1984, p. T/7; and Sept. 14, 1984, p. O/2.

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Books

Recent Trends in Sino-Japanese Relations

Walter Arnold

ROBERT TAYLOR. *The Sino-Japanese Axis: A New Force in Asia?* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

CHAE-JIN LEE. *China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984.

ROBERT E. BEDESKI. *The Fragile Entente: The 1978 Japan-China Peace Treaty in a Global Context*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1983.

THROUGHOUT THE postwar era, the need to expand foreign trade has dominated the worldview of the Japanese government and business community. Meeting this need has clearly been a primary motive behind Japan's gradual economic involvement in China and helped pave the way to Japan's diplomatic recognition of China in 1972. For China, the need to modernize its lagging economy, especially in the wake of the political upheavals and economic disruptions of the Cultural Revolution, has prompted the post-Mao leadership to seek closer economic relations with the advanced industrial nations, in particular Japan. Indeed, China's insatiable appetite for foreign technology and production know-how has provided powerful impetus for Japan's entry into China. As a result, by the late 1970's, Japan had turned its comparative advantage, productive capabilities, and trading ingenuity into tangible economic success in its dealings with the People's Republic. For a brief period, Japan virtually dominated the China market.

But this "love affair" was short-lived. In 1979–80, due to growing deficits and inflation, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was forced to make radical adjustments in its economic policy, and it abruptly cancelled a great many contracts with foreign firms and agencies, including US$1 billion in contracts for the Baoshan Steel Complex near Shanghai, the showpiece of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation.[1] This reversal of policy revealed not only how weak China's economy and related political and economic institutions were, but also how sharply divided Chinese officials were over the pace and direction of China's modernization. Caught off guard, Japanese economic interests were particularly hard hit by these events, and Japan found its position as China's main trade partner seriously jeopardized.

It took considerable effort on the state-to-state level to restore mutual trust and confidence in Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. Japan's Foreign Minister Saburo Okita, a man well-versed in China's economic affairs and well-connected in Chinese political circles, became involved in the highest level of diplomacy with China's Vice Chairman of the Communist Party Deng Xiaoping and Vice Premier Gu Mu. After delicate bilateral negotiations and successful coordination of policy perspectives among the relevant bureaucratic organizations in both countries, China agreed to compensate the injured Japanese firms, and

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[1]For a detailed analysis of the Japanese case, see Ryosei Kokubun, "The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy-Making in China: The Case of Plant Cancellations with Japan," in *The China Quarterly* (London), March 1986, pp. 19–44.

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in return Japan offered China a financial package designed to keep most of the contracted projects afloat (Lee, pp. 58–72).

This revival of Sino-Japanese economic collaboration appears to be based on firmer footing. Relations between the two countries have stabilized over the past several years, as both states have striven to administer their bilateral economic affairs in an orderly manner. Nonetheless, long-term prospects have been somewhat dimmed of late by a chain of irritating trade problems, of rising anti-Japanese sentiment in China, of deteriorating terms of trade for Chinese oil, coal, and agricultural products, and of a disillusioned Japanese business community frustrated by Chinese bureaucratic red tape.

On the political level, several other occurrences appear to have had a disturbing effect on Sino-Japanese relations, most notably the notorious textbook affair and the subsequent indiscreet remarks by former Minister of Education Masayuki Fujio,[2] and the visit by members of the Nakasone Cabinet to the Yasukuni Shrine (Japan's war memorial).[3] This is not to say that China and Japan have reached a critical impasse; however, it does suggest that a reassessment of Sino-Japanese relations is warranted. Fortunately, the three volumes under review here provide a good point of departure for such an undertaking, as they help to illuminate some of the antecedents of the current situation.

ALTHOUGH THEY differ in the level of their analysis and in their approach, Robert Taylor, Chae-Jin Lee, and Robert Bedeski stress that Sino-Japanese relations are defined by close interaction between political and economic factors. Indeed, both countries have used international trade and investment as political instruments in their pursuit of national power, and it is no overstatement to argue that trade patterns between the two have, in turn, been strongly influenced by the political factor of their mutual dependence.

As Taylor points out, Japanese elite circles regard China's sociopolitical stability as a prerequisite for stability in Asia. In addition, in the aftermath of the oil price increases in 1973–74, a resource-dependent Japan anxiously seeking to diversify its energy supplies perceived China to be an excellent alternate source of those supplies. China's leadership, on the other hand, notes Taylor, depends heavily on Japan for the success of its ambitious program of economic modernization, on which much of the leadership's legitimacy, credibility, and political fortunes hinge.

But as Chae-Jin Lee and Taylor both point out, China's dependence on Japan is not limited to the trade sector; it also extends to investment, joint ventures, and infrastructural projects in China. The authors also see China's growing trade deficit with advanced industrial economies—with Japan accounting for the lion's share of China's imports of technology and industrial products—as another area of dependence. Moreover, given the stiff competition from other developing countries, the oil glut in the Middle East, and the rising protectionism of Western capitalist countries—all factors seriously impairing China's competitivenes and export capability—it does not appear that China's situation will soon improve. Indeed, according to Taylor, Malthusian pressures still remain the single most critical impediment to China's development; thus, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States are likely to remain key sources of technical know-how, equipment, and investment for the development of Chinese agriculture and other natural resources.

As for the reverse influence of economics on politics, all three authors seem to concur that expanding economic relations have helped significantly to defuse the earlier political tensions and conflict that had been rooted in Japan's close alignment with the United States during the early 1950's. They attribute the phenomenal improvement in Sino-Japanese relations since 1972 to China's need to modernize its ailing economy, although, as Bedeski points out, China's heightened awareness of its security problem vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the PRC's rapprochement with the United States were likewise important considerations (pp. 4, 38).

Yet, according to Taylor, Japan has not been prepared to sacrifice its national political interests for the sake of its economic relationship with China, and China remains but one factor in the Japanese foreign

[2]Japan's official school textbooks describe Imperial Japan's aggression against and invasion of the East Asian mainland euphemistically as an "advance" into those territories and generally minimize Japan's detrimental role in Korea and China prior to 1945. This has led to popular discontent in those countries and to official protests by Seoul and Beijing.

Referring to the textbook uproar in China and Korea, then Education Minister Masayuki Fujio reportedly told a July 25, 1986, news conference that "the guys who complain about Japan's history textbooks should first look back to make sure they have not committed such a thing (invasions) in their history." See Ding Guo, "Nakasone's Indiscreet Remark and Promotion of Japanese Nationalism," in *Jiu shi nian dai* (Hong Kong), November, 1986, pp. 76–77. Premier Nakasone dismissed Fujio on September 8, 1986, after Fujio refused to step down voluntarily.

[3]The propriety of official visits by members of the Japanese cabinet to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, where currently class-A war criminals are enshrined together with millions of war dead, has been questioned in Japan and abroad. China has indicated that it does not object to official annual commemorations by Japanese cabinet members of Japan's war dead, provided that the class-A war criminals are removed See *Japan Times* (Tokyo), Oct. 25, 1986, p. 2.

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policy, in spite of the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In his opinion, vital concerns, particularly relations with the USSR, make it difficult for Japan to subscribe fully to China's view of the world. The argument is well taken, especially in view of Japan's omnidirectional diplomacy and current Soviet policy. Not only has Japan continued to participate actively in the Soviet development of Siberia since 1972, but Soviet-Japanese trade, reduced substantially after the 1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, has rebounded significantly in 1986.[4]

Normalization of relations in 1972 enabled Japanese leaders to dispense with the earlier need to separate politics from economics in dealing with China.[5] Since then, in keeping with the predominant Japanese view that a stable China is a prerequisite for stability in the Far East, Tokyo has attached increasing political importance to its economic relations with Beijing. China for its part, notes Lee, has deradicalized economic relations with Japan and, in contrast to the 1960's, no longer seems to see trade primarily as a political tool. In fact, China today is less frequently employing its traditional "divide and rule" approach to Japan (by which Chinese leaders attempted to penetrate and manipulate Japan's pluralistic political and economic power structures and to take advantage of competitive and contradictory factors operating in that country), while Japanese companies have had some modest success in sorting out China's bureaucratic maze and influencing the interaction among the many bureaucracies with which they must deal (p. 142).

LEE'S STUDY illuminates Sino-Japanese economic diplomacy—defined by the author as the process of negotiating and implementing agreements at both the state and enterprise level. He focuses mainly on the complex bureaucratic and political/economic environment in which China's political leadership has worked to yoke economic relations with Japan to its modernization program. Based on the carefully researched and well-documented case studies of the Baoshan Steel Complex, the Bohai Oil development and exports, and Japanese economic assistance, Lee's study clearly indicates that China's leadership in the late 1970's and early 1980's was deeply divided over the formulation and implementation of the modernization policy. Apparently, according to the author, there was no central authority or decision-making body capable of controlling the competing interests of the various party and state bureaucratic organizations; nor was there a successful effort to coordinate the numerous projects into a coherent whole (pp. 145–47). The results were inefficient and misguided policy choices, inflation, and budget deficits, the combination of which was highly detrimental to China's economic modernization effort. As ill-informed policy choices led to the cancellation of numerous international contracts, the PRC's reputation as a reliable international economic partner was put at serious risk, and relations with its major foreign suppliers of technology and with buyers of its energy products—particularly Japan—were strained.

Lee's conclusion is clear: China's economic policy environment is seriously constrained by the various bureaucratic and factional groups that compete for power and for influence over the decision-making of China's top leadership. He argues convincingly that the vast but inefficient Chinese bureaucracy is the Achilles heel of the current Sino-Japanese relationship, and he predicts that only as China improves its bureaucratic and managerial performance will it be capable of absorbing advanced foreign technology; only then will the two neighbors be able to develop a viable system of mutually beneficial economic cooperation.[6]

This basic theme is echoed by Taylor, who stresses the relevance of the example set by Japan's development experience, specifically the success of Japan's modernizers in inculcating society with the new values and attitudes needed to absorb foreign technology and ideas, while preserving the existing socio-political arrangement. Taylor views Japan's experience as critical for the success of China's economic modernization, which is in the process of replacing earlier policies of "self-reliance" and "self-sufficiency" with new ones linking foreign trade and investment to internal economic and industrial development. This great transformation, underway since the late 1970's, requires fundamental political change and a radical re-

[4] Japanese business and political circles are currently reappraising Japan's economic relations with the Soviet Union. Some view the Soviet intention to accommodate Japanese trading houses in the resource development of Siberia as being linked to Moscow's recent diplomatic overtures to Japan and the prospect of a visit to Tokyo by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. See *The Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Sept. 11, 1986, p. 117.

[5] The nature of pre-1972 Sino-Japanese dealings is described succinctly by Lee: "The absence of diplomatic relations between China and Japan did not always prevent them from concluding nongovernmental economic agreements or using the [Japanese] Export-Import Bank funds . . . . Economic interaction was the most tangible and creative aspect of the Sino-Japanese relationship until 1972 . . . [and] significantly contributed to ultimate diplomatic normalization . . . . " See Lee, p. 13.

[6] On the occasion of Nakasone's unofficial visit to China November 8–9, 1986, Deng Xiaoping told the Japanese prime minister that he was intent on overcoming bureaucratism and determined to promote greater efficiency within the bureaucracy. For details see *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Nov. 9, 1986, p. 1.

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form of China's economic institutions, the outcome of which is highly uncertain. Taylor contends, however, that China's future economic development hinges largely on the ability of the political leadership to bring about attitudinal and organizational changes appropriate to the modernization process.

FOR HIS part, Bedeski concentrates on the international political, strategic, and economic factors leading up to the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) in August of 1978. These include, among others: Japan's growing anxiety over President Jimmy Carter's decision to withdraw US ground forces from South Korea; the long-term Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement successfully concluded in February 1978; genuine Japanese enthusiasm for a special relationship with China; the prospect of pressuring Soviet concessions on the question of the Northern Territories; and the pragmatic thrust of Chinese domestic and foreign policies following Mao's death (p. 184). He weighs these factors carefully and analyzes their ramifications in great detail. He suggests that political intervention by Japan's foremost economic association, the *Keidanren,*[7] and, to some extent, domestic political calculations by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda finally led to Japan's tilt toward China and the PFT.

According to Bedeski, Japan's decision-makers were quite cognizant of the political risks, for China had insisted on the inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" clause, which the Soviet Union has chosen to interpret as a direct challenge to its security. For the Japanese leadership, the risk seemed worth taking, however, particularly in view of the generally cool relations that have prevailed between Japan and the Soviet Union since the close of the Pacific war. Bedeski concludes that China thereby succeeded in drawing Japan into its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Such an interpretation may overstate matters, given Japan's strenuous effort to present the "anti-hegemony" phrase to the Soviet Union as a call for self-restraint on the part of the two signatories and given Tokyo's genuine desire to continue its policy of omnidirectional diplomacy. (These aspirations remain unrealized, however, largely because of the Soviet Union's intransigent attitude toward Japan and selectively narrow view of Sino-Japanese relations.)

Bedeski also makes some interesting points about the link between politics and economics in Sino-Japanese relations since the signing of the PFT. For example, in the course of the evolving Sino-Vietnamese conflict, notes the author, China asked Japan to make radical changes in its foreign policy, seeking to commit the latter to China's anti-hegemony posture (pp. 60, 150). Japan, however, showed no inclination to compromise national political interest for economic gain, and has continued to pursue an independent and conciliatory policy toward Vietnam to this very day, maintaining open economic and political channels to Hanoi.[8] In fact, Japan has not ruled out the possibility of limited détente and economic cooperation with either of China's greatest adversaries, thus indicating its determination to pursue a foreign policy course independent of any other power (pp. 151).

Finally, Bedeski addresses the complex and salient issue of Sino-Japanese entente, and the possibility of a security arrangement linking China, Japan, and the United States. On the basis of extensive corroborating evidence, drawn chiefly from newspaper accounts and interviews, he concludes that a loose strategic alignment linking the three countries is remote, primarily because of the fundamental differences in their foreign policy orientations and objectives and because of the delicate domestic and international political environment in which Japan's defense must operate.

Bedeski also explores the possibility of strategic and military cooperation between Japan and China. His findings reveal widespread disagreement in Japan over collaboration with China in the military sphere. In fact, he demonstrates that military cooperation is negligible, having been largely restricted to exchange visits by military attachés and some high-level personnel. It should be added here that to date there has been no talk of Japan exporting arms or supplying military technology to China, although Sino-Japanese cooperation does now include the exchange of intelligence on the Soviet Union.[9] As both Bedeski and Taylor indicate, however, Japan's constitution, as well as conventional Japanese practice, rules out strategic or military relations with any country other than the United States.

[7]With a membership of over 100 trade and industrial associations and some 700 major firms, *Keidanren*, or the Federation of Economic Organizations, represents Japan's most influential economic association. It continues to play an important role in Sino-Japanese economic relations.

[8]Despite the unresolved Cambodian issue, Japan today is Vietnam's second-largest trading partner after the Soviet Union, even though the total value of this trade is only a modest US$250 million. There is considerable interest in Japan in expanding commercial ties with Vietnam. Besides Japan's formal diplomatic relations with Hanoi, some individual Japanese trading companies and enterprises are now engaged in economic activities with Vietnam; most prominent among them is Nissho Iwai, which maintains an office in Hanoi. The Nichi-Etsu Boeki Kai (Japan-Vietnam Trade Association), a private organization not drawing any public funds and with a membership of about 90 firms and enterprises, functions as the formal framework for Japanese trade with Vietnam.

[9]See *The Japan Economic Journal*, Oct. 18, 1986, p. 6.

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These preclude any kind of security pact, transfer of military technology, or export of arms.

Under the Nakasone administration today, considerable attitudinal changes can be discerned in the Japanese government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with regard to Japan's defense policy. In the face of continuing American pressure on Japan to increase its share in its own defense and in the face of the extraordinary Soviet arms buildup in the Far East, Tokyo's defense policy-makers are now involved in discussions about military cooperation with China.[10] There have been several attempts to implement high-level visits and exchanges between Japan's Self Defense Forces and the China's People's Liberation Army in order to improve defense relations with China, but these have been met with stiff opposition from pro-Taiwan senior LDP Diet members who have managed to block such a venture. Although those favoring strategic-military cooperation with China have become more active since the LDP's overwhelming July 6, 1986, double election victory (in both houses), there is little sense in Japan that joint operations exercises might become a reality in the future.[11] In sum, the potential for military-strategic cooperation between China and Japan is limited at best.

WHAT IS the current state of affairs in Sino-Japanese relations, and what will the future bring? As the works under review here point out, the earlier "honeymoon" between the two nations is over. Recently, differences over economic and political issues have been on the increase, and it seems unlikely that that they will be easily resolved in the future. Hence, in all probability, future relations between the two countries will be stormy at times.

A critical assessment of the future of Sino-Japanese relations must begin with a discussion of China, especially in view of recent political and economic developments there. Chinese student unrest represents a real potential force for destabilizing Sino-Japanese relations. In the past, student protest had been unleashed and manipulated by elements in China's top political leadership in order to achieve a variety of political goals.[12] Significantly, there was large-scale student unrest in September 1985, when students rose against what they called the "Japanese economic invasion of China."[13] The distinctly anti-Japanese tone of the movement reflected widespread Chinese concern over Japan's overwhelming economic presence in the PRC. Although both governments were quick to play down the incident, the potential for future conflict continues to loom large, and any profound analysis of Sino-Japanese relations will have to take account of this potential source of tension.[14]

Because of its extensive role in China's modernization program, Japan may conceivably become a convenient target for growing Chinese domestic discontent over the negative side-effects of that program. For example, with the great success of its rural economic reforms, Chinese leaders must now turn to the modernization of the urban and industrial economy. Among the many obstacles impeding the meaningful reform of these sectors is the principle of the "iron rice bowl,"[15] which is still well entrenched in most of the 400,000-odd state enterprises and their ossified bureaucratic structures. Removing this obstacle alone will prove to be a formidable and unpopular task indeed. Furthermore, China's policy of importing Western—particularly Japanese—technology and production techniques while trying to maintain the basic features of a planned socialist economy, will soon be put to the test. Some of the inevitable contradictions of this risky dualism are already evident and have added to the existing domestic discontent over the imbalances and uncertainties created by the mod-

[10]According to reliable sources, including Director General of the Defense Agency Yuko Kurihara and his predecessor, Koichi Kato, currently a member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Policy Affairs Council.

[11]*The Japan Economic Journal*, op. cit., p. 6.

[12]The Cultural Revolution ranks as the most prominent example. For important works on the subject matter with different levels of analysis see: Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1978; Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, *Son of the Revolution*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1983; and Stanley Rosen, *Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton)*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

[13]*Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 19, 1985, p. 1. Although the student protest, focusing on the rapid expansion of the influx of Japanese consumer goods such as radios, cassette recorders, and television sets, smoldered until December, it received only scant mention in both the Chinese and Japanese press.

[14]In order to acquaint the younger generations and future leaders of the two countries with each other, China and Japan began, at the request of Hu Yaobang, a highly publicized Youth Exchange Program that has been in place since 1984. The stated purpose of Prime Minister Nakasone's November visit to China was to promote this Youth Exchange; Japan pledged 10.4 billion yen for the Youth Center to be completed in 1989, and plans to invite 100 Chinese youths to Japan each year over the next five years.

While it is possible that the current Youth Exchange Program between China and Japan may help to defuse Sino-Japanese tensions somewhat, it is notable that one of Hu Yaobang's reported transgressions was his unilateral establishment of this exchange without having consulted other high-ranking Chinese officials. See *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 9, 1986, p. 1.

[15]"The Principle of the Iron Bowl" or "Eating from the Iron Pot" guarantees lifelong employment to Chinese workers and ensures the continuation of the government practice of bailing out ailing state enterprises. Both practices are detrimental to China's economic performance and have been under criticism recently. Some enterprises have actually had to declare bankruptcy.

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ernization program. Should that discontent turn against Japan, it may seriously rock the Sino-Japanese relationship.

With a US$6 billion (and growing) Chinese trade deficit with Japan, commercial frictions are another area of potential clash between the two countries.[16] For more than a decade (except for the period 1981–83), China has had a substantial trade deficit with its more developed neighbor. The PRC imports Japanese consumer durables, technology, and industrial equipment for its fast-paced industrial modernization and capital construction projects—imports that are depleting the country's scarce reserves of foreign exchange. At the same time, China's overall export earnings declined drastically in 1986, due partially to falling prices for crude oil, which accounts for about 20 per cent of China's overall export earnings. The terms of trade for China's other main exports to Japan—coal and agricultural products—are also generally deteriorating.

In order to defuse some of Beijing's growing discontent, a large Japanese delegation of business and economic leaders visited China in May 1986 to explore new ways to alleviate some of the PRC's trading and export difficulties, which the Japanese view simply as a "structural problem" of relations between two economies at different stages of development. Acting on the recommendations of this fact-finding mission, Japanese business and management experts are now assisting Chinese industrial enterprises with product design, quality control, and modern inventory and delivery management. It is anticipated that this technical assistance will help improve Chinese exports to Japan, which in the past have been plagued by poor quality and unreliable delivery schedules.[17]

Finally, the structural problems afflicting Sino-Japanese trade are further exacerbated by the continuous appreciation of the yen against the dollar. This development has massively increased China's cost of doing business with Japan.

In order to keep its important economic and trade links with Japan intact, and to cope with its serious trade imbalance, China is now increasingly insisting on countertrade (barter) arrangements in its dealings with Japan, even though barter is contrary to the free-trade credo and ideals of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), organizations of which Japan is a member. On the other hand, Tokyo will have to come to terms with Beijing's incessant requests for barter-like transactions in view of China's ever-growing trade deficit.

It appears, however, that the issue is not so much whether Japanese enterprises will be willing to accommodate China's requests for barter, but whether the Chinese side will be able to overcome the difficulties of implementing trade agreements requiring a great deal of coordination within its own commercial bureaucracy. In view of that bureaucracy's record of inefficiency, it could very well be that barter trade with Japan will create more problems than it will solve.

In the energy sector, too, frictions are increasing. The widely acclaimed joint venture begun in 1980 to extract oil from Bohai Bay is currently in great difficulties, with the partners squabbling over prices, apportionment of contracts, low productivity, and technology transfer problems. In fact, according to Japanese reports, the collapse of crude-oil prices in 1986 nearly broke up the Sino-Japanese oil partnership, with the Japanese agreeing to stay only after being assured a larger share of output. On the other hand, there have been Chinese charges that the Japanese are more interested in selling equipment and services than they are in producing oil.[18]

All of this notwithstanding, Japanese industry officials maintain that politics will carry the Bohai project through this difficult period, despite the obvious financial drain on both sides. Since this is the biggest and one of the earliest of several Sino-Japanese joint ventures, China is eager to see that it succeeds. The potential demonstration effect of this particular venture is highly significant; should it fail, Chinese hopes for further Japanese investment would be greatly diminished. According to Japanese news accounts, much Japanese investment in China has already run into seemingly insurmountable bureaucratic red tape, leaving Japanese companies frustrated and hesitant to invest further or re-invest in China.[19]

Finally, there is little point in discussing the future of Sino-Japanese relations without considering the role of the Soviet Union. A change in Soviet attitudes toward Japan may be in the offing, given the possibility of a visit by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to Japan and a Japanese prime minister apparently more willing than any of his recent

[16]For a recent expression of the official Chinese point of view, see Shen Jue Ren, "Expanding Friendship and Promotion of Sino-Japanese Economic and Trade Relations," in *Guoji Maoyi* (Beijing), July 1986, pp. 8–9.

[17]Based on Wada Sachiko, "Aiming for a Balanced Japan-China Trade," in *Boeki to sangyo* (Tokyo), October, 1986, pp. 38–41.

[18]See *Asahi Shinbun* (Tokyo), Apr. 12, 1986, p. 7 (evening edition); *Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun* (Tokyo), Apr. 18, 1986, p. 5; and *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* (Tokyo), Oct. 1, 1986, p. 9.

[19]For a Japanese view on joint venture problems, see Ishida Joji, "Problems Related to Sino-Japanese Ventures," in *Guoji Maoyi*, July 1986, pp. 13–14.

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predecessors to achieve a breakthrough in the longstanding Soviet-Japanese stalemate. According to Japanese sources, it appears that the Soviets are now more prepared than ever before to accommodate Japanese economic interests in their Siberian resource development.[20] Japan's renewed interest in economic involvement in the Soviet Far East may also be encouraged by the Soviets' need to build up foreign-exchange reserves in the wake of falling prices for oil (the major Soviet export to the West) and their growing need to import grain. Since one cannot easily separate the Soviet Union's recent economic overtures toward Japan from its basic political and military thrust into the Pacific area, these recent developments in Soviet-Japanese relations are of great strategic significance and could possibly have a spill-over effect on Japan's relations with China (which has also improved its economic relations with the Soviet Union through trade expansion over the past few years).

THE THREE studies under review here raise a great number of relevant issues in Sino-Japanese relations and offer numerous insights into this important relationship. The studies are perhaps most useful because they provoke further speculation on just how far China and Japan can influence one another's behavior. On the basis of the insights offered by all three authors, it would appear that the interdependence resulting from extensive Sino-Japanese trade and economic relations does not necessarily ensure that the two countries will be able to exercise any decisive political influence on one another, but it is clear that their relationship will inevitably have important political as well as economic dimensions, ones with which both states will have to grapple if their relationship is to continue to develop smoothly.

[20]See *The Japan Economic Journal*, Nov. 15, 1986, p. 1; and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Sept. 11, 1986, pp. 117–18.

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Pitfalls of Détente

Vladimir Tismaneanu

JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL. *How Democracies Perish.* Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1984.

ROBERT V. DANIELS. *Russia. The Roots of Confrontation.* Cambridge, MA, and London, Harvard University Press, 1985.

RICHARD F. STAAR. *USSR Foreign Policies After Detente.* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

HÉLÈNE CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE. *Ni paix, ni guerre. Le nouvel empire soviétique ou du bon usage de la détente.* (Neither Peace nor War. The New Soviet Empire, or Putting Détente to Good Use). Paris, Flammarion, 1986.

DÉTENTE, a term initially coined to describe certain options and strategies, turned into a rhetorical device expressing the unrealized hopes and aspirations of Western elites for coming to terms with the Soviet Union. At the root of the détente concept lies the belief that reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union is indeed a viable possibility. In the heyday of détente in the early 1970's, enthusiasts of that belief fervently espoused the détente process as a good thing in itself and ignored evidence about Soviet duplicity in international relations. Mesmerized by détente's alleged virtues, they were reluctant to make allowances for its vices. Thus, Soviet expansion in the Third World, now a well-established fact, was regarded by many Western statesmen as an ephemeral tendency, deplorable of course, but not a decisive violation of détente. Soviet advances and communist triumphs in Third World countries, such as they were, were often depicted as resulting from "inevitable revolutions," an ineluctable outcome of deep-working historical forces.

Writing with the benefit of hindsight, the initial architects of détente, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, have not spared their literary gifts in emphasizing what they had actually meant when embarking on the path of détente. According to them, the main purpose of that policy was to prevent further expansion of the Soviet empire without risking the fate of human civilization through a military showdown with the USSR. Détente was not a lamentable way of yielding to Soviet ambitions, but rather a means of bringing the Soviets to accept the rules of a decent diplomatic game. Nixon and Kissinger conclude that détente was conceived as a policy to assure honorable survival of the West; its failure has to be attributed to an all-corroding malaise brought on by the debacle in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal. Had American morale been in better shape, less plagued with self-resentment and guilt complexes, détente would have provided an excellent strategy for dealing with America's major rival.

A persistent illusion underlies these belated rationalizations—that the West can reach significant and enduring agreements with Soviet leaders, and that the Soviet concept of internationalism, the Leninist apotheosis of world proletarian revolution, is definitely a thing of the past. Indeed, it is argued that the West is now dealing with a techno-bureaucratic elite, a group of people interested above all in effectiveness and stability. International class struggle, albeit invoked in Soviet party statements, is dismissed as nothing more than an ideological ritual.

Today, when it comes to tallying the fruits of détente, its palpable results, the rationale for the détente process appears inherently flawed. It was as if, ignoring the darker side of reality, a resolute decision was made to forget the reason for the Cold War and to have no thoughts of the potential for Soviet double-talking and double-thinking. Why,

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precisely, leaders subscribed to this essentially distorted perspective no one has really explained. But one can hardly refute Jean-François Revel's demonstration that the final upshot of that process was a distressing demoralization of the West and a growing pessimism about the prospects for democracies in their contest with an obstinate, tough-minded enemy.

REVEL, one of France's leading political thinkers, was for many years regarded with suspicion by intellectuals addicted to all sorts of Marxist fantasies. Together with Raymond Aron, Boris Souvarine, Alain Besançon, Annie Kriegel, Branko Lazitch, Claude Lefort, Pierre Hassner, Eugène Ionesco, and not too many other prominent figures, Revel was anti-communist when such an attitude was less than fashionable on the Paris Left Bank.

Revel's political views, now shared by many French intellectuals, contradict the rosy image of a harmless Soviet power. He has been unrelenting in admonishing the French political class that anti-Americanism is not going to pay off, that France's long-term interests lie in a close alliance with the United States. Ironically, it is François Mitterrand, a Socialist president, who seems to subscribe to Revel's views, whereas traditional leftist (and Gaullist) anti-Atlantist phobias have remained prevalent among such declining groupings as the "New Right," a sector within the Socialist Party associated with Jean-Pierre Chevènement, and the increasingly marginal French Communist Party.[1]

In his book, *How Democracies Perish,* Revel voices what he sees as the crux of the problem of détente—the almost suicidal behavior of Western democracies. As he develops his main theme, the fateful historical competition between democracy and its totalitarian enemy, Revel argues that democracy may one day appear as a mere *accident de parcours*—a short-lived experiment in genuine political freedom. In his words: "Communism is more skillful, more persevering than democracy in defending itself. Democracy tends to ignore, even deny, threats to its existence because it loathes doing what is needed to counter them" (p. 4). The "industry of blame," is to be regarded as a main agent of dissolution: "Democratic civilization is the first in history to blame itself because another power is working to destroy it. The distinguishing mark of our century is not so much communism's determination to erase democracy from our planet, or its frequent success in pursuing that end, as it is the humility with which democracy is not only consenting to its own obliteration but is contriving to legitimize its deadliest enemy's victory" (p. 7).

In Revel's view, détente was the climax of a decadent syndrome on the part of Western elites. Its advocates drew from the legacy of those who had been seduced by Stalin's promises and thereby accepted the enslavement of half of Europe. Revel approvingly quotes the late Boris Souvarine, whose description of Stalin's deceptive method is equally applicable to the supposedly reconstructed successors to that dictator: "Stalin's policy is made up of caution, patience, intrigue, infiltration, corruption, terrorism, exploitation of human weakness. It only moves on to frontal attack when it cannot lose, against an adversary of its choice who is defeated in advance" (p. 97).

Henry Kissinger himself, the great artisan of détente, became convinced of the insatiable Soviet lust for domination. In a passage from his memoirs, quoted by Revel, the former Secretary of State admitted that "Soviet diplomacy knows no resting places. A scheme is presented as a major contribution to relaxing tensions; if we will only accept it, there will be an 'improvement in the atmosphere.' But as often as not, no sooner has one agreement been completed than the Kremlin advances another, which is pursued with characteristic single-mindedness and with the identical argument that failure to proceed will sour the atmosphere" (p. 111).

Détente, then, in the Soviet mind, has been a marvellous way to placate Western apprehensions, a nonbinding pledge and, in the last analysis, a semantic fraud. Indeed, looking back, how can one sincerely believe that détente (or "relaxation") introduced a truce of sorts, when it was precisely when the détente process reached its pinnacle that the USSR attained its most impressive level of military capability and succeeded in creating for itself an unprecedented power projection capability? For many Western analysts, Leonid Brezhnev was a dull, morose bureaucrat, and his lack of imagination was incontrovertible, but it was this same Brezhnev who presided over the transformation of the Soviet Union from a regional into a global empire. Brezhnev's achievement resulted in a new geopolitical equation with which we are now compelled to live.

NOT surprisingly, there is an overall pessimism in Revel's reading of contemporary history. After all, Soviet leaders continue to project their dogmatic obsessions onto the world arena and to look at international politics as a ground for unremitting confrontation.[2] The modernization of Soviet foreign policy has not meant a reappraisal of ultimate values and goals, but rather a revamping of

[1]For a provocative appraisal of French political debates under Mitterrand's presidency, see Serge July, *Les Années Mitterrand* (The Mitterrand Years), Paris, Grasset, 1986.

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methods, a refinement of tactics. The crude language of traditional Soviet propaganda may have been polished; more attractive, more sophisticated, possibly more Western-looking figures may have come to the fore; but the priorities of Soviet foreign policy follow an unmistakable pattern defined by Lenin and faithfully observed by all his successors. What they call "international solidarity" is but a means to usurp Marxist categories and popular expectations in the Third World to further the Soviet imperialist agenda.

Revel, like Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Pipes, or Adam Ulam, recognizes that Soviet foreign policy does not proceed haphazardly. On the contrary, it is a well-designed, carefully coordinated undertaking, with strategy and tactics, fronts, and avant-gardes.

The world communist movement is only one of the levers employed to disseminate the Soviet worldview. Public opinion, primarily in Western Europe, is another. Pacifists, ecologists, socialists of all shades, not to mention dyed-in-the-wool communists, denounce the failures of democracy and give vent to their discomfiture with "alienation" and "reification" engendered by the *Kulturindustrie* of "late capitalism." Though many of these people may not buy Soviet demagogy, they remain viscerally inimical to Western values and their institutional manifestations, and ready to endorse the "neutralist" (in effect, anti-American) scenario.[3]

Peace movements in the West, though many of them are well-intentioned, can, nonetheless, become another weapon in the Soviet arsenal of deception and subversion. While Western peace activists claim to be opposed to the arms buildup of both superpowers equally, they actually undermine self-confidence only in the West. In the meantime, independent peace activists in the Soviet bloc are bludgeoned, harassed, besmirched. Pacifism in the East is tolerated and encouraged by the *nomenklatura* for external consumption only. As for the nations subjugated by the USSR, they know too well—they have experienced it firsthand—the value of Soviet professions of good faith.

Václav Havel, the celebrated Czech playwright and Charter 77 activist, has pointed in a memorable essay to the absurd irrelevance of unidirectional anti-war initiatives. Recalling the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Czech dissident writer gave vent to his own and the Chartists' irritation with the political cant of self-righteous peace groups in the West: "Seriously, what are we to think of a peace movement, a European peace movement, which is virtually unaware of the only war conducted today by a European state? As for the argument that the victims of the aggression and their defenders enjoy the sympathies of Western establishments and so are not worthy of support from the left, its incredible ideological opportunism can provoke only one reaction—total disgust and a sense of limitless hopelessness."[4]

There is a noticeable resemblance between East European dissidents' confessions of feeling isolated and abandoned and Revel's despair over the democracies' piecemeal surrender. Conciliatory openings toward the Soviet Union have resulted in nothing but heightened Soviet power and haughty disdain of those who place a wager on Soviet good intentions. Educated in the cult of force and intrigue, Soviet leaders have played on democratic vulnerabilities and, particularly, on the reluctance of some Western leaders to meet their moral and political obligations.

Although Revel may be accused of overstating at times the incurable malady of the West, to disregard his articulate views as unduly alarmist conservative projections would be profoundly deleterious for Western political and intellectual elites. Perhaps a showdown with the Soviet Union can be avoided, but defeatism cannot bring about this outcome. As Revel warns us, it takes moral courage and political willingness to comprehend the nature of the adversary and devise means to foil his plans.[5]

More than two millenia ago, Demosthenes warned his fellow Athe-

[2]They may come with softening stances, but their global perceptions are still indebted to the old Leninist *kto-kogo* (who-whom) paradigm. From Stalin to Gorbachev, identification of revolutionary impulses with the interests of Soviet foreign policy has remained a sacred tenet. It is only natural then that Soviet interpretations of the origins of both World War II and the Cold War have not undergone significant modifications since Stalin's times. Boris Ponomarev, now an octogenarian, but still a member of the Central Committee, has been replaced as head of the CPSU International Department by the tandem Anatoliy Dobrynin–Vadim Medvedev, no less committed to these views than their predecessor.

[3]Intellectual estrangement, an endemic disease of Western anti-Establishment elites was impressively debunked by Paul Hollander. See his *Political Pilgrims. Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba*, New York, Harper & Row, 1983.

[4]See Václav Havel, "An Anatomy of Reticence," in *Cross Currents* (Ann Arbor, MI), No. 5, 1986, p. 16.

[5]Revel's views are shared by many Western intellectuals: suffice it to recall here the works of André Glucksmann, Bernard-Henri Lévy, Cornelius Castoriadis, or Alain Besançon, or in this country those of authors like Richard Pipes, Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhoretz, and Walter Laqueur. See André Glucksmann, *La force du vertige* (Vertigo), Paris, Grasset, 1983; Bernard-Henry Lévy, *Questions de principe* (Questions of Principle), Paris, Denoël/Gonthier, 1983; Cornelius Castoriadis, *Domaines de l'homme* (The Human Domain), Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1986; Alain Besançon, *The Rise of the Gulag. Intellectual Origins of Leninism*, New York, Continuum, 1981; Richard Pipes, *Survival Is Not Enough*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1984; and Norman Podhoretz, *The Bloody Crossroads*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986.

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nians about Philip of Macedon's treacherous and mischievous tactics. It was unfortunately an unheeded warning and those who derided it came to grief. The nuclear age is certainly a perplexing reality, but trying to turn fear of nuclear war into a rationale for voluntary submission to Soviet *diktat* betrays both historical myopia and an alarming decline in the sense of responsibility.

PROFESSOR Robert Daniels is too knowledgeable a scholar of the Soviet Union and the United States to misinterpret the epoch of détente:

In actuality, the relationship was fragile and transitory, the expression of interests that happened to coincide rather than of true respect and confidence. Détente was quickly undermined. On the one hand, it falsely encouraged Americans to expect human-rights concessions and sphere-of-interest restraint from the Soviets; on the other, it provided cover for the Soviets' behind-the-scenes maneuvers including the development of new missiles and the accumulation of influence in the third world." (p. 326)

As now seems obvious, détente was an extraordinary windfall for Soviet global strategists. Daniels offers a balanced description of the actual results of détente, which inexorably led to the new cold war. Encouraged by Washington's somewhat isolationist mood after Vietnam, writes Daniels, the USSR "began to intervene directly in third world countries to implant Moscow-dominated 'governments of socialist orientation' " (p. 349). This Soviet imperialist drive was shrouded in Marxist jargon about the imperatives of social and national liberation, and, in this fashion, an ideological alibi was concocted for increasing Soviet expansionism in the Third World.

Daniels depicts the Soviet Union today as a power burdened with enormous domestic problems and immense foreign commitments, whose political elite acts on the basis of ingrained ideological considerations that are being superseded by traditional Russian great-power interests. In his words:

Although Marxism-Leninism is still the language in which the Soviet leaders justify their policies and legitimize their rule, it became outmoded long ago as a political program. As an explanation of the world, it does not work; as propaganda, it is exhausted both in the Soviet Union and in the industrialized world where it was supposed to find its following. The Soviet Union is a conservative post-revolutionary state relying heavily on the imperialist menace to justify totalitarian closure and to sustain its ambiguous appeal to third-world nationalists. (p. 360)

Yet there is an optimistic strain in Daniels's reading of future Soviet evolution. He thinks reforms in the Soviet Union can and should be seen as a real possibility. According to him, the conservative bureaucrats will have to come to grips with this vital need. Consequently, a "Moscow Spring" is not unthinkable, and such an occurrence would presumably put an end to most of the West's forebodings. "Today," he writes, "the revolutionary cycle in Russia is long overdue for a new turn, away from Stalinist conservatism and toward a revival of the Revolution's early hopes for freedom and equality. The events of the Prague Spring of 1968, when the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia tried to democratize its own system from within, indicate the type of renewal for which Russia is ready." Whereas the Prague Spring was thwarted by Russian intervention, "if Russia undertakes reform, there is no one who will intervene to stop it," Daniels concludes (p. 363).

Several points can be made with regard to this analysis. First, the problems of reforming the fossilized Soviet system of today are somewhat more complicated than Daniels presents. Unlike the situation in Dubček's Czechoslovakia, in the USSR there is no cohesive elite interested in promoting a liberal-minded, or social-democratic overhaul of the system. Also, the USSR is a multinational empire and the leadership in Moscow has to reckon with the secondary effects of any attempt to reform the political center. Furthermore, the opposition of various interest groups is not to be overlooked: the military would not welcome any weakening of the Soviet hold on satellite countries, and reforms in the USSR are likely to unleash centrifugal trends in those countries.[6]

Second, Soviet ideology is the ultimate version of "false consciousness," the opium of the *nomenklatura*: communist bureaucrats have to act as if they believe the statements they force their subjects to internalize. While true believers have long since vanished, ideology is still there, the epitome of the system's sclerosis. In Alexander Zinoviev's succint formulation, Sovietism "is a uniform state ideology inculcated by the systematic processing of all citizens without exception. This is effected by the concomitant ideological control of the whole realm of social consciousness."[7]

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[6]Gorbachev's current quandary is more than eloquent with regard to the perplexities created by any effort to regenerate the Soviet system. With regard to the issue of reforms in the USSR, see my study "Neo-Stalinism and Reform Communism," in *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Summer 1986, pp. 259–80.

[7]Quoted by Charles Janson in his review of Zinoviev's latest book *Die Macht des Unglaubens* (The Power of Unbelief), Munich and Zurich, Piper, 1986, in *Soviet Analyst* (Richmond, England), Dec. 17, 1986, p. 4.

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Third, a messianic posture is still the mainstay of Soviet ideology. To be sure, the authenticity of its Leninism can justifiably be doubted, but what really matters is its effectiveness as a fundamental set of binding guidelines and assumptions about the "sense of history." Thus, Soviet use of Marxist-Leninist ideology is more than self-serving rhetoric. Détente has not changed this situation nor has it effected a softening of that ideology.

IN his book, *USSR Foreign Policies After Detente,* Richard F. Staar develops the argument that Soviet foreign policy strategies are subordinated to long-term ideological objectives. He maintains that the continuity of Soviet foreign policy, a phenomenon hard to contest, stems primarily from its ideological nature. Ostensibly less rigidly doctrinaire than its domestic counterpart, Soviet foreign policy is no less attached to a mythological interpretation of world history: the forces of "progress," i.e., the Soviet bloc and its allies, will eventually overcome the "imperialist" camp. Indeed, the style of Soviet terminology has improved since the days of Andrey Zhdanov's notorious Manichean formulations, but it is still saturated with clichés about the "international competition between the two social systems." An authoritarian regime has to create continuously the figure of its enemy, to demonize it in order to keep its subjects loyal. Organic solidarity has to be maintained by ceaseless references to alleged external threats and perfidious stratagems employed by the enemy.[8]

Gorbachev's "smiling offensive" has not altered this truth about Marxist-Leninist regimes. Staar convincingly documents the scope and intensity of Soviet anti-Western operations. His book substantiates many of Revel's apprehensions and provides us with a disturbing picture of a large-scale, well-organized, and quite effective apparatus dedicated to the subversion of the basic values and institutions cherished by the Western political tradition.

Staar is not convinced that Marxism-Leninism is irrevocably obsolete in the Soviet system. On the contrary, he argues that the foreign policy of the USSR is still inspired by ideological dogma: "According to this doctrine, the world revolutionary process has no timetable and may indeed experience temporary setbacks. In the long run, however, those who sit in the Kremlin believe that their political and socio-economic system will prevail over that of the West in general and of the United States in particular" (p. xxi). Clearly, Staar does not dismiss the Soviet doctrine of "international class struggle" and conflict between "the progressive" and "reactionary forces" as meaningless ritualistic incantations.

Although far from obsolete as a technique of domination and a means of manipulation, Soviet ideology is certainly extinguished as a source of inspiration for Western radical groups. No one in the West takes seriously any more Soviet braggadocio about the superiority of "real existing socialism." By the same token, institutional Leninism seems a pale shadow of the original revolutionary faith. As Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer—interested in facilitating the crystallization of a self-styled "Euroleft"—affirmed after the occupation of Afghanistan and the military coup in Poland, the revolutionary capital of the October Revolution has long been exhausted.[9]

Destitute as it is from the viewpoint of traditional (Western) Marxism, Soviet ideology is nevertheless able to simulate modernity when exported to Third World tyrannies. Remarkably unsuited for leftist-radical groups in the industrially advanced democracies, Leninism is still accepted and practiced by Third World revolutionary prophets. Besides its internal functions (socialization, infantilization, mobilization, legitimization, etc.), Leninism offers power-hungry revolutionary elites the means for attaining that power.

A HIGHLY respected analyst of Soviet affairs, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse shows in her most recent book how Soviet military and political penetration in certain "hot areas" of the Third World helped the emergence of "the second empire" under Brezhnev. Describing the stages of this process of emergence, the sinuous path followed by Soviet strategists to attain the goal of expanded global influence, she forcefully highlights the role of proxies as well as the gullibility of certain Western leaders during the euphoric days of détente.

In Carrère d'Encausse's opinion, Soviet foreign policy swings between moderation and militancy. Since Leonid Brezhnev's rule spun over almost two decades of Soviet history, he embodied both moderation, in the Helsinki agreements, and militancy, in promoting an extra-European empire (p. 377).

Carrère d'Encausse's conclusions are not particularly flattering for those enamored with détente. With good reason, she maintains that the Soviet leap forward in the Third World was carried out under the umbrella of détente. To Western interpretations of détente as indivisible, the Soviets have counterposed

[8]See Arnold Beichman, "The Demonisation of America," *Encounter* (London), January 1987, pp. 37–40.

[9]For a penetrating analysis of the relations between Soviet and Italian Communists, see Joan Barth Urban, *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party*, Ithaca, NY, and London, Cornell University Press, 1986.

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their view of détente as a *divisible* process. In her opinion, any analyst of Soviet affairs should bear in mind the more than flexible and quite subjective Soviet treatment of international commitments.

This illuminating study contradicts the conventional image of a Soviet immobility under Brezhnev's gerontocratic rule. Internal petrification does not necessarily lead to stagnation in foreign policy, and Soviet international behavior "can acquire its own autonomy and dynamics" (p. 360). This perspective converges with Seweryn Bialer's formulation of the nature of contemporary Soviet communism: "This then is the Soviet paradox of today and the foreseeable future, which both its leaders and the West have to face squarely in the 1980's: internal decline coupled with awesome military power directed toward external goals."[10]

Soviet activities in the Third World work in favor of any developments leading to change in the global balance of power.[11] A whole army of ideological experts has been mobilized to explain and vindicate "socialist" transformations undertaken by Third World neo-Leninist "vanguard" movements.

As for Gorbachev, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse deems that his strategy, codified in documents of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February/March 1986, consists of an "updated détente." In other words, the Soviet General Secretary takes the status quo for an unquestionable reality, and any further agreements should therefore take it for granted. Hence, Gorbachev's strategy can be easily reduced to two notions: *détente* and *normalization*. As Carrère d'Encausse puts its: "In the complicated space of East-West relations, i.e., in the rivalry between superpowers, the Third World is a decisive stake—it is not the center of the debate, but the place where the correlation of forces can be modified in the most convenient and least dangerous way" (p.373).

NEGOTIATING with the Soviet Union is an onerous obligation in this nuclear age. Whether or not they enjoy talking to Soviet leaders, Western statesmen have hardly any reasonable alternative to dialogue.[12] This is a fate that not even the most intransigently conservative American president could escape. The problem, however, is to how to jettison illusions about the trustworthiness of Soviet promises and how to set, as firmly as possible, conditions to which the Soviets would not only accede formally, but which they would also fulfill practically.

Writing in 1946, one year before the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, Arthur Koestler suggested the following minimal code of Soviet behavior as the basis for East-West relations: "A state which constructs a Maginot line of censorship, then fires off its propaganda from behind the shelter of this line, is committing psychological warfare. The Western powers should demand: (1) free circulation of foreign newspapers, periodicals, books, and films in the Soviet Union; (2) reforms in the Soviet system of censorship (if it must remain in existence) that would allow information about the outside world to circulate freely in the USSR; (3) free access for accredited journalists, parliamentarians, and others to the territory occupied by the Soviet Union; (4) an end to restrictions on the entry of foreigners to the USSR and the departure of Soviet citizens from the USSR; and (5) active cooperation between the USSR and the Western powers in organizing travel abroad through exchange programs for students, teachers, writers, workers, etc."[13] Reading this four-decades-old prescription and pondering how little of this basis for East-West relations has actually been realized since that time, can help one understand why Cassandras have never been popular, even though, or precisely because, they refuse to conceal the painful truth.

[10]See Seweryn Bialer, *The Soviet Paradox. External Expansion, Internal Decline*, New York, Knopf, 1986, p. 171; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, Cambridge, MA, Winthrops, 1981.

[11]For detailed analyses of Soviet strategy in the Third World, see Robert Cassen, Ed., *Soviet Interests in the Third World*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1985; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "A Third World Policy Waits for Gorbachev," in *Orbis*, Summer 1986, pp. 355–64.

[12]For a convincing approach to the dilemmas of Soviet-American relations, see Adam Ulam, *Dangerous Relations. The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983.

[13]See *The New York Times*, Mar. 10, 1946, as quoted by Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, *Utopia in Power*, New York, Summit Books, 1986, p. 652.

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